Index: mozilla/security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c =================================================================== RCS file: /cvsroot/mozilla/security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c,v retrieving revision 1.80 diff -pU10 -r1.80 mozilla/security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c --- mozilla/security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c +++ mozilla/security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c @@ -33,85 +33,85 @@ * and other provisions required by the GPL or the LGPL. If you do not delete * the provisions above, a recipient may use your version of this file under * the terms of any one of the MPL, the GPL or the LGPL. * * ***** END LICENSE BLOCK ***** */ /* * This file implements PKCS 11 on top of our existing security modules * * For more information about PKCS 11 See PKCS 11 Token Inteface Standard. * This implementation has two slots: - * slot 1 is our generic crypto support. It does not require login. + * slot 1 is our generic crypto support. It does not require login. * It supports Public Key ops, and all they bulk ciphers and hashes. * It can also support Private Key ops for imported Private keys. It does * not have any token storage. - * slot 2 is our private key support. It requires a login before use. It + * slot 2 is our private key support. It requires a login before use. It * can store Private Keys and Certs as token objects. Currently only private * keys and their associated Certificates are saved on the token. * * In this implementation, session objects are only visible to the session * that created or generated them. */ #include "seccomon.h" #include "secitem.h" #include "secport.h" #include "blapi.h" #include "pqgutil.h" #include "pkcs11.h" #include "pkcs11i.h" #include "lowkeyi.h" #include "pcert.h" #include "sechash.h" #include "secder.h" #include "secdig.h" -#include "lowpbe.h" /* We do PBE below */ +#include "lowpbe.h" /* We do PBE below */ #include "pkcs11t.h" #include "secoid.h" #include "alghmac.h" #include "softoken.h" #include "secasn1.h" #include "secerr.h" #include "pcert.h" -#include "ssl3prot.h" /* for SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH */ +#include "ssl3prot.h" /* for SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH */ #include "prprf.h" #define __PASTE(x,y) x##y /* * we renamed all our internal functions, get the correct * definitions for them... */ #undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO #undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST #define CK_EXTERN extern #define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(func) \ - CK_RV __PASTE(NS,func) -#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 1 + CK_RV __PASTE(NS,func) +#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 1 #include "pkcs11f.h" static void sftk_Null(void *data, PRBool freeit) { return; } #ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC extern SECStatus EC_DecodeParams(const SECItem *encodedParams, - ECParams **ecparams); + ECParams **ecparams); #ifdef EC_DEBUG #define SEC_PRINT(str1, str2, num, sitem) \ printf("pkcs11c.c:%s:%s (keytype=%d) [len=%d]\n", \ str1, str2, num, sitem->len); \ for (i = 0; i < sitem->len; i++) { \ - printf("%02x:", sitem->data[i]); \ + printf("%02x:", sitem->data[i]); \ } \ printf("\n") #else #define SEC_PRINT(a, b, c, d) #endif #endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ /* * free routines.... Free local type allocated data, and convert * other free routines to the destroy signature. @@ -140,47 +140,47 @@ sftk_cdmf2des(unsigned char *cdmfkey, un unsigned char key2[8] = { 0xef, 0x2c, 0x04, 0x1c, 0xe6, 0x38, 0x2f, 0xe6 }; unsigned char enc_src[8]; unsigned char enc_dest[8]; unsigned int leng,i; DESContext *descx; SECStatus rv; /* zero the parity bits */ for (i=0; i < 8; i++) { - enc_src[i] = cdmfkey[i] & 0xfe; + enc_src[i] = cdmfkey[i] & 0xfe; } /* encrypt with key 1 */ descx = DES_CreateContext(key1, NULL, NSS_DES, PR_TRUE); if (descx == NULL) return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; rv = DES_Encrypt(descx, enc_dest, &leng, 8, enc_src, 8); DES_DestroyContext(descx,PR_TRUE); if (rv != SECSuccess) return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; /* xor source with des, zero the parity bits and depricate the key*/ for (i=0; i < 8; i++) { - if (i & 1) { - enc_src[i] = (enc_src[i] ^ enc_dest[i]) & 0xfe; - } else { - enc_src[i] = (enc_src[i] ^ enc_dest[i]) & 0x0e; - } + if (i & 1) { + enc_src[i] = (enc_src[i] ^ enc_dest[i]) & 0xfe; + } else { + enc_src[i] = (enc_src[i] ^ enc_dest[i]) & 0x0e; + } } /* encrypt with key 2 */ descx = DES_CreateContext(key2, NULL, NSS_DES, PR_TRUE); if (descx == NULL) return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; rv = DES_Encrypt(descx, deskey, &leng, 8, enc_src, 8); DES_DestroyContext(descx,PR_TRUE); if (rv != SECSuccess) return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; - /* set the corret parity on our new des key */ + /* set the corret parity on our new des key */ sftk_FormatDESKey(deskey, 8); return CKR_OK; } /* NSC_DestroyObject destroys an object. */ CK_RV NSC_DestroyObject(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject) { SFTKSlot *slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession); @@ -192,39 +192,39 @@ NSC_DestroyObject(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSes * This whole block just makes sure we really can destroy the * requested object. */ session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); if (session == NULL) { return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; } object = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hObject,session); if (object == NULL) { - sftk_FreeSession(session); - return CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID; + sftk_FreeSession(session); + return CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID; } /* don't destroy a private object if we aren't logged in */ if ((!slot->isLoggedIn) && (slot->needLogin) && - (sftk_isTrue(object,CKA_PRIVATE))) { - sftk_FreeSession(session); - sftk_FreeObject(object); - return CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN; + (sftk_isTrue(object,CKA_PRIVATE))) { + sftk_FreeSession(session); + sftk_FreeObject(object); + return CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN; } /* don't destroy a token object if we aren't in a rw session */ if (((session->info.flags & CKF_RW_SESSION) == 0) && - (sftk_isTrue(object,CKA_TOKEN))) { - sftk_FreeSession(session); - sftk_FreeObject(object); - return CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY; + (sftk_isTrue(object,CKA_TOKEN))) { + sftk_FreeSession(session); + sftk_FreeObject(object); + return CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY; } sftk_DeleteObject(session,object); sftk_FreeSession(session); /* * get some indication if the object is destroyed. Note: this is not * 100%. Someone may have an object reference outstanding (though that * should not be the case by here. Also note that the object is "half" @@ -242,148 +242,148 @@ NSC_DestroyObject(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSes */ /* * return a context based on the SFTKContext type. */ SFTKSessionContext * sftk_ReturnContextByType(SFTKSession *session, SFTKContextType type) { switch (type) { - case SFTK_ENCRYPT: - case SFTK_DECRYPT: - return session->enc_context; - case SFTK_HASH: - return session->hash_context; - case SFTK_SIGN: - case SFTK_SIGN_RECOVER: - case SFTK_VERIFY: - case SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER: - return session->hash_context; + case SFTK_ENCRYPT: + case SFTK_DECRYPT: + return session->enc_context; + case SFTK_HASH: + return session->hash_context; + case SFTK_SIGN: + case SFTK_SIGN_RECOVER: + case SFTK_VERIFY: + case SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER: + return session->hash_context; } return NULL; } /* * change a context based on the SFTKContext type. */ void sftk_SetContextByType(SFTKSession *session, SFTKContextType type, - SFTKSessionContext *context) + SFTKSessionContext *context) { switch (type) { - case SFTK_ENCRYPT: - case SFTK_DECRYPT: - session->enc_context = context; - break; - case SFTK_HASH: - session->hash_context = context; - break; - case SFTK_SIGN: - case SFTK_SIGN_RECOVER: - case SFTK_VERIFY: - case SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER: - session->hash_context = context; - break; + case SFTK_ENCRYPT: + case SFTK_DECRYPT: + session->enc_context = context; + break; + case SFTK_HASH: + session->hash_context = context; + break; + case SFTK_SIGN: + case SFTK_SIGN_RECOVER: + case SFTK_VERIFY: + case SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER: + session->hash_context = context; + break; } return; } /* * code to grab the context. Needed by every C_XXXUpdate, C_XXXFinal, * and C_XXX function. The function takes a session handle, the context type, * and wether or not the session needs to be multipart. It returns the context, * and optionally returns the session pointer (if sessionPtr != NULL) if session * pointer is returned, the caller is responsible for freeing it. */ static CK_RV sftk_GetContext(CK_SESSION_HANDLE handle,SFTKSessionContext **contextPtr, - SFTKContextType type, PRBool needMulti, SFTKSession **sessionPtr) + SFTKContextType type, PRBool needMulti, SFTKSession **sessionPtr) { SFTKSession *session; SFTKSessionContext *context; session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(handle); if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; context = sftk_ReturnContextByType(session,type); /* make sure the context is valid */ if((context==NULL)||(context->type!=type)||(needMulti&&!(context->multi))){ sftk_FreeSession(session); - return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED; + return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED; } *contextPtr = context; if (sessionPtr != NULL) { - *sessionPtr = session; + *sessionPtr = session; } else { - sftk_FreeSession(session); + sftk_FreeSession(session); } return CKR_OK; } /* ************** Crypto Functions: Encrypt ************************ */ /* * All the NSC_InitXXX functions have a set of common checks and processing they * all need to do at the beginning. This is done here. */ static CK_RV sftk_InitGeneric(SFTKSession *session,SFTKSessionContext **contextPtr, - SFTKContextType ctype,SFTKObject **keyPtr, - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_KEY_TYPE *keyTypePtr, - CK_OBJECT_CLASS pubKeyType, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation) + SFTKContextType ctype,SFTKObject **keyPtr, + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_KEY_TYPE *keyTypePtr, + CK_OBJECT_CLASS pubKeyType, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation) { SFTKObject *key = NULL; SFTKAttribute *att; SFTKSessionContext *context; /* We can only init if there is not current context active */ if (sftk_ReturnContextByType(session,ctype) != NULL) { - return CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE; + return CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE; } /* find the key */ if (keyPtr) { key = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hKey,session); if (key == NULL) { - return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; - } + return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; + } - /* make sure it's a valid key for this operation */ - if (((key->objclass != CKO_SECRET_KEY) && (key->objclass != pubKeyType)) - || !sftk_isTrue(key,operation)) { - sftk_FreeObject(key); - return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - } - /* get the key type */ - att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE); - if (att == NULL) { - sftk_FreeObject(key); - return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - } - PORT_Assert(att->attrib.ulValueLen == sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE)); - if (att->attrib.ulValueLen != sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE)) { - sftk_FreeAttribute(att); - sftk_FreeObject(key); - return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; - } - PORT_Memcpy(keyTypePtr, att->attrib.pValue, sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE)); - sftk_FreeAttribute(att); - *keyPtr = key; + /* make sure it's a valid key for this operation */ + if (((key->objclass != CKO_SECRET_KEY) && (key->objclass != pubKeyType)) + || !sftk_isTrue(key,operation)) { + sftk_FreeObject(key); + return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + } + /* get the key type */ + att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE); + if (att == NULL) { + sftk_FreeObject(key); + return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + } + PORT_Assert(att->attrib.ulValueLen == sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE)); + if (att->attrib.ulValueLen != sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE)) { + sftk_FreeAttribute(att); + sftk_FreeObject(key); + return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; + } + PORT_Memcpy(keyTypePtr, att->attrib.pValue, sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE)); + sftk_FreeAttribute(att); + *keyPtr = key; } /* allocate the context structure */ context = (SFTKSessionContext *)PORT_Alloc(sizeof(SFTKSessionContext)); if (context == NULL) { - if (key) sftk_FreeObject(key); - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + if (key) sftk_FreeObject(key); + return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; } context->type = ctype; context->multi = PR_TRUE; context->cipherInfo = NULL; context->hashInfo = NULL; context->doPad = PR_FALSE; context->padDataLength = 0; context->key = key; context->blockSize = 0; @@ -392,957 +392,957 @@ sftk_InitGeneric(SFTKSession *session,SF } /* NSC_CryptInit initializes an encryption/Decryption operation. */ /* This function is used by NSC_EncryptInit, NSC_DecryptInit, * NSC_WrapKey, NSC_UnwrapKey, * NSC_SignInit, NSC_VerifyInit (via sftk_InitCBCMac), * The only difference in their uses is the value of etype. */ static CK_RV sftk_CryptInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE etype, - SFTKContextType contextType, PRBool isEncrypt) + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE etype, + SFTKContextType contextType, PRBool isEncrypt) { SFTKSession *session; SFTKObject *key; SFTKSessionContext *context; SFTKAttribute *att; CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS *rc2_param; #if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5 CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS *rc5_param; SECItem rc5Key; #endif CK_KEY_TYPE key_type; CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; unsigned effectiveKeyLength; unsigned char newdeskey[24]; PRBool useNewKey=PR_FALSE; int t; crv = sftk_MechAllowsOperation(pMechanism->mechanism, etype); if (crv != CKR_OK) - return crv; + return crv; session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session,&context,contextType,&key,hKey,&key_type, - isEncrypt ?CKO_PUBLIC_KEY:CKO_PRIVATE_KEY, etype); - + isEncrypt ?CKO_PUBLIC_KEY:CKO_PRIVATE_KEY, etype); + if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeSession(session); - return crv; + sftk_FreeSession(session); + return crv; } context->doPad = PR_FALSE; switch(pMechanism->mechanism) { case CKM_RSA_PKCS: case CKM_RSA_X_509: - if (key_type != CKK_RSA) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - context->multi = PR_FALSE; - if (isEncrypt) { - NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv); - if (pubKey == NULL) { - break; - } - context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PublicModulusLen(pubKey); - context->cipherInfo = (void *)pubKey; - context->update = (SFTKCipher) - (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RSA_X_509 - ? RSA_EncryptRaw : RSA_EncryptBlock); - } else { - NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv); - if (privKey == NULL) { - break; - } - context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PrivateModulusLen(privKey); - context->cipherInfo = (void *)privKey; - context->update = (SFTKCipher) - (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RSA_X_509 - ? RSA_DecryptRaw : RSA_DecryptBlock); - } - context->destroy = sftk_Null; - break; + if (key_type != CKK_RSA) { + crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + break; + } + context->multi = PR_FALSE; + if (isEncrypt) { + NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv); + if (pubKey == NULL) { + break; + } + context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PublicModulusLen(pubKey); + context->cipherInfo = (void *)pubKey; + context->update = (SFTKCipher) + (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RSA_X_509 + ? RSA_EncryptRaw : RSA_EncryptBlock); + } else { + NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv); + if (privKey == NULL) { + break; + } + context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PrivateModulusLen(privKey); + context->cipherInfo = (void *)privKey; + context->update = (SFTKCipher) + (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RSA_X_509 + ? RSA_DecryptRaw : RSA_DecryptBlock); + } + context->destroy = sftk_Null; + break; case CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD: - context->doPad = PR_TRUE; - /* fall thru */ + context->doPad = PR_TRUE; + /* fall thru */ case CKM_RC2_ECB: case CKM_RC2_CBC: - context->blockSize = 8; - if (key_type != CKK_RC2) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); - if (att == NULL) { - crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; - break; - } - rc2_param = (CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter; - effectiveKeyLength = (rc2_param->ulEffectiveBits+7)/8; - context->cipherInfo = - RC2_CreateContext((unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, - att->attrib.ulValueLen, rc2_param->iv, - pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RC2_ECB ? NSS_RC2 : - NSS_RC2_CBC,effectiveKeyLength); - sftk_FreeAttribute(att); - if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? RC2_Encrypt : RC2_Decrypt); - context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) RC2_DestroyContext; - break; + context->blockSize = 8; + if (key_type != CKK_RC2) { + crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + break; + } + att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); + if (att == NULL) { + crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; + break; + } + rc2_param = (CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter; + effectiveKeyLength = (rc2_param->ulEffectiveBits+7)/8; + context->cipherInfo = + RC2_CreateContext((unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, + att->attrib.ulValueLen, rc2_param->iv, + pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RC2_ECB ? NSS_RC2 : + NSS_RC2_CBC,effectiveKeyLength); + sftk_FreeAttribute(att); + if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) { + crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + break; + } + context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? RC2_Encrypt : RC2_Decrypt); + context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) RC2_DestroyContext; + break; #if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5 case CKM_RC5_CBC_PAD: - context->doPad = PR_TRUE; - /* fall thru */ + context->doPad = PR_TRUE; + /* fall thru */ case CKM_RC5_ECB: case CKM_RC5_CBC: - if (key_type != CKK_RC5) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); - if (att == NULL) { - crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; - break; - } - rc5_param = (CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter; - context->blockSize = rc5_param->ulWordsize*2; - rc5Key.data = (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue; - rc5Key.len = att->attrib.ulValueLen; - context->cipherInfo = RC5_CreateContext(&rc5Key,rc5_param->ulRounds, - rc5_param->ulWordsize,rc5_param->pIv, - pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RC5_ECB ? NSS_RC5 : NSS_RC5_CBC); - sftk_FreeAttribute(att); - if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? RC5_Encrypt : RC5_Decrypt); - context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) RC5_DestroyContext; - break; + if (key_type != CKK_RC5) { + crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + break; + } + att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); + if (att == NULL) { + crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; + break; + } + rc5_param = (CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter; + context->blockSize = rc5_param->ulWordsize*2; + rc5Key.data = (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue; + rc5Key.len = att->attrib.ulValueLen; + context->cipherInfo = RC5_CreateContext(&rc5Key,rc5_param->ulRounds, + rc5_param->ulWordsize,rc5_param->pIv, + pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RC5_ECB ? NSS_RC5 : NSS_RC5_CBC); + sftk_FreeAttribute(att); + if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) { + crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + break; + } + context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? RC5_Encrypt : RC5_Decrypt); + context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) RC5_DestroyContext; + break; #endif case CKM_RC4: - if (key_type != CKK_RC4) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); - if (att == NULL) { - crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; - break; - } - context->cipherInfo = - RC4_CreateContext((unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, - att->attrib.ulValueLen); - sftk_FreeAttribute(att); - if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; /* WRONG !!! */ - break; - } - context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? RC4_Encrypt : RC4_Decrypt); - context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) RC4_DestroyContext; - break; + if (key_type != CKK_RC4) { + crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + break; + } + att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); + if (att == NULL) { + crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; + break; + } + context->cipherInfo = + RC4_CreateContext((unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, + att->attrib.ulValueLen); + sftk_FreeAttribute(att); + if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) { + crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; /* WRONG !!! */ + break; + } + context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? RC4_Encrypt : RC4_Decrypt); + context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) RC4_DestroyContext; + break; case CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD: - context->doPad = PR_TRUE; - /* fall thru */ + context->doPad = PR_TRUE; + /* fall thru */ case CKM_CDMF_ECB: case CKM_CDMF_CBC: - if (key_type != CKK_CDMF) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - t = (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_CDMF_ECB) ? NSS_DES : NSS_DES_CBC; - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - goto finish_des; + if (key_type != CKK_CDMF) { + crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + break; + } + t = (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_CDMF_ECB) ? NSS_DES : NSS_DES_CBC; + if (crv != CKR_OK) break; + goto finish_des; case CKM_DES_ECB: - if (key_type != CKK_DES) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - t = NSS_DES; - goto finish_des; + if (key_type != CKK_DES) { + crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + break; + } + t = NSS_DES; + goto finish_des; case CKM_DES_CBC_PAD: - context->doPad = PR_TRUE; - /* fall thru */ + context->doPad = PR_TRUE; + /* fall thru */ case CKM_DES_CBC: - if (key_type != CKK_DES) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - t = NSS_DES_CBC; - goto finish_des; + if (key_type != CKK_DES) { + crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + break; + } + t = NSS_DES_CBC; + goto finish_des; case CKM_DES3_ECB: - if ((key_type != CKK_DES2) && (key_type != CKK_DES3)) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - t = NSS_DES_EDE3; - goto finish_des; + if ((key_type != CKK_DES2) && (key_type != CKK_DES3)) { + crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + break; + } + t = NSS_DES_EDE3; + goto finish_des; case CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD: - context->doPad = PR_TRUE; - /* fall thru */ + context->doPad = PR_TRUE; + /* fall thru */ case CKM_DES3_CBC: - if ((key_type != CKK_DES2) && (key_type != CKK_DES3)) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - t = NSS_DES_EDE3_CBC; + if ((key_type != CKK_DES2) && (key_type != CKK_DES3)) { + crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + break; + } + t = NSS_DES_EDE3_CBC; finish_des: - context->blockSize = 8; - att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); - if (att == NULL) { - crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; - break; - } - if (key_type == CKK_DES2 && + context->blockSize = 8; + att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); + if (att == NULL) { + crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; + break; + } + if (key_type == CKK_DES2 && (t == NSS_DES_EDE3_CBC || t == NSS_DES_EDE3)) { - /* extend DES2 key to DES3 key. */ - memcpy(newdeskey, att->attrib.pValue, 16); - memcpy(newdeskey + 16, newdeskey, 8); - useNewKey=PR_TRUE; - } else if (key_type == CKK_CDMF) { - crv = sftk_cdmf2des((unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,newdeskey); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeAttribute(att); - break; - } - useNewKey=PR_TRUE; - } - context->cipherInfo = DES_CreateContext( - useNewKey ? newdeskey : (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, - (unsigned char*)pMechanism->pParameter,t, isEncrypt); - if (useNewKey) - memset(newdeskey, 0, sizeof newdeskey); - sftk_FreeAttribute(att); - if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? DES_Encrypt : DES_Decrypt); - context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) DES_DestroyContext; - break; + /* extend DES2 key to DES3 key. */ + memcpy(newdeskey, att->attrib.pValue, 16); + memcpy(newdeskey + 16, newdeskey, 8); + useNewKey=PR_TRUE; + } else if (key_type == CKK_CDMF) { + crv = sftk_cdmf2des((unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,newdeskey); + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + sftk_FreeAttribute(att); + break; + } + useNewKey=PR_TRUE; + } + context->cipherInfo = DES_CreateContext( + useNewKey ? newdeskey : (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, + (unsigned char*)pMechanism->pParameter,t, isEncrypt); + if (useNewKey) + memset(newdeskey, 0, sizeof newdeskey); + sftk_FreeAttribute(att); + if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) { + crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + break; + } + context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? DES_Encrypt : DES_Decrypt); + context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) DES_DestroyContext; + break; case CKM_AES_CBC_PAD: - context->doPad = PR_TRUE; - /* fall thru */ + context->doPad = PR_TRUE; + /* fall thru */ case CKM_AES_ECB: case CKM_AES_CBC: - context->blockSize = 16; - if (key_type != CKK_AES) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); - if (att == NULL) { - crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; - break; - } - context->cipherInfo = AES_CreateContext( - (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, - (unsigned char*)pMechanism->pParameter, - pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_AES_ECB ? NSS_AES : NSS_AES_CBC, - isEncrypt, att->attrib.ulValueLen, 16); - sftk_FreeAttribute(att); - if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? AES_Encrypt : AES_Decrypt); - context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) AES_DestroyContext; - break; + context->blockSize = 16; + if (key_type != CKK_AES) { + crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + break; + } + att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); + if (att == NULL) { + crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; + break; + } + context->cipherInfo = AES_CreateContext( + (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, + (unsigned char*)pMechanism->pParameter, + pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_AES_ECB ? NSS_AES : NSS_AES_CBC, + isEncrypt, att->attrib.ulValueLen, 16); + sftk_FreeAttribute(att); + if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) { + crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + break; + } + context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? AES_Encrypt : AES_Decrypt); + context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) AES_DestroyContext; + break; case CKM_NETSCAPE_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD: - context->doPad = PR_TRUE; - /* fall thru */ + context->doPad = PR_TRUE; + /* fall thru */ case CKM_NETSCAPE_AES_KEY_WRAP: - context->multi = PR_FALSE; - context->blockSize = 8; - if (key_type != CKK_AES) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); - if (att == NULL) { - crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; - break; - } - context->cipherInfo = AESKeyWrap_CreateContext( - (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, - (unsigned char*)pMechanism->pParameter, - isEncrypt, att->attrib.ulValueLen); - sftk_FreeAttribute(att); - if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? AESKeyWrap_Encrypt - : AESKeyWrap_Decrypt); - context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) AESKeyWrap_DestroyContext; - break; + context->multi = PR_FALSE; + context->blockSize = 8; + if (key_type != CKK_AES) { + crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + break; + } + att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); + if (att == NULL) { + crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; + break; + } + context->cipherInfo = AESKeyWrap_CreateContext( + (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, + (unsigned char*)pMechanism->pParameter, + isEncrypt, att->attrib.ulValueLen); + sftk_FreeAttribute(att); + if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) { + crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + break; + } + context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? AESKeyWrap_Encrypt + : AESKeyWrap_Decrypt); + context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) AESKeyWrap_DestroyContext; + break; default: - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; - break; + crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; + break; } if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeContext(context); - sftk_FreeSession(session); - return crv; + sftk_FreeSession(session); + return crv; } sftk_SetContextByType(session, contextType, context); sftk_FreeSession(session); return CKR_OK; } /* NSC_EncryptInit initializes an encryption operation. */ CK_RV NSC_EncryptInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) { return sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_ENCRYPT, - SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_TRUE); + SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_TRUE); } /* NSC_EncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part encryption operation. */ CK_RV NSC_EncryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG ulPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, - CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen) + CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG ulPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, + CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen) { SFTKSessionContext *context; unsigned int outlen,i; unsigned int padoutlen = 0; unsigned int maxout = *pulEncryptedPartLen; CK_RV crv; SECStatus rv; /* make sure we're legal */ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_TRUE,NULL); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; if (!pEncryptedPart) { - if (context->doPad) { - CK_ULONG totalDataAvailable = ulPartLen + context->padDataLength; - CK_ULONG blocksToSend = totalDataAvailable/context->blockSize; - - *pulEncryptedPartLen = blocksToSend * context->blockSize; - return CKR_OK; - } - *pulEncryptedPartLen = ulPartLen; - return CKR_OK; + if (context->doPad) { + CK_ULONG totalDataAvailable = ulPartLen + context->padDataLength; + CK_ULONG blocksToSend = totalDataAvailable/context->blockSize; + + *pulEncryptedPartLen = blocksToSend * context->blockSize; + return CKR_OK; + } + *pulEncryptedPartLen = ulPartLen; + return CKR_OK; } /* do padding */ if (context->doPad) { - /* deal with previous buffered data */ - if (context->padDataLength != 0) { - /* fill in the padded to a full block size */ - for (i=context->padDataLength; - (ulPartLen != 0) && i < context->blockSize; i++) { - context->padBuf[i] = *pPart++; - ulPartLen--; - context->padDataLength++; - } - - /* not enough data to encrypt yet? then return */ - if (context->padDataLength != context->blockSize) { - *pulEncryptedPartLen = 0; - return CKR_OK; - } - /* encrypt the current padded data */ - rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pEncryptedPart, - &padoutlen, context->blockSize, context->padBuf, - context->blockSize); - if (rv != SECSuccess) return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; - pEncryptedPart += padoutlen; - maxout -= padoutlen; - } - /* save the residual */ - context->padDataLength = ulPartLen % context->blockSize; - if (context->padDataLength) { - PORT_Memcpy(context->padBuf, - &pPart[ulPartLen-context->padDataLength], - context->padDataLength); - ulPartLen -= context->padDataLength; - } - /* if we've exhausted our new buffer, we're done */ - if (ulPartLen == 0) { - *pulEncryptedPartLen = padoutlen; - return CKR_OK; - } + /* deal with previous buffered data */ + if (context->padDataLength != 0) { + /* fill in the padded to a full block size */ + for (i=context->padDataLength; + (ulPartLen != 0) && i < context->blockSize; i++) { + context->padBuf[i] = *pPart++; + ulPartLen--; + context->padDataLength++; + } + + /* not enough data to encrypt yet? then return */ + if (context->padDataLength != context->blockSize) { + *pulEncryptedPartLen = 0; + return CKR_OK; + } + /* encrypt the current padded data */ + rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pEncryptedPart, + &padoutlen, context->blockSize, context->padBuf, + context->blockSize); + if (rv != SECSuccess) return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; + pEncryptedPart += padoutlen; + maxout -= padoutlen; + } + /* save the residual */ + context->padDataLength = ulPartLen % context->blockSize; + if (context->padDataLength) { + PORT_Memcpy(context->padBuf, + &pPart[ulPartLen-context->padDataLength], + context->padDataLength); + ulPartLen -= context->padDataLength; + } + /* if we've exhausted our new buffer, we're done */ + if (ulPartLen == 0) { + *pulEncryptedPartLen = padoutlen; + return CKR_OK; + } } /* do it: NOTE: this assumes buf size in is >= buf size out! */ rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo,pEncryptedPart, - &outlen, maxout, pPart, ulPartLen); + &outlen, maxout, pPart, ulPartLen); *pulEncryptedPartLen = (CK_ULONG) (outlen + padoutlen); return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; } /* NSC_EncryptFinal finishes a multiple-part encryption operation. */ CK_RV NSC_EncryptFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_BYTE_PTR pLastEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastEncryptedPartLen) + CK_BYTE_PTR pLastEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastEncryptedPartLen) { SFTKSession *session; SFTKSessionContext *context; unsigned int outlen,i; unsigned int maxout = *pulLastEncryptedPartLen; CK_RV crv; SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; PRBool contextFinished = PR_TRUE; /* make sure we're legal */ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_TRUE,&session); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; *pulLastEncryptedPartLen = 0; if (!pLastEncryptedPart) { - /* caller is checking the amount of remaining data */ - if (context->blockSize > 0 && context->doPad) { - *pulLastEncryptedPartLen = context->blockSize; - contextFinished = PR_FALSE; /* still have padding to go */ - } - goto finish; + /* caller is checking the amount of remaining data */ + if (context->blockSize > 0 && context->doPad) { + *pulLastEncryptedPartLen = context->blockSize; + contextFinished = PR_FALSE; /* still have padding to go */ + } + goto finish; } /* do padding */ if (context->doPad) { - unsigned char padbyte = (unsigned char) - (context->blockSize - context->padDataLength); - /* fill out rest of pad buffer with pad magic*/ - for (i=context->padDataLength; i < context->blockSize; i++) { - context->padBuf[i] = padbyte; - } - rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo,pLastEncryptedPart, - &outlen, maxout, context->padBuf, context->blockSize); - if (rv == SECSuccess) *pulLastEncryptedPartLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen; + unsigned char padbyte = (unsigned char) + (context->blockSize - context->padDataLength); + /* fill out rest of pad buffer with pad magic*/ + for (i=context->padDataLength; i < context->blockSize; i++) { + context->padBuf[i] = padbyte; + } + rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo,pLastEncryptedPart, + &outlen, maxout, context->padBuf, context->blockSize); + if (rv == SECSuccess) *pulLastEncryptedPartLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen; } finish: if (contextFinished) { - sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_ENCRYPT, NULL); - sftk_FreeContext(context); + sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_ENCRYPT, NULL); + sftk_FreeContext(context); } sftk_FreeSession(session); return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; } /* NSC_Encrypt encrypts single-part data. */ CK_RV NSC_Encrypt (CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData, - CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, - CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedDataLen) + CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, + CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedDataLen) { SFTKSession *session; SFTKSessionContext *context; unsigned int outlen; unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulEncryptedDataLen; CK_RV crv; CK_RV crv2; SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; SECItem pText; pText.type = siBuffer; pText.data = pData; pText.len = ulDataLen; /* make sure we're legal */ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_FALSE,&session); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; if (!pEncryptedData) { - *pulEncryptedDataLen = context->multi ? - ulDataLen + 2 * context->blockSize : context->maxLen; - goto finish; + *pulEncryptedDataLen = context->multi ? + ulDataLen + 2 * context->blockSize : context->maxLen; + goto finish; } if (context->doPad) { - if (context->multi) { - CK_ULONG finalLen; - /* padding is fairly complicated, have the update and final - * code deal with it */ - sftk_FreeSession(session); - crv = NSC_EncryptUpdate(hSession, pData, ulDataLen, pEncryptedData, - pulEncryptedDataLen); - if (crv != CKR_OK) - *pulEncryptedDataLen = 0; - maxoutlen -= *pulEncryptedDataLen; - pEncryptedData += *pulEncryptedDataLen; - finalLen = maxoutlen; - crv2 = NSC_EncryptFinal(hSession, pEncryptedData, &finalLen); - if (crv2 == CKR_OK) - *pulEncryptedDataLen += finalLen; - return crv == CKR_OK ? crv2 : crv; - } - /* doPad without multi means that padding must be done on the first - ** and only update. There will be no final. - */ - PORT_Assert(context->blockSize > 1); - if (context->blockSize > 1) { - CK_ULONG remainder = ulDataLen % context->blockSize; - CK_ULONG padding = context->blockSize - remainder; - pText.len += padding; - pText.data = PORT_ZAlloc(pText.len); - if (pText.data) { - memcpy(pText.data, pData, ulDataLen); - memset(pText.data + ulDataLen, padding, padding); - } else { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - goto fail; - } - } + if (context->multi) { + CK_ULONG finalLen; + /* padding is fairly complicated, have the update and final + * code deal with it */ + sftk_FreeSession(session); + crv = NSC_EncryptUpdate(hSession, pData, ulDataLen, pEncryptedData, + pulEncryptedDataLen); + if (crv != CKR_OK) + *pulEncryptedDataLen = 0; + maxoutlen -= *pulEncryptedDataLen; + pEncryptedData += *pulEncryptedDataLen; + finalLen = maxoutlen; + crv2 = NSC_EncryptFinal(hSession, pEncryptedData, &finalLen); + if (crv2 == CKR_OK) + *pulEncryptedDataLen += finalLen; + return crv == CKR_OK ? crv2 : crv; + } + /* doPad without multi means that padding must be done on the first + ** and only update. There will be no final. + */ + PORT_Assert(context->blockSize > 1); + if (context->blockSize > 1) { + CK_ULONG remainder = ulDataLen % context->blockSize; + CK_ULONG padding = context->blockSize - remainder; + pText.len += padding; + pText.data = PORT_ZAlloc(pText.len); + if (pText.data) { + memcpy(pText.data, pData, ulDataLen); + memset(pText.data + ulDataLen, padding, padding); + } else { + crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + goto fail; + } + } } /* do it: NOTE: this assumes buf size is big enough. */ rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pEncryptedData, - &outlen, maxoutlen, pText.data, pText.len); + &outlen, maxoutlen, pText.data, pText.len); crv = (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; *pulEncryptedDataLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen; if (pText.data != pData) - PORT_ZFree(pText.data, pText.len); + PORT_ZFree(pText.data, pText.len); fail: sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_ENCRYPT, NULL); sftk_FreeContext(context); finish: sftk_FreeSession(session); return crv; } /* ************** Crypto Functions: Decrypt ************************ */ /* NSC_DecryptInit initializes a decryption operation. */ CK_RV NSC_DecryptInit( CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) { return sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_DECRYPT, - SFTK_DECRYPT, PR_FALSE); + SFTK_DECRYPT, PR_FALSE); } /* NSC_DecryptUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption operation. */ CK_RV NSC_DecryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, - CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen) + CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, + CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen) { SFTKSessionContext *context; unsigned int padoutlen = 0; unsigned int outlen; unsigned int maxout = *pulPartLen; CK_RV crv; SECStatus rv; /* make sure we're legal */ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_DECRYPT,PR_TRUE,NULL); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; /* this can only happen on an NSS programming error */ PORT_Assert((context->padDataLength == 0) - || context->padDataLength == context->blockSize); + || context->padDataLength == context->blockSize); if (!pPart) { - if (context->doPad) { - /* we can check the data length here because if we are padding, - * then we must be using a block cipher. In the non-padding case - * the error will be returned by the underlying decryption - * function when do do the actual decrypt. We need to do the - * check here to avoid returning a negative length to the caller. - */ - if ((ulEncryptedPartLen == 0) || - (ulEncryptedPartLen % context->blockSize) != 0) { - return CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE; - } - *pulPartLen = - ulEncryptedPartLen + context->padDataLength - context->blockSize; - return CKR_OK; - } - /* for stream ciphers there is are no constraints on ulEncryptedPartLen. - * for block ciphers, it must be a multiple of blockSize. The error is - * detected when this function is called again do decrypt the output. - */ - *pulPartLen = ulEncryptedPartLen; - return CKR_OK; + if (context->doPad) { + /* we can check the data length here because if we are padding, + * then we must be using a block cipher. In the non-padding case + * the error will be returned by the underlying decryption + * function when do do the actual decrypt. We need to do the + * check here to avoid returning a negative length to the caller. + */ + if ((ulEncryptedPartLen == 0) || + (ulEncryptedPartLen % context->blockSize) != 0) { + return CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE; + } + *pulPartLen = + ulEncryptedPartLen + context->padDataLength - context->blockSize; + return CKR_OK; + } + /* for stream ciphers there is are no constraints on ulEncryptedPartLen. + * for block ciphers, it must be a multiple of blockSize. The error is + * detected when this function is called again do decrypt the output. + */ + *pulPartLen = ulEncryptedPartLen; + return CKR_OK; } if (context->doPad) { - /* first decrypt our saved buffer */ - if (context->padDataLength != 0) { - rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pPart, &padoutlen, - maxout, context->padBuf, context->blockSize); - if (rv != SECSuccess) return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; - pPart += padoutlen; - maxout -= padoutlen; - } - /* now save the final block for the next decrypt or the final */ - PORT_Memcpy(context->padBuf,&pEncryptedPart[ulEncryptedPartLen - - context->blockSize], context->blockSize); - context->padDataLength = context->blockSize; - ulEncryptedPartLen -= context->padDataLength; + /* first decrypt our saved buffer */ + if (context->padDataLength != 0) { + rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pPart, &padoutlen, + maxout, context->padBuf, context->blockSize); + if (rv != SECSuccess) return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; + pPart += padoutlen; + maxout -= padoutlen; + } + /* now save the final block for the next decrypt or the final */ + PORT_Memcpy(context->padBuf,&pEncryptedPart[ulEncryptedPartLen - + context->blockSize], context->blockSize); + context->padDataLength = context->blockSize; + ulEncryptedPartLen -= context->padDataLength; } /* do it: NOTE: this assumes buf size in is >= buf size out! */ rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo,pPart, &outlen, - maxout, pEncryptedPart, ulEncryptedPartLen); + maxout, pEncryptedPart, ulEncryptedPartLen); *pulPartLen = (CK_ULONG) (outlen + padoutlen); return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; } /* NSC_DecryptFinal finishes a multiple-part decryption operation. */ CK_RV NSC_DecryptFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_BYTE_PTR pLastPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastPartLen) + CK_BYTE_PTR pLastPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastPartLen) { SFTKSession *session; SFTKSessionContext *context; unsigned int outlen; unsigned int maxout = *pulLastPartLen; CK_RV crv; SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; /* make sure we're legal */ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_DECRYPT,PR_TRUE,&session); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; *pulLastPartLen = 0; if (!pLastPart) { - /* caller is checking the amount of remaining data */ - if (context->padDataLength > 0) { - *pulLastPartLen = context->padDataLength; - } - rv = SECSuccess; - goto finish; + /* caller is checking the amount of remaining data */ + if (context->padDataLength > 0) { + *pulLastPartLen = context->padDataLength; + } + rv = SECSuccess; + goto finish; } if (context->doPad) { - /* decrypt our saved buffer */ - if (context->padDataLength != 0) { - /* this assumes that pLastPart is big enough to hold the *whole* - * buffer!!! */ - rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pLastPart, &outlen, - maxout, context->padBuf, context->blockSize); - if (rv == SECSuccess) { - unsigned int padSize = - (unsigned int) pLastPart[context->blockSize-1]; - if ((padSize > context->blockSize) || (padSize == 0)) { - rv = SECFailure; - } else { - *pulLastPartLen = outlen - padSize; - } - } - } + /* decrypt our saved buffer */ + if (context->padDataLength != 0) { + /* this assumes that pLastPart is big enough to hold the *whole* + * buffer!!! */ + rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pLastPart, &outlen, + maxout, context->padBuf, context->blockSize); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + unsigned int padSize = + (unsigned int) pLastPart[context->blockSize-1]; + if ((padSize > context->blockSize) || (padSize == 0)) { + rv = SECFailure; + } else { + *pulLastPartLen = outlen - padSize; + } + } + } } sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_DECRYPT, NULL); sftk_FreeContext(context); finish: sftk_FreeSession(session); return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; } /* NSC_Decrypt decrypts encrypted data in a single part. */ CK_RV NSC_Decrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData,CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen,CK_BYTE_PTR pData, - CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen) + CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData,CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen,CK_BYTE_PTR pData, + CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen) { SFTKSession *session; SFTKSessionContext *context; unsigned int outlen; unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulDataLen; CK_RV crv; CK_RV crv2; SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; /* make sure we're legal */ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_DECRYPT,PR_FALSE,&session); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; if (!pData) { - *pulDataLen = ulEncryptedDataLen + context->blockSize; - goto finish; + *pulDataLen = ulEncryptedDataLen + context->blockSize; + goto finish; } if (context->doPad && context->multi) { - CK_ULONG finalLen; - /* padding is fairly complicated, have the update and final - * code deal with it */ - sftk_FreeSession(session); - crv = NSC_DecryptUpdate(hSession,pEncryptedData,ulEncryptedDataLen, - pData, pulDataLen); - if (crv != CKR_OK) - *pulDataLen = 0; - maxoutlen -= *pulDataLen; - pData += *pulDataLen; - finalLen = maxoutlen; - crv2 = NSC_DecryptFinal(hSession, pData, &finalLen); - if (crv2 == CKR_OK) - *pulDataLen += finalLen; - return crv == CKR_OK ? crv2 : crv; + CK_ULONG finalLen; + /* padding is fairly complicated, have the update and final + * code deal with it */ + sftk_FreeSession(session); + crv = NSC_DecryptUpdate(hSession,pEncryptedData,ulEncryptedDataLen, + pData, pulDataLen); + if (crv != CKR_OK) + *pulDataLen = 0; + maxoutlen -= *pulDataLen; + pData += *pulDataLen; + finalLen = maxoutlen; + crv2 = NSC_DecryptFinal(hSession, pData, &finalLen); + if (crv2 == CKR_OK) + *pulDataLen += finalLen; + return crv == CKR_OK ? crv2 : crv; } rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pData, &outlen, maxoutlen, - pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen); + pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen); /* XXX need to do MUCH better error mapping than this. */ crv = (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; if (rv == SECSuccess && context->doPad) { - CK_ULONG padding = pData[outlen - 1]; - if (padding > context->blockSize || !padding) { - crv = CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID; - } else - outlen -= padding; + CK_ULONG padding = pData[outlen - 1]; + if (padding > context->blockSize || !padding) { + crv = CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID; + } else + outlen -= padding; } *pulDataLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen; sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_DECRYPT, NULL); sftk_FreeContext(context); finish: sftk_FreeSession(session); return crv; } /* ************** Crypto Functions: Digest (HASH) ************************ */ /* NSC_DigestInit initializes a message-digesting operation. */ CK_RV NSC_DigestInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism) + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism) { SFTKSession *session; SFTKSessionContext *context; CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); if (session == NULL) - return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session,&context,SFTK_HASH,NULL,0,NULL, 0, 0); if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeSession(session); - return crv; + sftk_FreeSession(session); + return crv; } #define INIT_MECH(mech,mmm) \ case mech: { \ - mmm ## Context * mmm ## _ctx = mmm ## _NewContext(); \ - context->cipherInfo = (void *)mmm ## _ctx; \ - context->cipherInfoLen = mmm ## _FlattenSize(mmm ## _ctx); \ - context->currentMech = mech; \ - context->hashUpdate = (SFTKHash) mmm ## _Update; \ - context->end = (SFTKEnd) mmm ## _End; \ - context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) mmm ## _DestroyContext; \ - context->maxLen = mmm ## _LENGTH; \ + mmm ## Context * mmm ## _ctx = mmm ## _NewContext(); \ + context->cipherInfo = (void *)mmm ## _ctx; \ + context->cipherInfoLen = mmm ## _FlattenSize(mmm ## _ctx); \ + context->currentMech = mech; \ + context->hashUpdate = (SFTKHash) mmm ## _Update; \ + context->end = (SFTKEnd) mmm ## _End; \ + context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) mmm ## _DestroyContext; \ + context->maxLen = mmm ## _LENGTH; \ if (mmm ## _ctx) \ - mmm ## _Begin(mmm ## _ctx); \ - else \ - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; \ - break; \ + mmm ## _Begin(mmm ## _ctx); \ + else \ + crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; \ + break; \ } switch(pMechanism->mechanism) { INIT_MECH(CKM_MD2, MD2) INIT_MECH(CKM_MD5, MD5) INIT_MECH(CKM_SHA_1, SHA1) INIT_MECH(CKM_SHA256, SHA256) INIT_MECH(CKM_SHA384, SHA384) INIT_MECH(CKM_SHA512, SHA512) default: - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; - break; + crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; + break; } if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeContext(context); - sftk_FreeSession(session); - return crv; + sftk_FreeSession(session); + return crv; } sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_HASH, context); sftk_FreeSession(session); return CKR_OK; } /* NSC_Digest digests data in a single part. */ CK_RV NSC_Digest(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest, - CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen) + CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest, + CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen) { SFTKSession *session; SFTKSessionContext *context; unsigned int digestLen; unsigned int maxout = *pulDigestLen; CK_RV crv; /* make sure we're legal */ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_HASH,PR_FALSE,&session); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; if (pDigest == NULL) { - *pulDigestLen = context->maxLen; - goto finish; + *pulDigestLen = context->maxLen; + goto finish; } /* do it: */ (*context->hashUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pData, ulDataLen); /* NOTE: this assumes buf size is bigenough for the algorithm */ (*context->end)(context->cipherInfo, pDigest, &digestLen,maxout); *pulDigestLen = digestLen; sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_HASH, NULL); sftk_FreeContext(context); finish: sftk_FreeSession(session); return CKR_OK; } /* NSC_DigestUpdate continues a multiple-part message-digesting operation. */ CK_RV NSC_DigestUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, - CK_ULONG ulPartLen) + CK_ULONG ulPartLen) { SFTKSessionContext *context; CK_RV crv; /* make sure we're legal */ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_HASH,PR_TRUE,NULL); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; /* do it: */ (*context->hashUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pPart, ulPartLen); return CKR_OK; } /* NSC_DigestFinal finishes a multiple-part message-digesting operation. */ CK_RV NSC_DigestFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest, - CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen) + CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen) { SFTKSession *session; SFTKSessionContext *context; unsigned int maxout = *pulDigestLen; unsigned int digestLen; CK_RV crv; /* make sure we're legal */ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_HASH, PR_TRUE, &session); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; if (pDigest != NULL) { (*context->end)(context->cipherInfo, pDigest, &digestLen, maxout); *pulDigestLen = digestLen; - sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_HASH, NULL); - sftk_FreeContext(context); + sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_HASH, NULL); + sftk_FreeContext(context); } else { - *pulDigestLen = context->maxLen; + *pulDigestLen = context->maxLen; } sftk_FreeSession(session); return CKR_OK; } /* * these helper functions are used by Generic Macing and Signing functions * that use hashes as part of their operations. */ #define DOSUB(mmm) \ static CK_RV \ sftk_doSub ## mmm(SFTKSessionContext *context) { \ mmm ## Context * mmm ## _ctx = mmm ## _NewContext(); \ context->hashInfo = (void *) mmm ## _ctx; \ context->hashUpdate = (SFTKHash) mmm ## _Update; \ context->end = (SFTKEnd) mmm ## _End; \ context->hashdestroy = (SFTKDestroy) mmm ## _DestroyContext; \ if (!context->hashInfo) { \ - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; \ + return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; \ } \ mmm ## _Begin( mmm ## _ctx ); \ return CKR_OK; \ } DOSUB(MD2) DOSUB(MD5) DOSUB(SHA1) DOSUB(SHA256) DOSUB(SHA384) DOSUB(SHA512) /* * HMAC General copies only a portion of the result. This update routine likes * the final HMAC output with the signature. */ static SECStatus sftk_HMACCopy(CK_ULONG *copyLen,unsigned char *sig,unsigned int *sigLen, - unsigned int maxLen,unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen) + unsigned int maxLen,unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen) { if (maxLen < *copyLen) return SECFailure; PORT_Memcpy(sig,hash,*copyLen); *sigLen = *copyLen; return SECSuccess; } /* Verify is just a compare for HMAC */ static SECStatus sftk_HMACCmp(CK_ULONG *copyLen,unsigned char *sig,unsigned int sigLen, - unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen) + unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen) { return PORT_Memcmp(sig,hash,*copyLen) ? SECSuccess : SECFailure ; } /* * common HMAC initalization routine */ static CK_RV sftk_doHMACInit(SFTKSessionContext *context,HASH_HashType hash, - SFTKObject *key, CK_ULONG mac_size) + SFTKObject *key, CK_ULONG mac_size) { SFTKAttribute *keyval; HMACContext *HMACcontext; CK_ULONG *intpointer; const SECHashObject *hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(hash); PRBool isFIPS = (key->slot->slotID == FIPS_SLOT_ID); /* required by FIPS 198 Section 4 */ if (isFIPS && (mac_size < 4 || mac_size < hashObj->length/2)) { - return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; } keyval = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); if (keyval == NULL) return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE; HMACcontext = HMAC_Create(hashObj, - (const unsigned char*)keyval->attrib.pValue, - keyval->attrib.ulValueLen, isFIPS); + (const unsigned char*)keyval->attrib.pValue, + keyval->attrib.ulValueLen, isFIPS); context->hashInfo = HMACcontext; context->multi = PR_TRUE; sftk_FreeAttribute(keyval); if (context->hashInfo == NULL) { - if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS) { - return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE; - } - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS) { + return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE; + } + return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; } context->hashUpdate = (SFTKHash) HMAC_Update; context->end = (SFTKEnd) HMAC_Finish; context->hashdestroy = (SFTKDestroy) HMAC_Destroy; intpointer = (CK_ULONG *) PORT_Alloc(sizeof(CK_ULONG)); if (intpointer == NULL) { - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; } *intpointer = mac_size; context->cipherInfo = (void *) intpointer; context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) sftk_Space; context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_HMACCopy; context->verify = (SFTKVerify) sftk_HMACCmp; context->maxLen = hashObj->length; HMAC_Begin(HMACcontext); return CKR_OK; } @@ -1374,92 +1374,92 @@ static unsigned char ssl_pad_2 [60] = { 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c }; static SECStatus sftk_SSLMACSign(SFTKSSLMACInfo *info,unsigned char *sig,unsigned int *sigLen, - unsigned int maxLen,unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen) + unsigned int maxLen,unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen) { unsigned char tmpBuf[SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; unsigned int out; info->begin(info->hashContext); info->update(info->hashContext,info->key,info->keySize); info->update(info->hashContext,ssl_pad_2,info->padSize); info->update(info->hashContext,hash,hashLen); info->end(info->hashContext,tmpBuf,&out,SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH); PORT_Memcpy(sig,tmpBuf,info->macSize); *sigLen = info->macSize; return SECSuccess; } static SECStatus sftk_SSLMACVerify(SFTKSSLMACInfo *info,unsigned char *sig,unsigned int sigLen, - unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen) + unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen) { unsigned char tmpBuf[SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; unsigned int out; info->begin(info->hashContext); info->update(info->hashContext,info->key,info->keySize); info->update(info->hashContext,ssl_pad_2,info->padSize); info->update(info->hashContext,hash,hashLen); info->end(info->hashContext,tmpBuf,&out,SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH); return (PORT_Memcmp(sig,tmpBuf,info->macSize) == 0) ? - SECSuccess : SECFailure; + SECSuccess : SECFailure; } /* * common HMAC initalization routine */ static CK_RV sftk_doSSLMACInit(SFTKSessionContext *context,SECOidTag oid, - SFTKObject *key, CK_ULONG mac_size) + SFTKObject *key, CK_ULONG mac_size) { SFTKAttribute *keyval; SFTKBegin begin; int padSize; SFTKSSLMACInfo *sslmacinfo; CK_RV crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; if (oid == SEC_OID_SHA1) { - crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context); - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; - begin = (SFTKBegin) SHA1_Begin; - padSize = 40; + crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context); + if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; + begin = (SFTKBegin) SHA1_Begin; + padSize = 40; } else { - crv = sftk_doSubMD5(context); - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; - begin = (SFTKBegin) MD5_Begin; - padSize = 48; + crv = sftk_doSubMD5(context); + if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; + begin = (SFTKBegin) MD5_Begin; + padSize = 48; } context->multi = PR_TRUE; keyval = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); if (keyval == NULL) return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE; context->hashUpdate(context->hashInfo,keyval->attrib.pValue, - keyval->attrib.ulValueLen); + keyval->attrib.ulValueLen); context->hashUpdate(context->hashInfo,ssl_pad_1,padSize); sslmacinfo = (SFTKSSLMACInfo *) PORT_Alloc(sizeof(SFTKSSLMACInfo)); if (sslmacinfo == NULL) { sftk_FreeAttribute(keyval); - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; } sslmacinfo->macSize = mac_size; sslmacinfo->hashContext = context->hashInfo; PORT_Memcpy(sslmacinfo->key,keyval->attrib.pValue, - keyval->attrib.ulValueLen); + keyval->attrib.ulValueLen); sslmacinfo->keySize = keyval->attrib.ulValueLen; sslmacinfo->begin = begin; sslmacinfo->end = context->end; sslmacinfo->update = context->hashUpdate; sslmacinfo->padSize = padSize; sftk_FreeAttribute(keyval); context->cipherInfo = (void *) sslmacinfo; context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) sftk_Space; context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_SSLMACSign; context->verify = (SFTKVerify) sftk_SSLMACVerify; @@ -1469,178 +1469,178 @@ sftk_doSSLMACInit(SFTKSessionContext *co /* ************** Crypto Functions: Sign ************************ */ /* * Check if We're using CBCMacing and initialize the session context if we are. */ static CK_RV sftk_InitCBCMac(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE keyUsage, - SFTKContextType contextType) - + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE keyUsage, + SFTKContextType contextType) + { CK_MECHANISM cbc_mechanism; CK_ULONG mac_bytes = SFTK_INVALID_MAC_SIZE; CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS rc2_params; #if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5 CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS rc5_params; CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *rc5_mac; #endif unsigned char ivBlock[SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; SFTKSessionContext *context; CK_RV crv; int blockSize; switch (pMechanism->mechanism) { case CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL: - mac_bytes = - ((CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter)->ulMacLength; - /* fall through */ + mac_bytes = + ((CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter)->ulMacLength; + /* fall through */ case CKM_RC2_MAC: - /* this works because ulEffectiveBits is in the same place in both the - * CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS and CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS */ - rc2_params.ulEffectiveBits = ((CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *) - pMechanism->pParameter)->ulEffectiveBits; - PORT_Memset(rc2_params.iv,0,sizeof(rc2_params.iv)); - cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_RC2_CBC; - cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &rc2_params; - cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(rc2_params); - blockSize = 8; - break; + /* this works because ulEffectiveBits is in the same place in both the + * CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS and CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS */ + rc2_params.ulEffectiveBits = ((CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *) + pMechanism->pParameter)->ulEffectiveBits; + PORT_Memset(rc2_params.iv,0,sizeof(rc2_params.iv)); + cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_RC2_CBC; + cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &rc2_params; + cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(rc2_params); + blockSize = 8; + break; #if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5 case CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL: - mac_bytes = - ((CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter)->ulMacLength; - /* fall through */ + mac_bytes = + ((CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter)->ulMacLength; + /* fall through */ case CKM_RC5_MAC: - /* this works because ulEffectiveBits is in the same place in both the - * CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS and CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS */ - rc5_mac = (CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter; - rc5_params.ulWordsize = rc5_mac->ulWordsize; - rc5_params.ulRounds = rc5_mac->ulRounds; - rc5_params.pIv = ivBlock; - blockSize = rc5_mac->ulWordsize*2; - rc5_params.ulIvLen = blockSize; - PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize); - cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_RC5_CBC; - cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &rc5_params; - cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(rc5_params); - break; + /* this works because ulEffectiveBits is in the same place in both the + * CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS and CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS */ + rc5_mac = (CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter; + rc5_params.ulWordsize = rc5_mac->ulWordsize; + rc5_params.ulRounds = rc5_mac->ulRounds; + rc5_params.pIv = ivBlock; + blockSize = rc5_mac->ulWordsize*2; + rc5_params.ulIvLen = blockSize; + PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize); + cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_RC5_CBC; + cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &rc5_params; + cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(rc5_params); + break; #endif /* add cast and idea later */ case CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL: - mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter; - /* fall through */ + mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter; + /* fall through */ case CKM_DES_MAC: - blockSize = 8; - PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize); - cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_DES_CBC; - cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock; - cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize; - break; + blockSize = 8; + PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize); + cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_DES_CBC; + cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock; + cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize; + break; case CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL: - mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter; - /* fall through */ + mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter; + /* fall through */ case CKM_DES3_MAC: - blockSize = 8; - PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize); - cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_DES3_CBC; - cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock; - cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize; - break; + blockSize = 8; + PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize); + cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_DES3_CBC; + cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock; + cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize; + break; case CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL: - mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter; - /* fall through */ + mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter; + /* fall through */ case CKM_CDMF_MAC: - blockSize = 8; - PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize); - cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_CDMF_CBC; - cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock; - cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize; - break; + blockSize = 8; + PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize); + cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_CDMF_CBC; + cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock; + cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize; + break; case CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL: - mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter; - /* fall through */ + mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter; + /* fall through */ case CKM_AES_MAC: - blockSize = 16; - PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize); - cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_AES_CBC; - cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock; - cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize; - break; + blockSize = 16; + PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize); + cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_AES_CBC; + cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock; + cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize; + break; default: - return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED; + return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED; } crv = sftk_CryptInit(hSession, &cbc_mechanism, hKey, keyUsage, - contextType, PR_TRUE); + contextType, PR_TRUE); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,contextType,PR_TRUE,NULL); /* this shouldn't happen! */ PORT_Assert(crv == CKR_OK); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; context->blockSize = blockSize; if (mac_bytes == SFTK_INVALID_MAC_SIZE) mac_bytes = blockSize/2; context->macSize = mac_bytes; return CKR_OK; } /* * encode RSA PKCS #1 Signature data before signing... */ static SECStatus sftk_HashSign(SFTKHashSignInfo *info,unsigned char *sig,unsigned int *sigLen, - unsigned int maxLen,unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen) + unsigned int maxLen,unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen) { return RSA_HashSign(info->hashOid,info->key,sig,sigLen,maxLen, - hash,hashLen); + hash,hashLen); } SECStatus RSA_HashSign(SECOidTag hashOid, NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, - unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxLen, - unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen) + unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxLen, + unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen) { SECStatus rv = SECFailure; SECItem digder; PLArenaPool *arena = NULL; SGNDigestInfo *di = NULL; digder.data = NULL; arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); if ( !arena ) { goto loser; } /* Construct digest info */ di = SGN_CreateDigestInfo(hashOid, hash, hashLen); if (!di) { goto loser; } /* Der encode the digest as a DigestInfo */ rv = DER_Encode(arena, &digder, SGNDigestInfoTemplate, di); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; + goto loser; } /* ** Encrypt signature after constructing appropriate PKCS#1 signature ** block */ rv = RSA_Sign(key,sig,sigLen,maxLen,digder.data,digder.len); loser: SGN_DestroyDigestInfo(di); if (arena != NULL) { - PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); + PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); } return rv; } static SECStatus nsc_DSA_Verify_Stub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf, unsigned int sigLen, void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen) { SECItem signature, digest; NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key = (NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *)ctx; @@ -1699,437 +1699,437 @@ nsc_ECDSASignStub(void *ctx, void *sigBu digest.data = (unsigned char *)dataBuf; digest.len = dataLen; rv = ECDSA_SignDigest(&(key->u.ec), &signature, &digest); *sigLen = signature.len; return rv; } #endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ /* NSC_SignInit setups up the signing operations. There are three basic * types of signing: - * (1) the tradition single part, where "Raw RSA" or "Raw DSA" is applied + * (1) the tradition single part, where "Raw RSA" or "Raw DSA" is applied * to data in a single Sign operation (which often looks a lot like an * encrypt, with data coming in and data going out). - * (2) Hash based signing, where we continually hash the data, then apply + * (2) Hash based signing, where we continually hash the data, then apply * some sort of signature to the end. - * (3) Block Encryption CBC MAC's, where the Data is encrypted with a key, + * (3) Block Encryption CBC MAC's, where the Data is encrypted with a key, * and only the final block is part of the mac. * * For case number 3, we initialize a context much like the Encryption Context * (in fact we share code). We detect case 3 in C_SignUpdate, C_Sign, and * C_Final by the following method... if it's not multi-part, and it's doesn't * have a hash context, it must be a block Encryption CBC MAC. * * For case number 2, we initialize a hash structure, as well as make it * multi-part. Updates are simple calls to the hash update function. Final * calls the hashend, then passes the result to the 'update' function (which * operates as a final signature function). In some hash based MAC'ing (as * opposed to hash base signatures), the update function is can be simply a * copy (as is the case with HMAC). */ CK_RV NSC_SignInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) { SFTKSession *session; SFTKObject *key; SFTKSessionContext *context; CK_KEY_TYPE key_type; CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *privKey; SFTKHashSignInfo *info = NULL; /* Block Cipher MACing Algorithms use a different Context init method..*/ crv = sftk_InitCBCMac(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_SIGN, SFTK_SIGN); if (crv != CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) return crv; /* we're not using a block cipher mac */ session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session,&context,SFTK_SIGN,&key,hKey,&key_type, - CKO_PRIVATE_KEY,CKA_SIGN); + CKO_PRIVATE_KEY,CKA_SIGN); if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeSession(session); - return crv; + sftk_FreeSession(session); + return crv; } context->multi = PR_FALSE; #define INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(mmm) \ case CKM_ ## mmm ## _RSA_PKCS: \ context->multi = PR_TRUE; \ - crv = sftk_doSub ## mmm (context); \ - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; \ - context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_HashSign; \ - info = PORT_New(SFTKHashSignInfo); \ - if (info == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } \ - info->hashOid = SEC_OID_ ## mmm ; \ - goto finish_rsa; + crv = sftk_doSub ## mmm (context); \ + if (crv != CKR_OK) break; \ + context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_HashSign; \ + info = PORT_New(SFTKHashSignInfo); \ + if (info == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } \ + info->hashOid = SEC_OID_ ## mmm ; \ + goto finish_rsa; switch(pMechanism->mechanism) { INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(MD5) INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(MD2) INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA1) INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA256) INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA384) INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA512) case CKM_RSA_PKCS: - context->update = (SFTKCipher) RSA_Sign; - goto finish_rsa; + context->update = (SFTKCipher) RSA_Sign; + goto finish_rsa; case CKM_RSA_X_509: - context->update = (SFTKCipher) RSA_SignRaw; + context->update = (SFTKCipher) RSA_SignRaw; finish_rsa: - if (key_type != CKK_RSA) { - if (info) PORT_Free(info); - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv); - if (privKey == NULL) { - if (info) PORT_Free(info); - break; - } - /* OK, info is allocated only if we're doing hash and sign mechanism. - * It's necessary to be able to set the correct OID in the final - * signature. - */ - if (info) { - info->key = privKey; - context->cipherInfo = info; - context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)sftk_Space; - } else { - context->cipherInfo = privKey; - context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)sftk_Null; - } - context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PrivateModulusLen(privKey); - break; + if (key_type != CKK_RSA) { + if (info) PORT_Free(info); + crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + break; + } + privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv); + if (privKey == NULL) { + if (info) PORT_Free(info); + break; + } + /* OK, info is allocated only if we're doing hash and sign mechanism. + * It's necessary to be able to set the correct OID in the final + * signature. + */ + if (info) { + info->key = privKey; + context->cipherInfo = info; + context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)sftk_Space; + } else { + context->cipherInfo = privKey; + context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)sftk_Null; + } + context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PrivateModulusLen(privKey); + break; case CKM_DSA_SHA1: context->multi = PR_TRUE; - crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - /* fall through */ + crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context); + if (crv != CKR_OK) break; + /* fall through */ case CKM_DSA: - if (key_type != CKK_DSA) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_DSA,&crv); - if (privKey == NULL) { - break; - } - context->cipherInfo = privKey; - context->update = (SFTKCipher) nsc_DSA_Sign_Stub; - context->destroy = (privKey == key->objectInfo) ? - (SFTKDestroy) sftk_Null:(SFTKDestroy)sftk_FreePrivKey; - context->maxLen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN; + if (key_type != CKK_DSA) { + crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + break; + } + privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_DSA,&crv); + if (privKey == NULL) { + break; + } + context->cipherInfo = privKey; + context->update = (SFTKCipher) nsc_DSA_Sign_Stub; + context->destroy = (privKey == key->objectInfo) ? + (SFTKDestroy) sftk_Null:(SFTKDestroy)sftk_FreePrivKey; + context->maxLen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN; - break; + break; #ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC case CKM_ECDSA_SHA1: - context->multi = PR_TRUE; - crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - /* fall through */ + context->multi = PR_TRUE; + crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context); + if (crv != CKR_OK) break; + /* fall through */ case CKM_ECDSA: - if (key_type != CKK_EC) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_EC,&crv); - if (privKey == NULL) { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - context->cipherInfo = privKey; - context->update = (SFTKCipher) nsc_ECDSASignStub; - context->destroy = (privKey == key->objectInfo) ? - (SFTKDestroy) sftk_Null:(SFTKDestroy)sftk_FreePrivKey; - context->maxLen = MAX_ECKEY_LEN * 2; + if (key_type != CKK_EC) { + crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + break; + } + privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_EC,&crv); + if (privKey == NULL) { + crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + break; + } + context->cipherInfo = privKey; + context->update = (SFTKCipher) nsc_ECDSASignStub; + context->destroy = (privKey == key->objectInfo) ? + (SFTKDestroy) sftk_Null:(SFTKDestroy)sftk_FreePrivKey; + context->maxLen = MAX_ECKEY_LEN * 2; - break; + break; #endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ #define INIT_HMAC_MECH(mmm) \ case CKM_ ## mmm ## _HMAC_GENERAL: \ - crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context, HASH_Alg ## mmm ,key, \ - *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter); \ - break; \ + crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context, HASH_Alg ## mmm ,key, \ + *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter); \ + break; \ case CKM_ ## mmm ## _HMAC: \ - crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context, HASH_Alg ## mmm ,key, mmm ## _LENGTH); \ - break; + crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context, HASH_Alg ## mmm ,key, mmm ## _LENGTH); \ + break; INIT_HMAC_MECH(MD2) INIT_HMAC_MECH(MD5) INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA256) INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA384) INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA512) case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL: - crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgSHA1,key, - *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter); - break; + crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgSHA1,key, + *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter); + break; case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC: - crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgSHA1,key,SHA1_LENGTH); - break; + crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgSHA1,key,SHA1_LENGTH); + break; case CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC: - crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context,SEC_OID_MD5,key, - *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter); - break; + crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context,SEC_OID_MD5,key, + *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter); + break; case CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC: - crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context,SEC_OID_SHA1,key, - *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter); - break; + crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context,SEC_OID_SHA1,key, + *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter); + break; case CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL: - crv = sftk_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type); - break; + crv = sftk_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type); + break; default: - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; - break; + crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; + break; } if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeContext(context); - sftk_FreeSession(session); - return crv; + sftk_FreeSession(session); + return crv; } sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_SIGN, context); sftk_FreeSession(session); return CKR_OK; } /* MACUpdate is the common implementation for SignUpdate and VerifyUpdate. * (sign and verify only very in their setup and final operations) */ static CK_RV sftk_MACUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, - CK_ULONG ulPartLen,SFTKContextType type) + CK_ULONG ulPartLen,SFTKContextType type) { unsigned int outlen; SFTKSessionContext *context; CK_RV crv; SECStatus rv; /* make sure we're legal */ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,type,PR_FALSE,NULL); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; if (context->hashInfo) { - (*context->hashUpdate)(context->hashInfo, pPart, ulPartLen); - return CKR_OK; + (*context->hashUpdate)(context->hashInfo, pPart, ulPartLen); + return CKR_OK; } /* must be block cipher macing */ /* deal with previous buffered data */ if (context->padDataLength != 0) { - int i; - /* fill in the padded to a full block size */ - for (i=context->padDataLength; (ulPartLen != 0) && - i < (int)context->blockSize; i++) { - context->padBuf[i] = *pPart++; - ulPartLen--; - context->padDataLength++; - } - - /* not enough data to encrypt yet? then return */ - if (context->padDataLength != context->blockSize) return CKR_OK; - /* encrypt the current padded data */ - rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo,context->macBuf,&outlen, - SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE,context->padBuf,context->blockSize); - if (rv != SECSuccess) return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; + int i; + /* fill in the padded to a full block size */ + for (i=context->padDataLength; (ulPartLen != 0) && + i < (int)context->blockSize; i++) { + context->padBuf[i] = *pPart++; + ulPartLen--; + context->padDataLength++; + } + + /* not enough data to encrypt yet? then return */ + if (context->padDataLength != context->blockSize) return CKR_OK; + /* encrypt the current padded data */ + rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo,context->macBuf,&outlen, + SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE,context->padBuf,context->blockSize); + if (rv != SECSuccess) return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; } /* save the residual */ context->padDataLength = ulPartLen % context->blockSize; if (context->padDataLength) { - PORT_Memcpy(context->padBuf, - &pPart[ulPartLen-context->padDataLength], - context->padDataLength); - ulPartLen -= context->padDataLength; + PORT_Memcpy(context->padBuf, + &pPart[ulPartLen-context->padDataLength], + context->padDataLength); + ulPartLen -= context->padDataLength; } /* if we've exhausted our new buffer, we're done */ if (ulPartLen == 0) { return CKR_OK; } - /* run the data through out encrypter */ + /* run the data through out encrypter */ while (ulPartLen) { - rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, context->padBuf, &outlen, - SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE, pPart, context->blockSize); - if (rv != SECSuccess) return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; - /* paranoia.. make sure we exit the loop */ - PORT_Assert(ulPartLen >= context->blockSize); - if (ulPartLen < context->blockSize) break; - ulPartLen -= context->blockSize; + rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, context->padBuf, &outlen, + SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE, pPart, context->blockSize); + if (rv != SECSuccess) return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; + /* paranoia.. make sure we exit the loop */ + PORT_Assert(ulPartLen >= context->blockSize); + if (ulPartLen < context->blockSize) break; + ulPartLen -= context->blockSize; } return CKR_OK; - + } /* NSC_SignUpdate continues a multiple-part signature operation, * where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the data, * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature */ CK_RV NSC_SignUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, - CK_ULONG ulPartLen) + CK_ULONG ulPartLen) { return sftk_MACUpdate(hSession, pPart, ulPartLen, SFTK_SIGN); } /* NSC_SignFinal finishes a multiple-part signature operation, * returning the signature. */ CK_RV NSC_SignFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, - CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen) + CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen) { SFTKSession *session; SFTKSessionContext *context; unsigned int outlen; unsigned int digestLen; unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulSignatureLen; unsigned char tmpbuf[SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; CK_RV crv; SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; /* make sure we're legal */ *pulSignatureLen = 0; crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_SIGN,PR_TRUE,&session); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; if (!pSignature) { - *pulSignatureLen = context->maxLen; - goto finish; + *pulSignatureLen = context->maxLen; + goto finish; } else if (context->hashInfo) { (*context->end)(context->hashInfo, tmpbuf, &digestLen, sizeof(tmpbuf)); - rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pSignature, - &outlen, maxoutlen, tmpbuf, digestLen); + rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pSignature, + &outlen, maxoutlen, tmpbuf, digestLen); *pulSignatureLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen; } else { - /* deal with the last block if any residual */ - if (context->padDataLength) { - /* fill out rest of pad buffer with pad magic*/ - int i; - for (i=context->padDataLength; i < (int)context->blockSize; i++) { - context->padBuf[i] = 0; - } - rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo,context->macBuf, - &outlen,SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE,context->padBuf,context->blockSize); - } - if (rv == SECSuccess) { - PORT_Memcpy(pSignature,context->macBuf,context->macSize); - *pulSignatureLen = context->macSize; - } + /* deal with the last block if any residual */ + if (context->padDataLength) { + /* fill out rest of pad buffer with pad magic*/ + int i; + for (i=context->padDataLength; i < (int)context->blockSize; i++) { + context->padBuf[i] = 0; + } + rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo,context->macBuf, + &outlen,SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE,context->padBuf,context->blockSize); + } + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + PORT_Memcpy(pSignature,context->macBuf,context->macSize); + *pulSignatureLen = context->macSize; + } } sftk_FreeContext(context); sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_SIGN, NULL); finish: sftk_FreeSession(session); return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; } /* NSC_Sign signs (encrypts with private key) data in a single part, * where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the data, * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature */ CK_RV NSC_Sign(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_BYTE_PTR pData,CK_ULONG ulDataLen,CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, - CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen) + CK_BYTE_PTR pData,CK_ULONG ulDataLen,CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, + CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen) { SFTKSession *session; SFTKSessionContext *context; unsigned int outlen; unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulSignatureLen; CK_RV crv,crv2; SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; /* make sure we're legal */ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_SIGN,PR_FALSE,&session); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; if (!pSignature) { - *pulSignatureLen = context->maxLen; - goto finish; + *pulSignatureLen = context->maxLen; + goto finish; } /* multi part Signing are completely implemented by SignUpdate and * sign Final */ if (context->multi) { sftk_FreeSession(session); - crv = NSC_SignUpdate(hSession,pData,ulDataLen); - if (crv != CKR_OK) *pulSignatureLen = 0; - crv2 = NSC_SignFinal(hSession, pSignature, pulSignatureLen); - return crv == CKR_OK ? crv2 :crv; + crv = NSC_SignUpdate(hSession,pData,ulDataLen); + if (crv != CKR_OK) *pulSignatureLen = 0; + crv2 = NSC_SignFinal(hSession, pSignature, pulSignatureLen); + return crv == CKR_OK ? crv2 :crv; } rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pSignature, - &outlen, maxoutlen, pData, ulDataLen); + &outlen, maxoutlen, pData, ulDataLen); *pulSignatureLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen; sftk_FreeContext(context); sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_SIGN, NULL); finish: sftk_FreeSession(session); return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; } /* ************** Crypto Functions: Sign Recover ************************ */ /* NSC_SignRecoverInit initializes a signature operation, * where the (digest) data can be recovered from the signature. * E.g. encryption with the user's private key */ CK_RV NSC_SignRecoverInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) { switch (pMechanism->mechanism) { case CKM_RSA_PKCS: case CKM_RSA_X_509: - return NSC_SignInit(hSession,pMechanism,hKey); + return NSC_SignInit(hSession,pMechanism,hKey); default: - break; + break; } return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; } /* NSC_SignRecover signs data in a single operation * where the (digest) data can be recovered from the signature. * E.g. encryption with the user's private key */ CK_RV NSC_SignRecover(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData, - CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen) + CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen) { return NSC_Sign(hSession,pData,ulDataLen,pSignature,pulSignatureLen); } /* ************** Crypto Functions: verify ************************ */ /* Handle RSA Signature formatting */ static SECStatus sftk_hashCheckSign(SFTKHashVerifyInfo *info, unsigned char *sig, - unsigned int sigLen, unsigned char *digest, unsigned int digestLen) + unsigned int sigLen, unsigned char *digest, unsigned int digestLen) { return RSA_HashCheckSign(info->hashOid, info->key, sig, sigLen, - digest, digestLen); + digest, digestLen); } SECStatus RSA_HashCheckSign(SECOidTag hashOid, NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, - unsigned char *sig, unsigned int sigLen, - unsigned char *digest, unsigned int digestLen) + unsigned char *sig, unsigned int sigLen, + unsigned char *digest, unsigned int digestLen) { SECItem it; SGNDigestInfo *di = NULL; SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; it.data = NULL; if (key == NULL) goto loser; @@ -2142,428 +2142,429 @@ RSA_HashCheckSign(SECOidTag hashOid, NSS /* decrypt the block */ rv = RSA_CheckSignRecover(key, it.data, &it.len, it.len, sig, sigLen); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; di = SGN_DecodeDigestInfo(&it); if (di == NULL) goto loser; if (di->digest.len != digestLen) goto loser; /* make sure the tag is OK */ if (SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&di->digestAlgorithm) != hashOid) { - goto loser; + goto loser; } /* Now check the signature */ if (PORT_Memcmp(digest, di->digest.data, di->digest.len) == 0) { - goto done; + goto done; } loser: rv = SECFailure; done: if (it.data != NULL) PORT_Free(it.data); if (di != NULL) SGN_DestroyDigestInfo(di); return rv; } /* NSC_VerifyInit initializes a verification operation, * where the signature is an appendix to the data, * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature (e.g. DSA) */ CK_RV NSC_VerifyInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) { SFTKSession *session; SFTKObject *key; SFTKSessionContext *context; CK_KEY_TYPE key_type; CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *pubKey; SFTKHashVerifyInfo *info = NULL; /* Block Cipher MACing Algorithms use a different Context init method..*/ crv = sftk_InitCBCMac(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_VERIFY, SFTK_VERIFY); if (crv != CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) return crv; session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session,&context,SFTK_VERIFY,&key,hKey,&key_type, - CKO_PUBLIC_KEY,CKA_VERIFY); + CKO_PUBLIC_KEY,CKA_VERIFY); if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeSession(session); - return crv; + sftk_FreeSession(session); + return crv; } context->multi = PR_FALSE; #define INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(mmm) \ case CKM_ ## mmm ## _RSA_PKCS: \ context->multi = PR_TRUE; \ - crv = sftk_doSub ## mmm (context); \ - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; \ - context->verify = (SFTKVerify) sftk_hashCheckSign; \ - info = PORT_New(SFTKHashVerifyInfo); \ - if (info == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } \ - info->hashOid = SEC_OID_ ## mmm ; \ - goto finish_rsa; + crv = sftk_doSub ## mmm (context); \ + if (crv != CKR_OK) break; \ + context->verify = (SFTKVerify) sftk_hashCheckSign; \ + info = PORT_New(SFTKHashVerifyInfo); \ + if (info == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } \ + info->hashOid = SEC_OID_ ## mmm ; \ + goto finish_rsa; switch(pMechanism->mechanism) { INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(MD5) INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(MD2) INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA1) INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA256) INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA384) INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA512) case CKM_RSA_PKCS: - context->verify = (SFTKVerify) RSA_CheckSign; - goto finish_rsa; + context->verify = (SFTKVerify) RSA_CheckSign; + goto finish_rsa; case CKM_RSA_X_509: - context->verify = (SFTKVerify) RSA_CheckSignRaw; + context->verify = (SFTKVerify) RSA_CheckSignRaw; finish_rsa: - if (key_type != CKK_RSA) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv); - if (pubKey == NULL) { - break; - } - if (info) { - info->key = pubKey; - context->cipherInfo = info; - context->destroy = sftk_Space; - } else { - context->cipherInfo = pubKey; - context->destroy = sftk_Null; - } - break; + if (key_type != CKK_RSA) { + if (info) PORT_Free(info); + crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + break; + } + pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv); + if (pubKey == NULL) { + break; + } + if (info) { + info->key = pubKey; + context->cipherInfo = info; + context->destroy = sftk_Space; + } else { + context->cipherInfo = pubKey; + context->destroy = sftk_Null; + } + break; case CKM_DSA_SHA1: context->multi = PR_TRUE; - crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - /* fall through */ + crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context); + if (crv != CKR_OK) break; + /* fall through */ case CKM_DSA: - if (key_type != CKK_DSA) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_DSA,&crv); - if (pubKey == NULL) { - break; - } - context->cipherInfo = pubKey; - context->verify = (SFTKVerify) nsc_DSA_Verify_Stub; - context->destroy = sftk_Null; - break; + if (key_type != CKK_DSA) { + crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + break; + } + pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_DSA,&crv); + if (pubKey == NULL) { + break; + } + context->cipherInfo = pubKey; + context->verify = (SFTKVerify) nsc_DSA_Verify_Stub; + context->destroy = sftk_Null; + break; #ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC case CKM_ECDSA_SHA1: - context->multi = PR_TRUE; - crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - /* fall through */ + context->multi = PR_TRUE; + crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context); + if (crv != CKR_OK) break; + /* fall through */ case CKM_ECDSA: - if (key_type != CKK_EC) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_EC,&crv); - if (pubKey == NULL) { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - context->cipherInfo = pubKey; - context->verify = (SFTKVerify) nsc_ECDSAVerifyStub; - context->destroy = sftk_Null; - break; + if (key_type != CKK_EC) { + crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + break; + } + pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_EC,&crv); + if (pubKey == NULL) { + crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + break; + } + context->cipherInfo = pubKey; + context->verify = (SFTKVerify) nsc_ECDSAVerifyStub; + context->destroy = sftk_Null; + break; #endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ INIT_HMAC_MECH(MD2) INIT_HMAC_MECH(MD5) INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA256) INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA384) INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA512) case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL: - crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgSHA1,key, - *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter); - break; + crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgSHA1,key, + *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter); + break; case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC: - crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgSHA1,key,SHA1_LENGTH); - break; + crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgSHA1,key,SHA1_LENGTH); + break; case CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC: - crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context,SEC_OID_MD5,key, - *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter); - break; + crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context,SEC_OID_MD5,key, + *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter); + break; case CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC: - crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context,SEC_OID_SHA1,key, - *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter); - break; + crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context,SEC_OID_SHA1,key, + *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter); + break; case CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL: - crv = sftk_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type); - break; + crv = sftk_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type); + break; default: - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; - break; + crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; + break; } if (crv != CKR_OK) { PORT_Free(context); - sftk_FreeSession(session); - return crv; + sftk_FreeSession(session); + return crv; } sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_VERIFY, context); sftk_FreeSession(session); return CKR_OK; } /* NSC_Verify verifies a signature in a single-part operation, * where the signature is an appendix to the data, * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature */ CK_RV NSC_Verify(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData, - CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen) + CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen) { SFTKSession *session; SFTKSessionContext *context; CK_RV crv; SECStatus rv; /* make sure we're legal */ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_VERIFY,PR_FALSE,&session); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; rv = (*context->verify)(context->cipherInfo,pSignature, ulSignatureLen, - pData, ulDataLen); + pData, ulDataLen); sftk_FreeContext(context); sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_VERIFY, NULL); sftk_FreeSession(session); return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; } /* NSC_VerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part verification operation, * where the signature is an appendix to the data, * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature */ CK_RV NSC_VerifyUpdate( CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, - CK_ULONG ulPartLen) + CK_ULONG ulPartLen) { return sftk_MACUpdate(hSession, pPart, ulPartLen, SFTK_VERIFY); } /* NSC_VerifyFinal finishes a multiple-part verification operation, * checking the signature. */ CK_RV NSC_VerifyFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen) + CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen) { SFTKSession *session; SFTKSessionContext *context; unsigned int outlen; unsigned int digestLen; unsigned char tmpbuf[SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; CK_RV crv; SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; /* make sure we're legal */ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_VERIFY,PR_TRUE,&session); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; if (context->hashInfo) { (*context->end)(context->hashInfo, tmpbuf, &digestLen, sizeof(tmpbuf)); - rv = (*context->verify)(context->cipherInfo, pSignature, - ulSignatureLen, tmpbuf, digestLen); + rv = (*context->verify)(context->cipherInfo, pSignature, + ulSignatureLen, tmpbuf, digestLen); } else { - if (context->padDataLength) { - /* fill out rest of pad buffer with pad magic*/ - int i; - for (i=context->padDataLength; i < (int)context->blockSize; i++) { - context->padBuf[i] = 0; - } - rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo,context->macBuf, - &outlen,SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE,context->padBuf,context->blockSize); - } - if (rv == SECSuccess) { - rv =(PORT_Memcmp(pSignature,context->macBuf,context->macSize) == 0) - ? SECSuccess : SECFailure; - } + if (context->padDataLength) { + /* fill out rest of pad buffer with pad magic*/ + int i; + for (i=context->padDataLength; i < (int)context->blockSize; i++) { + context->padBuf[i] = 0; + } + rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo,context->macBuf, + &outlen,SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE,context->padBuf,context->blockSize); + } + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + rv =(PORT_Memcmp(pSignature,context->macBuf,context->macSize) == 0) + ? SECSuccess : SECFailure; + } } sftk_FreeContext(context); sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_VERIFY, NULL); sftk_FreeSession(session); return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; } /* ************** Crypto Functions: Verify Recover ************************ */ /* NSC_VerifyRecoverInit initializes a signature verification operation, * where the data is recovered from the signature. * E.g. Decryption with the user's public key */ CK_RV NSC_VerifyRecoverInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) { SFTKSession *session; SFTKObject *key; SFTKSessionContext *context; CK_KEY_TYPE key_type; CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *pubKey; session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session,&context,SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER, - &key,hKey,&key_type,CKO_PUBLIC_KEY,CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER); + &key,hKey,&key_type,CKO_PUBLIC_KEY,CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER); if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeSession(session); - return crv; + sftk_FreeSession(session); + return crv; } context->multi = PR_TRUE; switch(pMechanism->mechanism) { case CKM_RSA_PKCS: case CKM_RSA_X_509: - if (key_type != CKK_RSA) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - context->multi = PR_FALSE; - pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv); - if (pubKey == NULL) { - break; - } - context->cipherInfo = pubKey; - context->update = (SFTKCipher) (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RSA_X_509 - ? RSA_CheckSignRecoverRaw : RSA_CheckSignRecover); - context->destroy = sftk_Null; - break; + if (key_type != CKK_RSA) { + crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + break; + } + context->multi = PR_FALSE; + pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv); + if (pubKey == NULL) { + break; + } + context->cipherInfo = pubKey; + context->update = (SFTKCipher) (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RSA_X_509 + ? RSA_CheckSignRecoverRaw : RSA_CheckSignRecover); + context->destroy = sftk_Null; + break; default: - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; - break; + crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; + break; } if (crv != CKR_OK) { PORT_Free(context); - sftk_FreeSession(session); - return crv; + sftk_FreeSession(session); + return crv; } sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER, context); sftk_FreeSession(session); return CKR_OK; } /* NSC_VerifyRecover verifies a signature in a single-part operation, * where the data is recovered from the signature. * E.g. Decryption with the user's public key */ CK_RV NSC_VerifyRecover(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen, - CK_BYTE_PTR pData,CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen) + CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen, + CK_BYTE_PTR pData,CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen) { SFTKSession *session; SFTKSessionContext *context; unsigned int outlen; unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulDataLen; CK_RV crv; SECStatus rv; /* make sure we're legal */ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER, - PR_FALSE,&session); + PR_FALSE,&session); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; if (pData == NULL) { - /* to return the actual size, we need to do the decrypt, just return - * the max size, which is the size of the input signature. */ - *pulDataLen = ulSignatureLen; - rv = SECSuccess; - goto finish; + /* to return the actual size, we need to do the decrypt, just return + * the max size, which is the size of the input signature. */ + *pulDataLen = ulSignatureLen; + rv = SECSuccess; + goto finish; } rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pData, &outlen, maxoutlen, - pSignature, ulSignatureLen); + pSignature, ulSignatureLen); *pulDataLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen; sftk_FreeContext(context); sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER, NULL); finish: sftk_FreeSession(session); return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; } /* **************************** Random Functions: ************************ */ /* NSC_SeedRandom mixes additional seed material into the token's random number * generator. */ CK_RV NSC_SeedRandom(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed, - CK_ULONG ulSeedLen) + CK_ULONG ulSeedLen) { SECStatus rv; rv = RNG_RandomUpdate(pSeed, ulSeedLen); return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; } /* NSC_GenerateRandom generates random data. */ CK_RV NSC_GenerateRandom(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomData, CK_ULONG ulRandomLen) + CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomData, CK_ULONG ulRandomLen) { SECStatus rv; rv = RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(pRandomData, ulRandomLen); return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; } /* **************************** Key Functions: ************************ */ /* * generate a password based encryption key. This code uses * PKCS5 to do the work. */ static CK_RV nsc_pbe_key_gen(NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *pkcs5_pbe, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, - char *buf, CK_ULONG *key_length, PRBool faulty3DES) + char *buf, CK_ULONG *key_length, PRBool faulty3DES) { SECItem *pbe_key = NULL, iv, pwitem; CK_PBE_PARAMS *pbe_params = NULL; *key_length = 0; iv.data = NULL; iv.len = 0; pbe_params = (CK_PBE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter; pwitem.data = (unsigned char *)pbe_params->pPassword; pwitem.len = (unsigned int)pbe_params->ulPasswordLen; pbe_key = nsspkcs5_ComputeKeyAndIV(pkcs5_pbe, &pwitem, &iv, faulty3DES); if (pbe_key == NULL) { - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; } PORT_Memcpy(buf, pbe_key->data, pbe_key->len); *key_length = pbe_key->len; SECITEM_ZfreeItem(pbe_key, PR_TRUE); pbe_key = NULL; if (iv.data) { if (pbe_params->pInitVector != NULL) { - PORT_Memcpy(pbe_params->pInitVector, iv.data, iv.len); + PORT_Memcpy(pbe_params->pInitVector, iv.data, iv.len); } PORT_Free(iv.data); } return CKR_OK; } static CK_RV nsc_parameter_gen(CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, SFTKObject *key) { SFTKAttribute *attribute; @@ -2571,253 +2572,253 @@ nsc_parameter_gen(CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, unsigned int seedBits = 0; unsigned int primeBits; unsigned int j; CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; PQGParams *params = NULL; PQGVerify *vfy = NULL; SECStatus rv; attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_PRIME_BITS); if (attribute == NULL) { - return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; + return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; } primeBits = (unsigned int) *(CK_ULONG *)attribute->attrib.pValue; sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute); j = PQG_PBITS_TO_INDEX(primeBits); if (j == (unsigned int)-1) { - return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; + return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; } attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_SEED_BITS); if (attribute != NULL) { - seedBits = (unsigned int) *(CK_ULONG *)attribute->attrib.pValue; - sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute); + seedBits = (unsigned int) *(CK_ULONG *)attribute->attrib.pValue; + sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute); } sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_PRIME_BITS); sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_SEED_BITS); if (seedBits == 0) { - rv = PQG_ParamGen(j, ¶ms, &vfy); + rv = PQG_ParamGen(j, ¶ms, &vfy); } else { - rv = PQG_ParamGenSeedLen(j,seedBits/8, ¶ms, &vfy); + rv = PQG_ParamGenSeedLen(j,seedBits/8, ¶ms, &vfy); } if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; + return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; } crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_PRIME, - params->prime.data, params->prime.len); + params->prime.data, params->prime.len); if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_SUBPRIME, - params->subPrime.data, params->subPrime.len); + params->subPrime.data, params->subPrime.len); if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_BASE, - params->base.data, params->base.len); + params->base.data, params->base.len); if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; counter = vfy->counter; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_COUNTER, - &counter, sizeof(counter)); + &counter, sizeof(counter)); crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_SEED, - vfy->seed.data, vfy->seed.len); + vfy->seed.data, vfy->seed.len); if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_H, - vfy->h.data, vfy->h.len); + vfy->h.data, vfy->h.len); if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; loser: if (params) { - PQG_DestroyParams(params); + PQG_DestroyParams(params); } if (vfy) { - PQG_DestroyVerify(vfy); + PQG_DestroyVerify(vfy); } return crv; } static CK_RV nsc_SetupBulkKeyGen(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism, CK_KEY_TYPE *key_type, - CK_ULONG *key_length) + CK_ULONG *key_length) { CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; switch (mechanism) { case CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN: - *key_type = CKK_RC2; - if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; - break; + *key_type = CKK_RC2; + if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; + break; #if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5 case CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN: - *key_type = CKK_RC5; - if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; - break; + *key_type = CKK_RC5; + if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; + break; #endif case CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN: - *key_type = CKK_RC4; - if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; - break; + *key_type = CKK_RC4; + if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; + break; case CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN: - *key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; - if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; - break; + *key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; + if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; + break; case CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN: - *key_type = CKK_CDMF; - *key_length = 8; - break; + *key_type = CKK_CDMF; + *key_length = 8; + break; case CKM_DES_KEY_GEN: - *key_type = CKK_DES; - *key_length = 8; - break; + *key_type = CKK_DES; + *key_length = 8; + break; case CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN: - *key_type = CKK_DES2; - *key_length = 16; - break; + *key_type = CKK_DES2; + *key_length = 16; + break; case CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN: - *key_type = CKK_DES3; - *key_length = 24; - break; + *key_type = CKK_DES3; + *key_length = 24; + break; case CKM_AES_KEY_GEN: - *key_type = CKK_AES; - if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; - break; + *key_type = CKK_AES; + if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; + break; default: - PORT_Assert(0); - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; - break; + PORT_Assert(0); + crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; + break; } return crv; } CK_RV nsc_SetupHMACKeyGen(CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, NSSPKCS5PBEParameter **pbe) { SECItem salt; CK_PBE_PARAMS *pbe_params = NULL; NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *params; PRArenaPool *arena = NULL; SECStatus rv; *pbe = NULL; arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE); if (arena == NULL) { - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; } params = (NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *) PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, - sizeof(NSSPKCS5PBEParameter)); + sizeof(NSSPKCS5PBEParameter)); if (params == NULL) { - PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_TRUE); - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_TRUE); + return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; } params->poolp = arena; params->ivLen = 0; params->pbeType = NSSPKCS5_PKCS12_V2; params->hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1; params->encAlg = SEC_OID_SHA1; /* any invalid value */ params->is2KeyDES = PR_FALSE; params->keyID = pbeBitGenIntegrityKey; pbe_params = (CK_PBE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter; params->iter = pbe_params->ulIteration; salt.data = (unsigned char *)pbe_params->pSalt; salt.len = (unsigned int)pbe_params->ulSaltLen; rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena,¶ms->salt,&salt); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_TRUE); - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_TRUE); + return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; } switch (pMechanism->mechanism) { case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_HMAC_KEY_GEN: case CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC: - params->hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1; - params->keyLen = 20; - break; + params->hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1; + params->keyLen = 20; + break; case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD5_HMAC_KEY_GEN: - params->hashType = HASH_AlgMD5; - params->keyLen = 16; - break; + params->hashType = HASH_AlgMD5; + params->keyLen = 16; + break; case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD2_HMAC_KEY_GEN: - params->hashType = HASH_AlgMD2; - params->keyLen = 16; - break; + params->hashType = HASH_AlgMD2; + params->keyLen = 16; + break; default: - PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_TRUE); - return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; + PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_TRUE); + return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; } *pbe = params; return CKR_OK; } /* maybe this should be table driven? */ static CK_RV nsc_SetupPBEKeyGen(CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, NSSPKCS5PBEParameter **pbe, - CK_KEY_TYPE *key_type) + CK_KEY_TYPE *key_type) { CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; SECOidData *oid; CK_PBE_PARAMS *pbe_params; NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *params; SECItem salt; *pbe = NULL; oid = SECOID_FindOIDByMechanism(pMechanism->mechanism); if (oid == NULL) { - return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; + return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; } pbe_params = (CK_PBE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter; salt.data = (unsigned char *)pbe_params->pSalt; salt.len = (unsigned int)pbe_params->ulSaltLen; params=nsspkcs5_NewParam(oid->offset, &salt, pbe_params->ulIteration); if (params == NULL) { - return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; + return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; } switch (params->encAlg) { case SEC_OID_DES_CBC: - *key_type = CKK_DES; - break; + *key_type = CKK_DES; + break; case SEC_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC: - *key_type = params->is2KeyDES ? CKK_DES2 : CKK_DES3; - break; + *key_type = params->is2KeyDES ? CKK_DES2 : CKK_DES3; + break; case SEC_OID_RC2_CBC: - *key_type = CKK_RC2; - break; + *key_type = CKK_RC2; + break; case SEC_OID_RC4: - *key_type = CKK_RC4; - break; + *key_type = CKK_RC4; + break; default: - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; - nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(params); - break; + crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; + nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(params); + break; } if (crv == CKR_OK) { - *pbe = params; + *pbe = params; } return crv; } /* NSC_GenerateKey generates a secret key, creating a new key object. */ CK_RV NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate,CK_ULONG ulCount, - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey) + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate,CK_ULONG ulCount, + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey) { SFTKObject *key; SFTKSession *session; PRBool checkWeak = PR_FALSE; CK_ULONG key_length = 0; CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE; CK_OBJECT_CLASS objclass = CKO_SECRET_KEY; CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE; int i; @@ -2832,200 +2833,200 @@ CK_RV NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE * produce them any more. The affected algorithm was 3DES. */ PRBool faultyPBE3DES = PR_FALSE; /* * now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of */ key = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */ if (key == NULL) { - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; } /* * load the template values into the object */ for (i=0; i < (int) ulCount; i++) { - if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN) { - key_length = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue; - continue; - } + if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN) { + key_length = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue; + continue; + } - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,sftk_attr_expand(&pTemplate[i])); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,sftk_attr_expand(&pTemplate[i])); + if (crv != CKR_OK) break; } if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeObject(key); - return crv; + sftk_FreeObject(key); + return crv; } /* make sure we don't have any class, key_type, or value fields */ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_CLASS); sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE); sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_VALUE); /* Now Set up the parameters to generate the key (based on mechanism) */ key_gen_type = nsc_bulk; /* bulk key by default */ switch (pMechanism->mechanism) { case CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN: case CKM_DES_KEY_GEN: case CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN: case CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN: - checkWeak = PR_TRUE; + checkWeak = PR_TRUE; case CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN: case CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN: case CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN: case CKM_AES_KEY_GEN: #if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5 case CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN: #endif - crv = nsc_SetupBulkKeyGen(pMechanism->mechanism,&key_type,&key_length); - break; + crv = nsc_SetupBulkKeyGen(pMechanism->mechanism,&key_type,&key_length); + break; case CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN: - key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; - key_length = 48; - key_gen_type = nsc_ssl; - break; + key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; + key_length = 48; + key_gen_type = nsc_ssl; + break; case CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC: case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_HMAC_KEY_GEN: case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD5_HMAC_KEY_GEN: case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD2_HMAC_KEY_GEN: - key_gen_type = nsc_pbe; - key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; - crv = nsc_SetupHMACKeyGen(pMechanism, &pbe_param); - break; + key_gen_type = nsc_pbe; + key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; + crv = nsc_SetupHMACKeyGen(pMechanism, &pbe_param); + break; case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_FAULTY_3DES_CBC: - faultyPBE3DES = PR_TRUE; + faultyPBE3DES = PR_TRUE; case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_TRIPLE_DES_CBC: case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_40_BIT_RC2_CBC: case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_DES_CBC: case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_128_BIT_RC2_CBC: case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_40_BIT_RC4: case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_128_BIT_RC4: case CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC: case CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC: case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC: case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC: case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128: case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40: case CKM_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC: case CKM_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC: - key_gen_type = nsc_pbe; - crv = nsc_SetupPBEKeyGen(pMechanism,&pbe_param, &key_type); - break; + key_gen_type = nsc_pbe; + crv = nsc_SetupPBEKeyGen(pMechanism,&pbe_param, &key_type); + break; case CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN: - key_gen_type = nsc_param; - key_type = CKK_DSA; - objclass = CKO_KG_PARAMETERS; - crv = CKR_OK; - break; + key_gen_type = nsc_param; + key_type = CKK_DSA; + objclass = CKO_KG_PARAMETERS; + crv = CKR_OK; + break; default: - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; - break; + crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; + break; } /* make sure we aren't going to overflow the buffer */ if (sizeof(buf) < key_length) { - /* someone is getting pretty optimistic about how big their key can - * be... */ + /* someone is getting pretty optimistic about how big their key can + * be... */ crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; } if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; } /* if there was no error, * key_type *MUST* be set in the switch statement above */ PORT_Assert( key_type != CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE ); /* * now to the actual key gen. */ switch (key_gen_type) { case nsc_pbe: - crv = nsc_pbe_key_gen(pbe_param, pMechanism, buf, &key_length, - faultyPBE3DES); - nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(pbe_param); - break; + crv = nsc_pbe_key_gen(pbe_param, pMechanism, buf, &key_length, + faultyPBE3DES); + nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(pbe_param); + break; case nsc_ssl: - rsa_pms = (SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *)buf; - version = (CK_VERSION *)pMechanism->pParameter; - rsa_pms->client_version[0] = version->major; + rsa_pms = (SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *)buf; + version = (CK_VERSION *)pMechanism->pParameter; + rsa_pms->client_version[0] = version->major; rsa_pms->client_version[1] = version->minor; crv = - NSC_GenerateRandom(0,&rsa_pms->random[0], sizeof(rsa_pms->random)); - break; + NSC_GenerateRandom(0,&rsa_pms->random[0], sizeof(rsa_pms->random)); + break; case nsc_bulk: - /* get the key, check for weak keys and repeat if found */ - do { + /* get the key, check for weak keys and repeat if found */ + do { crv = NSC_GenerateRandom(0, (unsigned char *)buf, key_length); - } while (crv == CKR_OK && checkWeak && - sftk_IsWeakKey((unsigned char *)buf,key_type)); - break; + } while (crv == CKR_OK && checkWeak && + sftk_IsWeakKey((unsigned char *)buf,key_type)); + break; case nsc_param: - /* generate parameters */ - *buf = 0; - crv = nsc_parameter_gen(key_type,key); - break; + /* generate parameters */ + *buf = 0; + crv = nsc_parameter_gen(key_type,key); + break; } if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; } /* Add the class, key_type, and value */ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_CLASS,&objclass,sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS)); if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; } crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&key_type,sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE)); if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; } if (key_length != 0) { - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_VALUE,buf,key_length); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; } + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_VALUE,buf,key_length); + if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; } } /* get the session */ session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); if (session == NULL) { - sftk_FreeObject(key); + sftk_FreeObject(key); return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; } /* * handle the base object stuff */ crv = sftk_handleObject(key,session); sftk_FreeSession(session); if (sftk_isTrue(key,CKA_SENSITIVE)) { - sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); + sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); } if (!sftk_isTrue(key,CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) { - sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); + sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); } *phKey = key->handle; sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; } -#define PAIRWISE_DIGEST_LENGTH SHA1_LENGTH /* 160-bits */ -#define PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH 20 /* 160-bits */ +#define PAIRWISE_DIGEST_LENGTH SHA1_LENGTH /* 160-bits */ +#define PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH 20 /* 160-bits */ /* * FIPS 140-2 pairwise consistency check utilized to validate key pair. * * This function returns * CKR_OK if pairwise consistency check passed * CKR_GENERAL_ERROR if pairwise consistency check failed * other error codes if paiswise consistency check could not be * performed, for example, CKR_HOST_MEMORY. */ static CK_RV sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - SFTKObject *publicKey, SFTKObject *privateKey, CK_KEY_TYPE keyType) + SFTKObject *publicKey, SFTKObject *privateKey, CK_KEY_TYPE keyType) { /* * Key type Mechanism type * -------------------------------- * For encrypt/decrypt: CKK_RSA => CKM_RSA_PKCS * others => CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM * * For sign/verify: CKK_RSA => CKM_RSA_PKCS * CKK_DSA => CKM_DSA * CKK_EC => CKM_ECDSA @@ -3050,745 +3051,745 @@ sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION CK_ULONG bytes_encrypted; CK_ULONG bytes_compared; /* Variables used for Signature/Verification functions. */ /* always uses SHA-1 digest */ unsigned char *known_digest = (unsigned char *)"Mozilla Rules World!"; unsigned char *signature; CK_ULONG signature_length; if (keyType == CKK_RSA) { - SFTKAttribute *attribute; + SFTKAttribute *attribute; - /* Get modulus length of private key. */ - attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(privateKey, CKA_MODULUS); - if (attribute == NULL) { - return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; - } - modulusLen = attribute->attrib.ulValueLen; - if (*(unsigned char *)attribute->attrib.pValue == 0) { - modulusLen--; - } - sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute); + /* Get modulus length of private key. */ + attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(privateKey, CKA_MODULUS); + if (attribute == NULL) { + return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + modulusLen = attribute->attrib.ulValueLen; + if (*(unsigned char *)attribute->attrib.pValue == 0) { + modulusLen--; + } + sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute); } /**************************************************/ /* Pairwise Consistency Check of Encrypt/Decrypt. */ /**************************************************/ isEncryptable = sftk_isTrue(privateKey, CKA_DECRYPT); /* * If the decryption attribute is set, attempt to encrypt * with the public key and decrypt with the private key. */ if (isEncryptable) { - if (keyType != CKK_RSA) { - return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; - } - bytes_encrypted = modulusLen; - mech.mechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS; - - /* Allocate space for ciphertext. */ - ciphertext = (unsigned char *) PORT_ZAlloc(bytes_encrypted); - if (ciphertext == NULL) { - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - } - - /* Prepare for encryption using the public key. */ - crv = NSC_EncryptInit(hSession, &mech, publicKey->handle); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_Free(ciphertext); - return crv; - } - - /* Encrypt using the public key. */ - crv = NSC_Encrypt(hSession, - known_message, - PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH, - ciphertext, - &bytes_encrypted); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_Free(ciphertext); - return crv; - } - - /* Always use the smaller of these two values . . . */ - bytes_compared = PR_MIN(bytes_encrypted, PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH); - - /* - * If there was a failure, the plaintext - * goes at the end, therefore . . . - */ - text_compared = ciphertext + bytes_encrypted - bytes_compared; - - /* - * Check to ensure that ciphertext does - * NOT EQUAL known input message text - * per FIPS PUB 140-2 directive. - */ - if (PORT_Memcmp(text_compared, known_message, - bytes_compared) == 0) { - /* Set error to Invalid PRIVATE Key. */ - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); - PORT_Free(ciphertext); - return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; - } - - /* Prepare for decryption using the private key. */ - crv = NSC_DecryptInit(hSession, &mech, privateKey->handle); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_Free(ciphertext); - return crv; - } - - memset(plaintext, 0, PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH); - - /* - * Initialize bytes decrypted to be the - * expected PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH. - */ - bytes_decrypted = PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH; - - /* - * Decrypt using the private key. - * NOTE: No need to reset the - * value of bytes_encrypted. - */ - crv = NSC_Decrypt(hSession, - ciphertext, - bytes_encrypted, - plaintext, - &bytes_decrypted); - - /* Finished with ciphertext; free it. */ - PORT_Free(ciphertext); - - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - return crv; - } - - /* - * Check to ensure that the output plaintext - * does EQUAL known input message text. - */ - if ((bytes_decrypted != PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH) || - (PORT_Memcmp(plaintext, known_message, - PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH) != 0)) { - /* Set error to Bad PUBLIC Key. */ - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY); - return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; - } + if (keyType != CKK_RSA) { + return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + bytes_encrypted = modulusLen; + mech.mechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS; + + /* Allocate space for ciphertext. */ + ciphertext = (unsigned char *) PORT_ZAlloc(bytes_encrypted); + if (ciphertext == NULL) { + return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + } + + /* Prepare for encryption using the public key. */ + crv = NSC_EncryptInit(hSession, &mech, publicKey->handle); + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + PORT_Free(ciphertext); + return crv; + } + + /* Encrypt using the public key. */ + crv = NSC_Encrypt(hSession, + known_message, + PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH, + ciphertext, + &bytes_encrypted); + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + PORT_Free(ciphertext); + return crv; + } + + /* Always use the smaller of these two values . . . */ + bytes_compared = PR_MIN(bytes_encrypted, PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH); + + /* + * If there was a failure, the plaintext + * goes at the end, therefore . . . + */ + text_compared = ciphertext + bytes_encrypted - bytes_compared; + + /* + * Check to ensure that ciphertext does + * NOT EQUAL known input message text + * per FIPS PUB 140-2 directive. + */ + if (PORT_Memcmp(text_compared, known_message, + bytes_compared) == 0) { + /* Set error to Invalid PRIVATE Key. */ + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); + PORT_Free(ciphertext); + return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; + } + + /* Prepare for decryption using the private key. */ + crv = NSC_DecryptInit(hSession, &mech, privateKey->handle); + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + PORT_Free(ciphertext); + return crv; + } + + memset(plaintext, 0, PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH); + + /* + * Initialize bytes decrypted to be the + * expected PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH. + */ + bytes_decrypted = PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH; + + /* + * Decrypt using the private key. + * NOTE: No need to reset the + * value of bytes_encrypted. + */ + crv = NSC_Decrypt(hSession, + ciphertext, + bytes_encrypted, + plaintext, + &bytes_decrypted); + + /* Finished with ciphertext; free it. */ + PORT_Free(ciphertext); + + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + return crv; + } + + /* + * Check to ensure that the output plaintext + * does EQUAL known input message text. + */ + if ((bytes_decrypted != PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH) || + (PORT_Memcmp(plaintext, known_message, + PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH) != 0)) { + /* Set error to Bad PUBLIC Key. */ + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY); + return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; + } } /**********************************************/ /* Pairwise Consistency Check of Sign/Verify. */ /**********************************************/ canSignVerify = sftk_isTrue(privateKey, CKA_SIGN); if (canSignVerify) { - /* Determine length of signature. */ - switch (keyType) { - case CKK_RSA: - signature_length = modulusLen; - mech.mechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS; - break; - case CKK_DSA: - signature_length = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN; - mech.mechanism = CKM_DSA; - break; + /* Determine length of signature. */ + switch (keyType) { + case CKK_RSA: + signature_length = modulusLen; + mech.mechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS; + break; + case CKK_DSA: + signature_length = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN; + mech.mechanism = CKM_DSA; + break; #ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC - case CKK_EC: - signature_length = MAX_ECKEY_LEN * 2; - mech.mechanism = CKM_ECDSA; - break; + case CKK_EC: + signature_length = MAX_ECKEY_LEN * 2; + mech.mechanism = CKM_ECDSA; + break; #endif - default: - return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; - } - - /* Allocate space for signature data. */ - signature = (unsigned char *) PORT_ZAlloc(signature_length); - if (signature == NULL) { - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - } - - /* Sign the known hash using the private key. */ - crv = NSC_SignInit(hSession, &mech, privateKey->handle); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_Free(signature); - return crv; - } - - crv = NSC_Sign(hSession, - known_digest, - PAIRWISE_DIGEST_LENGTH, - signature, - &signature_length); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_Free(signature); - return crv; - } - - /* Verify the known hash using the public key. */ - crv = NSC_VerifyInit(hSession, &mech, publicKey->handle); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_Free(signature); - return crv; - } - - crv = NSC_Verify(hSession, - known_digest, - PAIRWISE_DIGEST_LENGTH, - signature, - signature_length); - - /* Free signature data. */ - PORT_Free(signature); - - if ((crv == CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE) || - (crv == CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID)) { - return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; - } - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - return crv; - } + default: + return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + + /* Allocate space for signature data. */ + signature = (unsigned char *) PORT_ZAlloc(signature_length); + if (signature == NULL) { + return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + } + + /* Sign the known hash using the private key. */ + crv = NSC_SignInit(hSession, &mech, privateKey->handle); + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + PORT_Free(signature); + return crv; + } + + crv = NSC_Sign(hSession, + known_digest, + PAIRWISE_DIGEST_LENGTH, + signature, + &signature_length); + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + PORT_Free(signature); + return crv; + } + + /* Verify the known hash using the public key. */ + crv = NSC_VerifyInit(hSession, &mech, publicKey->handle); + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + PORT_Free(signature); + return crv; + } + + crv = NSC_Verify(hSession, + known_digest, + PAIRWISE_DIGEST_LENGTH, + signature, + signature_length); + + /* Free signature data. */ + PORT_Free(signature); + + if ((crv == CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE) || + (crv == CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID)) { + return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; + } + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + return crv; + } } /**********************************************/ /* Pairwise Consistency Check for Derivation */ /**********************************************/ isDerivable = sftk_isTrue(privateKey, CKA_DERIVE); if (isDerivable) { - /* - * We are not doing consistency check for Diffie-Hellman Key - - * otherwise it would be here - * This is also true for Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman keys - * NOTE: EC keys are currently subjected to pairwise - * consistency check for signing/verification. - */ - /* - * FIPS 140-2 had the following pairwise consistency test for - * public and private keys used for key agreement: - * If the keys are used to perform key agreement, then the - * cryptographic module shall create a second, compatible - * key pair. The cryptographic module shall perform both - * sides of the key agreement algorithm and shall compare - * the resulting shared values. If the shared values are - * not equal, the test shall fail. - * This test was removed in Change Notice 3. - */ + /* + * We are not doing consistency check for Diffie-Hellman Key - + * otherwise it would be here + * This is also true for Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman keys + * NOTE: EC keys are currently subjected to pairwise + * consistency check for signing/verification. + */ + /* + * FIPS 140-2 had the following pairwise consistency test for + * public and private keys used for key agreement: + * If the keys are used to perform key agreement, then the + * cryptographic module shall create a second, compatible + * key pair. The cryptographic module shall perform both + * sides of the key agreement algorithm and shall compare + * the resulting shared values. If the shared values are + * not equal, the test shall fail. + * This test was removed in Change Notice 3. + */ } return CKR_OK; } /* NSC_GenerateKeyPair generates a public-key/private-key pair, * creating new key objects. */ CK_RV NSC_GenerateKeyPair (CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPublicKeyTemplate, - CK_ULONG ulPublicKeyAttributeCount, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPrivateKeyTemplate, - CK_ULONG ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPublicKey, - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPrivateKey) -{ - SFTKObject * publicKey,*privateKey; - SFTKSession * session; - CK_KEY_TYPE key_type; - CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; - CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE; - SECStatus rv; - CK_OBJECT_CLASS pubClass = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; - CK_OBJECT_CLASS privClass = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; - int i; - SFTKSlot * slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession); + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPublicKeyTemplate, + CK_ULONG ulPublicKeyAttributeCount, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPrivateKeyTemplate, + CK_ULONG ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPublicKey, + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPrivateKey) +{ + SFTKObject * publicKey,*privateKey; + SFTKSession * session; + CK_KEY_TYPE key_type; + CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; + CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE; + SECStatus rv; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS pubClass = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS privClass = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; + int i; + SFTKSlot * slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession); unsigned int bitSize; /* RSA */ - int public_modulus_bits = 0; - SECItem pubExp; - RSAPrivateKey * rsaPriv; + int public_modulus_bits = 0; + SECItem pubExp; + RSAPrivateKey * rsaPriv; /* DSA */ - PQGParams pqgParam; - DHParams dhParam; - DSAPrivateKey * dsaPriv; + PQGParams pqgParam; + DHParams dhParam; + DSAPrivateKey * dsaPriv; /* Diffie Hellman */ - int private_value_bits = 0; - DHPrivateKey * dhPriv; + int private_value_bits = 0; + DHPrivateKey * dhPriv; #ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC /* Elliptic Curve Cryptography */ - SECItem ecEncodedParams; /* DER Encoded parameters */ - ECPrivateKey * ecPriv; + SECItem ecEncodedParams; /* DER Encoded parameters */ + ECPrivateKey * ecPriv; ECParams * ecParams; #endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ /* * now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of */ publicKey = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */ if (publicKey == NULL) { - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; } /* * load the template values into the publicKey */ for (i=0; i < (int) ulPublicKeyAttributeCount; i++) { - if (pPublicKeyTemplate[i].type == CKA_MODULUS_BITS) { - public_modulus_bits = *(CK_ULONG *)pPublicKeyTemplate[i].pValue; - continue; - } - - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, - sftk_attr_expand(&pPublicKeyTemplate[i])); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; + if (pPublicKeyTemplate[i].type == CKA_MODULUS_BITS) { + public_modulus_bits = *(CK_ULONG *)pPublicKeyTemplate[i].pValue; + continue; + } + + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, + sftk_attr_expand(&pPublicKeyTemplate[i])); + if (crv != CKR_OK) break; } if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeObject(publicKey); - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + sftk_FreeObject(publicKey); + return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; } privateKey = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */ if (privateKey == NULL) { - sftk_FreeObject(publicKey); - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + sftk_FreeObject(publicKey); + return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; } /* * now load the private key template */ for (i=0; i < (int) ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount; i++) { - if (pPrivateKeyTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_BITS) { - private_value_bits = *(CK_ULONG *)pPrivateKeyTemplate[i].pValue; - continue; - } - - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, - sftk_attr_expand(&pPrivateKeyTemplate[i])); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; + if (pPrivateKeyTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_BITS) { + private_value_bits = *(CK_ULONG *)pPrivateKeyTemplate[i].pValue; + continue; + } + + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, + sftk_attr_expand(&pPrivateKeyTemplate[i])); + if (crv != CKR_OK) break; } if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeObject(publicKey); - sftk_FreeObject(privateKey); - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + sftk_FreeObject(publicKey); + sftk_FreeObject(privateKey); + return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; } sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_CLASS); sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE); sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_VALUE); sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_CLASS); sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE); sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_VALUE); /* Now Set up the parameters to generate the key (based on mechanism) */ switch (pMechanism->mechanism) { case CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN: - /* format the keys */ - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_MODULUS); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_MODULUS); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME_1); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME_2); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EXPONENT_1); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EXPONENT_2); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_COEFFICIENT); - key_type = CKK_RSA; - if (public_modulus_bits == 0) { - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; - break; - } - if (public_modulus_bits < RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) { - crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; - break; - } - if (public_modulus_bits % 2 != 0) { - crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; - break; - } - - /* extract the exponent */ - crv=sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL,&pubExp,publicKey,CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; + /* format the keys */ + sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_MODULUS); + sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB); + sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_MODULUS); + sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT); + sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT); + sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME_1); + sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME_2); + sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EXPONENT_1); + sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EXPONENT_2); + sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_COEFFICIENT); + key_type = CKK_RSA; + if (public_modulus_bits == 0) { + crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; + break; + } + if (public_modulus_bits < RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) { + crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; + break; + } + if (public_modulus_bits % 2 != 0) { + crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; + break; + } + + /* extract the exponent */ + crv=sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL,&pubExp,publicKey,CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT); + if (crv != CKR_OK) break; bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(pubExp.data, pubExp.len); - if (bitSize < 2) { - crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; - break; - } + if (bitSize < 2) { + crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; + break; + } crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, - sftk_item_expand(&pubExp)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_Free(pubExp.data); - break; - } - - rsaPriv = RSA_NewKey(public_modulus_bits, &pubExp); - PORT_Free(pubExp.data); - if (rsaPriv == NULL) { - crv = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; - break; - } + sftk_item_expand(&pubExp)); + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + PORT_Free(pubExp.data); + break; + } + + rsaPriv = RSA_NewKey(public_modulus_bits, &pubExp); + PORT_Free(pubExp.data); + if (rsaPriv == NULL) { + crv = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; + break; + } /* now fill in the RSA dependent paramenters in the public key */ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_MODULUS, - sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->modulus)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done; + sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->modulus)); + if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done; /* now fill in the RSA dependent paramenters in the private key */ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB, - sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->modulus)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done; + sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->modulus)); + if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_MODULUS, - sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->modulus)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done; + sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->modulus)); + if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, - sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->privateExponent)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done; + sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->privateExponent)); + if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME_1, - sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->prime1)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done; + sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->prime1)); + if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME_2, - sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->prime2)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done; + sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->prime2)); + if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EXPONENT_1, - sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->exponent1)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done; + sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->exponent1)); + if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EXPONENT_2, - sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->exponent2)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done; + sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->exponent2)); + if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_COEFFICIENT, - sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->coefficient)); + sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->coefficient)); kpg_done: - /* Should zeroize the contents first, since this func doesn't. */ - PORT_FreeArena(rsaPriv->arena, PR_TRUE); - break; + /* Should zeroize the contents first, since this func doesn't. */ + PORT_FreeArena(rsaPriv->arena, PR_TRUE); + break; case CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN: - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_VALUE); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_SUBPRIME); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_BASE); - key_type = CKK_DSA; - - /* extract the necessary paramters and copy them to the private key */ - crv=sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL,&pqgParam.prime,publicKey,CKA_PRIME); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv=sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL,&pqgParam.subPrime,publicKey, - CKA_SUBPRIME); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data); - break; - } - crv=sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL,&pqgParam.base,publicKey,CKA_BASE); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data); - PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data); - break; - } + sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_VALUE); + sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB); + sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME); + sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_SUBPRIME); + sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_BASE); + key_type = CKK_DSA; + + /* extract the necessary paramters and copy them to the private key */ + crv=sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL,&pqgParam.prime,publicKey,CKA_PRIME); + if (crv != CKR_OK) break; + crv=sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL,&pqgParam.subPrime,publicKey, + CKA_SUBPRIME); + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data); + break; + } + crv=sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL,&pqgParam.base,publicKey,CKA_BASE); + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data); + PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data); + break; + } crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME, - sftk_item_expand(&pqgParam.prime)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data); - PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data); - PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data); - break; - } + sftk_item_expand(&pqgParam.prime)); + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data); + PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data); + PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data); + break; + } crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_SUBPRIME, - sftk_item_expand(&pqgParam.subPrime)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data); - PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data); - PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data); - break; - } + sftk_item_expand(&pqgParam.subPrime)); + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data); + PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data); + PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data); + break; + } crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_BASE, - sftk_item_expand(&pqgParam.base)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data); - PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data); - PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data); - break; - } + sftk_item_expand(&pqgParam.base)); + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data); + PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data); + PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data); + break; + } bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(pqgParam.subPrime.data, - pqgParam.subPrime.len); + pqgParam.subPrime.len); if (bitSize != DSA_Q_BITS) { - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; - PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data); - PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data); - PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data); - break; - } + crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; + PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data); + PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data); + PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data); + break; + } bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(pqgParam.prime.data,pqgParam.prime.len); if ((bitSize < DSA_MIN_P_BITS) || (bitSize > DSA_MAX_P_BITS)) { - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; - PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data); - PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data); - PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data); - break; - } + crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; + PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data); + PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data); + PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data); + break; + } bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(pqgParam.base.data,pqgParam.base.len); if ((bitSize < 1) || (bitSize > DSA_MAX_P_BITS)) { - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; - PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data); - PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data); - PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data); - break; - } - - /* Generate the key */ - rv = DSA_NewKey(&pqgParam, &dsaPriv); - - PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data); - PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data); - PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data); + crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; + PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data); + PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data); + PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data); + break; + } + + /* Generate the key */ + rv = DSA_NewKey(&pqgParam, &dsaPriv); + + PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data); + PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data); + PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { crv = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; break; } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { crv = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; break; } - /* store the generated key into the attributes */ + /* store the generated key into the attributes */ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_VALUE, - sftk_item_expand(&dsaPriv->publicValue)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto dsagn_done; + sftk_item_expand(&dsaPriv->publicValue)); + if (crv != CKR_OK) goto dsagn_done; /* now fill in the RSA dependent paramenters in the private key */ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB, - sftk_item_expand(&dsaPriv->publicValue)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto dsagn_done; + sftk_item_expand(&dsaPriv->publicValue)); + if (crv != CKR_OK) goto dsagn_done; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_VALUE, - sftk_item_expand(&dsaPriv->privateValue)); + sftk_item_expand(&dsaPriv->privateValue)); dsagn_done: - /* should zeroize, since this function doesn't. */ - PORT_FreeArena(dsaPriv->params.arena, PR_TRUE); - break; + /* should zeroize, since this function doesn't. */ + PORT_FreeArena(dsaPriv->params.arena, PR_TRUE); + break; case CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN: - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_BASE); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_VALUE); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB); - key_type = CKK_DH; + sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME); + sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_BASE); + sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_VALUE); + sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB); + key_type = CKK_DH; - /* extract the necessary parameters and copy them to private keys */ + /* extract the necessary parameters and copy them to private keys */ crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL, &dhParam.prime, publicKey, - CKA_PRIME); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL, &dhParam.base, publicKey, CKA_BASE); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data); - break; - } - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_PRIME, - sftk_item_expand(&dhParam.prime)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data); - PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data); - break; - } - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_BASE, - sftk_item_expand(&dhParam.base)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data); - PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data); - break; - } + CKA_PRIME); + if (crv != CKR_OK) break; + crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL, &dhParam.base, publicKey, CKA_BASE); + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data); + break; + } + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_PRIME, + sftk_item_expand(&dhParam.prime)); + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data); + PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data); + break; + } + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_BASE, + sftk_item_expand(&dhParam.base)); + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data); + PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data); + break; + } bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(dhParam.prime.data,dhParam.prime.len); if ((bitSize < DH_MIN_P_BITS) || (bitSize > DH_MAX_P_BITS)) { - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; - PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data); - PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data); - break; - } + crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; + PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data); + PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data); + break; + } bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(dhParam.base.data,dhParam.base.len); if ((bitSize < 1) || (bitSize > DH_MAX_P_BITS)) { - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; - PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data); - PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data); - break; - } - - rv = DH_NewKey(&dhParam, &dhPriv); - PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data); - PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - crv = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; - break; - } - - crv=sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_VALUE, - sftk_item_expand(&dhPriv->publicValue)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto dhgn_done; + crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; + PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data); + PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data); + break; + } + + rv = DH_NewKey(&dhParam, &dhPriv); + PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data); + PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + crv = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; + break; + } + + crv=sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_VALUE, + sftk_item_expand(&dhPriv->publicValue)); + if (crv != CKR_OK) goto dhgn_done; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB, - sftk_item_expand(&dhPriv->publicValue)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto dhgn_done; + sftk_item_expand(&dhPriv->publicValue)); + if (crv != CKR_OK) goto dhgn_done; - crv=sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_VALUE, - sftk_item_expand(&dhPriv->privateValue)); + crv=sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_VALUE, + sftk_item_expand(&dhPriv->privateValue)); dhgn_done: - /* should zeroize, since this function doesn't. */ - PORT_FreeArena(dhPriv->arena, PR_TRUE); - break; + /* should zeroize, since this function doesn't. */ + PORT_FreeArena(dhPriv->arena, PR_TRUE); + break; #ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC case CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN: - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EC_PARAMS); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_VALUE); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB); - key_type = CKK_EC; - - /* extract the necessary parameters and copy them to private keys */ - crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL, &ecEncodedParams, publicKey, - CKA_EC_PARAMS); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_EC_PARAMS, - sftk_item_expand(&ecEncodedParams)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_Free(ecEncodedParams.data); - break; - } - - /* Decode ec params before calling EC_NewKey */ - rv = EC_DecodeParams(&ecEncodedParams, &ecParams); - PORT_Free(ecEncodedParams.data); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - crv = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; - break; - } - rv = EC_NewKey(ecParams, &ecPriv); - PORT_FreeArena(ecParams->arena, PR_TRUE); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - crv = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; - break; - } - - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT, - sftk_item_expand(&ecPriv->publicValue)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto ecgn_done; - - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_VALUE, - sftk_item_expand(&ecPriv->privateValue)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto ecgn_done; + sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EC_PARAMS); + sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_VALUE); + sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB); + key_type = CKK_EC; + + /* extract the necessary parameters and copy them to private keys */ + crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL, &ecEncodedParams, publicKey, + CKA_EC_PARAMS); + if (crv != CKR_OK) break; + + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_EC_PARAMS, + sftk_item_expand(&ecEncodedParams)); + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + PORT_Free(ecEncodedParams.data); + break; + } + + /* Decode ec params before calling EC_NewKey */ + rv = EC_DecodeParams(&ecEncodedParams, &ecParams); + PORT_Free(ecEncodedParams.data); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + crv = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; + break; + } + rv = EC_NewKey(ecParams, &ecPriv); + PORT_FreeArena(ecParams->arena, PR_TRUE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + crv = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; + break; + } + + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT, + sftk_item_expand(&ecPriv->publicValue)); + if (crv != CKR_OK) goto ecgn_done; + + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_VALUE, + sftk_item_expand(&ecPriv->privateValue)); + if (crv != CKR_OK) goto ecgn_done; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB, - sftk_item_expand(&ecPriv->publicValue)); + sftk_item_expand(&ecPriv->publicValue)); ecgn_done: - /* should zeroize, since this function doesn't. */ - PORT_FreeArena(ecPriv->ecParams.arena, PR_TRUE); - break; + /* should zeroize, since this function doesn't. */ + PORT_FreeArena(ecPriv->ecParams.arena, PR_TRUE); + break; #endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ default: - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; + crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; } if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeObject(privateKey); - sftk_FreeObject(publicKey); - return crv; + sftk_FreeObject(privateKey); + sftk_FreeObject(publicKey); + return crv; } /* Add the class, key_type The loop lets us check errors blow out * on errors and clean up at the bottom */ session = NULL; /* make pedtantic happy... session cannot leave the*/ - /* loop below NULL unless an error is set... */ + /* loop below NULL unless an error is set... */ do { - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_CLASS,&privClass, - sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS)); + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_CLASS,&privClass, + sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS)); if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_CLASS,&pubClass, - sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS)); + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_CLASS,&pubClass, + sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS)); if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&key_type, - sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE)); + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&key_type, + sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE)); if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&key_type, - sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE)); + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&key_type, + sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE)); if (crv != CKR_OK) break; session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); if (session == NULL) crv = CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; } while (0); if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeObject(privateKey); - sftk_FreeObject(publicKey); - return crv; + sftk_FreeObject(privateKey); + sftk_FreeObject(publicKey); + return crv; } /* * handle the base object cleanup for the public Key */ crv = sftk_handleObject(privateKey,session); if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeSession(session); - sftk_FreeObject(privateKey); - sftk_FreeObject(publicKey); - return crv; + sftk_FreeObject(privateKey); + sftk_FreeObject(publicKey); + return crv; } /* * handle the base object cleanup for the private Key * If we have any problems, we destroy the public Key we've * created and linked. */ crv = sftk_handleObject(publicKey,session); sftk_FreeSession(session); if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeObject(publicKey); - NSC_DestroyObject(hSession,privateKey->handle); - sftk_FreeObject(privateKey); - return crv; + sftk_FreeObject(publicKey); + NSC_DestroyObject(hSession,privateKey->handle); + sftk_FreeObject(privateKey); + return crv; } if (sftk_isTrue(privateKey,CKA_SENSITIVE)) { - sftk_forceAttribute(privateKey,CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, - &cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); + sftk_forceAttribute(privateKey,CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, + &cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); } if (sftk_isTrue(publicKey,CKA_SENSITIVE)) { - sftk_forceAttribute(publicKey,CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, - &cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); + sftk_forceAttribute(publicKey,CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, + &cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); } if (!sftk_isTrue(privateKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) { - sftk_forceAttribute(privateKey,CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, - &cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); + sftk_forceAttribute(privateKey,CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, + &cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); } if (!sftk_isTrue(publicKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) { - sftk_forceAttribute(publicKey,CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, - &cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); + sftk_forceAttribute(publicKey,CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, + &cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); } /* Perform FIPS 140-2 pairwise consistency check. */ crv = sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(hSession, - publicKey, privateKey, key_type); + publicKey, privateKey, key_type); if (crv != CKR_OK) { - NSC_DestroyObject(hSession,publicKey->handle); - sftk_FreeObject(publicKey); - NSC_DestroyObject(hSession,privateKey->handle); - sftk_FreeObject(privateKey); - if (sftk_audit_enabled) { - char msg[128]; - PR_snprintf(msg,sizeof msg, - "C_GenerateKeyPair(hSession=%lu, " - "pMechanism->mechanism=0x%08lX)=0x%08lX " - "self-test: pair-wise consistency test failed", - (PRUint32)hSession,(PRUint32)pMechanism->mechanism, - (PRUint32)crv); - sftk_LogAuditMessage(NSS_AUDIT_ERROR, msg); - } - return crv; + NSC_DestroyObject(hSession,publicKey->handle); + sftk_FreeObject(publicKey); + NSC_DestroyObject(hSession,privateKey->handle); + sftk_FreeObject(privateKey); + if (sftk_audit_enabled) { + char msg[128]; + PR_snprintf(msg,sizeof msg, + "C_GenerateKeyPair(hSession=%lu, " + "pMechanism->mechanism=0x%08lX)=0x%08lX " + "self-test: pair-wise consistency test failed", + (PRUint32)hSession,(PRUint32)pMechanism->mechanism, + (PRUint32)crv); + sftk_LogAuditMessage(NSS_AUDIT_ERROR, msg); + } + return crv; } *phPrivateKey = privateKey->handle; *phPublicKey = publicKey->handle; sftk_FreeObject(publicKey); sftk_FreeObject(privateKey); return CKR_OK; } @@ -3801,289 +3802,289 @@ static SECItem *sftk_PackagePrivateKey(S SECOidTag algorithm = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN; void *dummy, *param = NULL; SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; SECItem *encodedKey = NULL; #ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC SECItem *fordebug; int savelen; #endif if(!key) { - *crvp = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; /* really can't happen */ - return NULL; + *crvp = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; /* really can't happen */ + return NULL; } attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE); if(!attribute) { - *crvp = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - return NULL; + *crvp = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + return NULL; } lk = sftk_GetPrivKey(key, *(CK_KEY_TYPE *)attribute->attrib.pValue, crvp); sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute); if(!lk) { - return NULL; + return NULL; } - arena = PORT_NewArena(2048); /* XXX different size? */ + arena = PORT_NewArena(2048); /* XXX different size? */ if(!arena) { - *crvp = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - rv = SECFailure; - goto loser; + *crvp = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; } pki = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo*)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, - sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo)); + sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo)); if(!pki) { - *crvp = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - rv = SECFailure; - goto loser; + *crvp = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; } pki->arena = arena; param = NULL; switch(lk->keyType) { - case NSSLOWKEYRSAKey: - prepare_low_rsa_priv_key_for_asn1(lk); - dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &pki->privateKey, lk, - nsslowkey_RSAPrivateKeyTemplate); - algorithm = SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION; - break; - case NSSLOWKEYDSAKey: + case NSSLOWKEYRSAKey: + prepare_low_rsa_priv_key_for_asn1(lk); + dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &pki->privateKey, lk, + nsslowkey_RSAPrivateKeyTemplate); + algorithm = SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION; + break; + case NSSLOWKEYDSAKey: prepare_low_dsa_priv_key_export_for_asn1(lk); - dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &pki->privateKey, lk, - nsslowkey_DSAPrivateKeyExportTemplate); - prepare_low_pqg_params_for_asn1(&lk->u.dsa.params); - param = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, &(lk->u.dsa.params), - nsslowkey_PQGParamsTemplate); - algorithm = SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE; - break; -#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC + dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &pki->privateKey, lk, + nsslowkey_DSAPrivateKeyExportTemplate); + prepare_low_pqg_params_for_asn1(&lk->u.dsa.params); + param = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, &(lk->u.dsa.params), + nsslowkey_PQGParamsTemplate); + algorithm = SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE; + break; +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC case NSSLOWKEYECKey: prepare_low_ec_priv_key_for_asn1(lk); - /* Public value is encoded as a bit string so adjust length - * to be in bits before ASN encoding and readjust - * immediately after. - * - * Since the SECG specification recommends not including the - * parameters as part of ECPrivateKey, we zero out the curveOID - * length before encoding and restore it later. - */ - lk->u.ec.publicValue.len <<= 3; - savelen = lk->u.ec.ecParams.curveOID.len; - lk->u.ec.ecParams.curveOID.len = 0; - dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &pki->privateKey, lk, - nsslowkey_ECPrivateKeyTemplate); - lk->u.ec.ecParams.curveOID.len = savelen; - lk->u.ec.publicValue.len >>= 3; - - fordebug = &pki->privateKey; - SEC_PRINT("sftk_PackagePrivateKey()", "PrivateKey", lk->keyType, - fordebug); + /* Public value is encoded as a bit string so adjust length + * to be in bits before ASN encoding and readjust + * immediately after. + * + * Since the SECG specification recommends not including the + * parameters as part of ECPrivateKey, we zero out the curveOID + * length before encoding and restore it later. + */ + lk->u.ec.publicValue.len <<= 3; + savelen = lk->u.ec.ecParams.curveOID.len; + lk->u.ec.ecParams.curveOID.len = 0; + dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &pki->privateKey, lk, + nsslowkey_ECPrivateKeyTemplate); + lk->u.ec.ecParams.curveOID.len = savelen; + lk->u.ec.publicValue.len >>= 3; + + fordebug = &pki->privateKey; + SEC_PRINT("sftk_PackagePrivateKey()", "PrivateKey", lk->keyType, + fordebug); - param = SECITEM_DupItem(&lk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding); + param = SECITEM_DupItem(&lk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding); - algorithm = SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY; - break; + algorithm = SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY; + break; #endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ - case NSSLOWKEYDHKey: - default: - dummy = NULL; - break; + case NSSLOWKEYDHKey: + default: + dummy = NULL; + break; } if(!dummy || ((lk->keyType == NSSLOWKEYDSAKey) && !param)) { - *crvp = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; /* should map NSS SECError */ - rv = SECFailure; - goto loser; + *crvp = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; /* should map NSS SECError */ + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; } rv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(arena, &pki->algorithm, algorithm, - (SECItem*)param); + (SECItem*)param); if(rv != SECSuccess) { - *crvp = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; /* should map NSS SECError */ - rv = SECFailure; - goto loser; + *crvp = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; /* should map NSS SECError */ + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; } dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeInteger(arena, &pki->version, - NSSLOWKEY_PRIVATE_KEY_INFO_VERSION); + NSSLOWKEY_PRIVATE_KEY_INFO_VERSION); if(!dummy) { - *crvp = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; /* should map NSS SECError */ - rv = SECFailure; - goto loser; + *crvp = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; /* should map NSS SECError */ + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; } encodedKey = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, pki, - nsslowkey_PrivateKeyInfoTemplate); + nsslowkey_PrivateKeyInfoTemplate); *crvp = encodedKey ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; #ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC fordebug = encodedKey; SEC_PRINT("sftk_PackagePrivateKey()", "PrivateKeyInfo", lk->keyType, - fordebug); + fordebug); #endif loser: if(arena) { - PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE); + PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE); } if(lk && (lk != key->objectInfo)) { - nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(lk); + nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(lk); } if(param) { - SECITEM_ZfreeItem((SECItem*)param, PR_TRUE); + SECITEM_ZfreeItem((SECItem*)param, PR_TRUE); } if(rv != SECSuccess) { - return NULL; + return NULL; } return encodedKey; } /* it doesn't matter yet, since we colapse error conditions in the * level above, but we really should map those few key error differences */ static CK_RV sftk_mapWrap(CK_RV crv) { switch (crv) { case CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID: crv = CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID; break; } return crv; } /* NSC_WrapKey wraps (i.e., encrypts) a key. */ CK_RV NSC_WrapKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hWrappingKey, - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, - CK_ULONG_PTR pulWrappedKeyLen) + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hWrappingKey, + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, + CK_ULONG_PTR pulWrappedKeyLen) { SFTKSession *session; SFTKAttribute *attribute; SFTKObject *key; CK_RV crv; session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); if (session == NULL) { - return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; } key = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hKey,session); sftk_FreeSession(session); if (key == NULL) { - return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; + return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; } switch(key->objclass) { - case CKO_SECRET_KEY: - { - SFTKSessionContext *context = NULL; - SECItem pText; - - attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); - - if (attribute == NULL) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - crv = sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hWrappingKey, - CKA_WRAP, SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_TRUE); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute); - break; - } - - pText.type = siBuffer; - pText.data = (unsigned char *)attribute->attrib.pValue; - pText.len = attribute->attrib.ulValueLen; - - /* Find out if this is a block cipher. */ - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_FALSE,NULL); - if (crv != CKR_OK || !context) - break; - if (context->blockSize > 1) { - unsigned int remainder = pText.len % context->blockSize; - if (!context->doPad && remainder) { - /* When wrapping secret keys with unpadded block ciphers, - ** the keys are zero padded, if necessary, to fill out - ** a full block. - */ - pText.len += context->blockSize - remainder; - pText.data = PORT_ZAlloc(pText.len); - if (pText.data) - memcpy(pText.data, attribute->attrib.pValue, - attribute->attrib.ulValueLen); - else { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - } - } - - crv = NSC_Encrypt(hSession, (CK_BYTE_PTR)pText.data, - pText.len, pWrappedKey, pulWrappedKeyLen); - /* always force a finalize, both on errors and when - * we are just getting the size */ - if (crv != CKR_OK || pWrappedKey == NULL) { - CK_RV lcrv ; - lcrv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context, - SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_FALSE,NULL); - sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_ENCRYPT, NULL); - if (lcrv == CKR_OK && context) { - sftk_FreeContext(context); - } - } - - if (pText.data != (unsigned char *)attribute->attrib.pValue) - PORT_ZFree(pText.data, pText.len); - sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute); - break; - } - - case CKO_PRIVATE_KEY: - { - SECItem *bpki = sftk_PackagePrivateKey(key, &crv); - SFTKSessionContext *context = NULL; - - if(!bpki) { - break; - } - - crv = sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hWrappingKey, - CKA_WRAP, SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_TRUE); - if(crv != CKR_OK) { - SECITEM_ZfreeItem(bpki, PR_TRUE); - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - - crv = NSC_Encrypt(hSession, bpki->data, bpki->len, - pWrappedKey, pulWrappedKeyLen); - /* always force a finalize */ - if (crv != CKR_OK || pWrappedKey == NULL) { - CK_RV lcrv ; - lcrv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context, - SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_FALSE,NULL); - sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_ENCRYPT, NULL); - if (lcrv == CKR_OK && context) { - sftk_FreeContext(context); - } - } - SECITEM_ZfreeItem(bpki, PR_TRUE); - break; - } - - default: - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; + case CKO_SECRET_KEY: + { + SFTKSessionContext *context = NULL; + SECItem pText; + + attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); + + if (attribute == NULL) { + crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + break; + } + crv = sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hWrappingKey, + CKA_WRAP, SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_TRUE); + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute); + break; + } + + pText.type = siBuffer; + pText.data = (unsigned char *)attribute->attrib.pValue; + pText.len = attribute->attrib.ulValueLen; + + /* Find out if this is a block cipher. */ + crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_FALSE,NULL); + if (crv != CKR_OK || !context) + break; + if (context->blockSize > 1) { + unsigned int remainder = pText.len % context->blockSize; + if (!context->doPad && remainder) { + /* When wrapping secret keys with unpadded block ciphers, + ** the keys are zero padded, if necessary, to fill out + ** a full block. + */ + pText.len += context->blockSize - remainder; + pText.data = PORT_ZAlloc(pText.len); + if (pText.data) + memcpy(pText.data, attribute->attrib.pValue, + attribute->attrib.ulValueLen); + else { + crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + break; + } + } + } + + crv = NSC_Encrypt(hSession, (CK_BYTE_PTR)pText.data, + pText.len, pWrappedKey, pulWrappedKeyLen); + /* always force a finalize, both on errors and when + * we are just getting the size */ + if (crv != CKR_OK || pWrappedKey == NULL) { + CK_RV lcrv ; + lcrv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context, + SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_FALSE,NULL); + sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_ENCRYPT, NULL); + if (lcrv == CKR_OK && context) { + sftk_FreeContext(context); + } + } + + if (pText.data != (unsigned char *)attribute->attrib.pValue) + PORT_ZFree(pText.data, pText.len); + sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute); + break; + } + + case CKO_PRIVATE_KEY: + { + SECItem *bpki = sftk_PackagePrivateKey(key, &crv); + SFTKSessionContext *context = NULL; + + if(!bpki) { + break; + } + + crv = sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hWrappingKey, + CKA_WRAP, SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_TRUE); + if(crv != CKR_OK) { + SECITEM_ZfreeItem(bpki, PR_TRUE); + crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + break; + } + + crv = NSC_Encrypt(hSession, bpki->data, bpki->len, + pWrappedKey, pulWrappedKeyLen); + /* always force a finalize */ + if (crv != CKR_OK || pWrappedKey == NULL) { + CK_RV lcrv ; + lcrv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context, + SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_FALSE,NULL); + sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_ENCRYPT, NULL); + if (lcrv == CKR_OK && context) { + sftk_FreeContext(context); + } + } + SECITEM_ZfreeItem(bpki, PR_TRUE); + break; + } + + default: + crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + break; } sftk_FreeObject(key); return sftk_mapWrap(crv); } /* * import a pprivate key info into the desired slot */ static SECStatus @@ -4095,342 +4096,342 @@ sftk_unwrapPrivateKey(SFTKObject *key, S const SEC_ASN1Template *keyTemplate, *paramTemplate; void *paramDest = NULL; PLArenaPool *arena; NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *lpk = NULL; NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo *pki = NULL; SECItem *ck_id = NULL; CK_RV crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; arena = PORT_NewArena(2048); if(!arena) { - return SECFailure; + return SECFailure; } pki = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo*)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, - sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo)); + sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo)); if(!pki) { - PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE); - return SECFailure; + PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE); + return SECFailure; } if(SEC_ASN1DecodeItem(arena, pki, nsslowkey_PrivateKeyInfoTemplate, bpki) - != SECSuccess) { - PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); - return SECFailure; + != SECSuccess) { + PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); + return SECFailure; } lpk = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, - sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey)); + sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey)); if(lpk == NULL) { - goto loser; + goto loser; } lpk->arena = arena; switch(SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&pki->algorithm)) { - case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION: - keyTemplate = nsslowkey_RSAPrivateKeyTemplate; - paramTemplate = NULL; - paramDest = NULL; - lpk->keyType = NSSLOWKEYRSAKey; - prepare_low_rsa_priv_key_for_asn1(lpk); - break; - case SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE: - keyTemplate = nsslowkey_DSAPrivateKeyExportTemplate; - paramTemplate = nsslowkey_PQGParamsTemplate; - paramDest = &(lpk->u.dsa.params); - lpk->keyType = NSSLOWKEYDSAKey; - prepare_low_dsa_priv_key_export_for_asn1(lpk); - prepare_low_pqg_params_for_asn1(&lpk->u.dsa.params); - break; - /* case NSSLOWKEYDHKey: */ + case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION: + keyTemplate = nsslowkey_RSAPrivateKeyTemplate; + paramTemplate = NULL; + paramDest = NULL; + lpk->keyType = NSSLOWKEYRSAKey; + prepare_low_rsa_priv_key_for_asn1(lpk); + break; + case SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE: + keyTemplate = nsslowkey_DSAPrivateKeyExportTemplate; + paramTemplate = nsslowkey_PQGParamsTemplate; + paramDest = &(lpk->u.dsa.params); + lpk->keyType = NSSLOWKEYDSAKey; + prepare_low_dsa_priv_key_export_for_asn1(lpk); + prepare_low_pqg_params_for_asn1(&lpk->u.dsa.params); + break; + /* case NSSLOWKEYDHKey: */ #ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY: - keyTemplate = nsslowkey_ECPrivateKeyTemplate; - paramTemplate = NULL; - paramDest = &(lpk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding); - lpk->keyType = NSSLOWKEYECKey; - prepare_low_ec_priv_key_for_asn1(lpk); - prepare_low_ecparams_for_asn1(&lpk->u.ec.ecParams); - break; + keyTemplate = nsslowkey_ECPrivateKeyTemplate; + paramTemplate = NULL; + paramDest = &(lpk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding); + lpk->keyType = NSSLOWKEYECKey; + prepare_low_ec_priv_key_for_asn1(lpk); + prepare_low_ecparams_for_asn1(&lpk->u.ec.ecParams); + break; #endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ - default: - keyTemplate = NULL; - paramTemplate = NULL; - paramDest = NULL; - break; + default: + keyTemplate = NULL; + paramTemplate = NULL; + paramDest = NULL; + break; } if(!keyTemplate) { - goto loser; + goto loser; } /* decode the private key and any algorithm parameters */ rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, lpk, keyTemplate, &pki->privateKey); #ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC if (lpk->keyType == NSSLOWKEYECKey) { /* convert length in bits to length in bytes */ - lpk->u.ec.publicValue.len >>= 3; + lpk->u.ec.publicValue.len >>= 3; rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, - &(lpk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding), - &(pki->algorithm.parameters)); - if(rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; - } + &(lpk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding), + &(pki->algorithm.parameters)); + if(rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } } #endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ if(rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; + goto loser; } if(paramDest && paramTemplate) { - rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, paramDest, paramTemplate, - &(pki->algorithm.parameters)); - if(rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; - } + rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, paramDest, paramTemplate, + &(pki->algorithm.parameters)); + if(rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } } rv = SECFailure; switch (lpk->keyType) { case NSSLOWKEYRSAKey: - keyType = CKK_RSA; - if(sftk_hasAttribute(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB)) { - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB); - } - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, - sizeof(keyType)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_UNWRAP, &cktrue, - sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_DECRYPT, &cktrue, - sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN, &cktrue, - sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &cktrue, - sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_MODULUS, - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.modulus)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.publicExponent)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.privateExponent)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIME_1, - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.prime1)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIME_2, - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.prime2)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_EXPONENT_1, - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.exponent1)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_EXPONENT_2, - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.exponent2)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_COEFFICIENT, - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.coefficient)); - break; + keyType = CKK_RSA; + if(sftk_hasAttribute(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB)) { + sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB); + } + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, + sizeof(keyType)); + if(crv != CKR_OK) break; + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_UNWRAP, &cktrue, + sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); + if(crv != CKR_OK) break; + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_DECRYPT, &cktrue, + sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); + if(crv != CKR_OK) break; + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN, &cktrue, + sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); + if(crv != CKR_OK) break; + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &cktrue, + sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); + if(crv != CKR_OK) break; + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_MODULUS, + sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.modulus)); + if(crv != CKR_OK) break; + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, + sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.publicExponent)); + if(crv != CKR_OK) break; + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, + sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.privateExponent)); + if(crv != CKR_OK) break; + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIME_1, + sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.prime1)); + if(crv != CKR_OK) break; + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIME_2, + sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.prime2)); + if(crv != CKR_OK) break; + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_EXPONENT_1, + sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.exponent1)); + if(crv != CKR_OK) break; + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_EXPONENT_2, + sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.exponent2)); + if(crv != CKR_OK) break; + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_COEFFICIENT, + sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.coefficient)); + break; case NSSLOWKEYDSAKey: - keyType = CKK_DSA; - crv = (sftk_hasAttribute(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB)) ? CKR_OK : - CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, - sizeof(keyType)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN, &cktrue, - sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &cktrue, - sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIME, - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.params.prime)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SUBPRIME, - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.params.subPrime)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_BASE, - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.params.base)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_VALUE, - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.privateValue)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - break; + keyType = CKK_DSA; + crv = (sftk_hasAttribute(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB)) ? CKR_OK : + CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + if(crv != CKR_OK) break; + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, + sizeof(keyType)); + if(crv != CKR_OK) break; + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN, &cktrue, + sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); + if(crv != CKR_OK) break; + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &cktrue, + sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); + if(crv != CKR_OK) break; + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIME, + sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.params.prime)); + if(crv != CKR_OK) break; + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SUBPRIME, + sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.params.subPrime)); + if(crv != CKR_OK) break; + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_BASE, + sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.params.base)); + if(crv != CKR_OK) break; + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_VALUE, + sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.privateValue)); + if(crv != CKR_OK) break; + break; #ifdef notdef case NSSLOWKEYDHKey: - template = dhTemplate; - templateCount = sizeof(dhTemplate)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE); - keyType = CKK_DH; - break; + template = dhTemplate; + templateCount = sizeof(dhTemplate)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE); + keyType = CKK_DH; + break; #endif - /* what about fortezza??? */ + /* what about fortezza??? */ #ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC case NSSLOWKEYECKey: - keyType = CKK_EC; - crv = (sftk_hasAttribute(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB)) ? CKR_OK : - CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, - sizeof(keyType)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN, &cktrue, - sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &cktrue, - sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_DERIVE, &cktrue, - sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_EC_PARAMS, - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_VALUE, - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.ec.privateValue)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - /* XXX Do we need to decode the EC Params here ?? */ - break; + keyType = CKK_EC; + crv = (sftk_hasAttribute(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB)) ? CKR_OK : + CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + if(crv != CKR_OK) break; + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, + sizeof(keyType)); + if(crv != CKR_OK) break; + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN, &cktrue, + sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); + if(crv != CKR_OK) break; + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &cktrue, + sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); + if(crv != CKR_OK) break; + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_DERIVE, &cktrue, + sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); + if(crv != CKR_OK) break; + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_EC_PARAMS, + sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding)); + if(crv != CKR_OK) break; + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_VALUE, + sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.ec.privateValue)); + if(crv != CKR_OK) break; + /* XXX Do we need to decode the EC Params here ?? */ + break; #endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ - default: - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; + default: + crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + break; } loser: if(ck_id) { - SECITEM_ZfreeItem(ck_id, PR_TRUE); + SECITEM_ZfreeItem(ck_id, PR_TRUE); } if(lpk) { - nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(lpk); + nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(lpk); } if(crv != CKR_OK) { - return SECFailure; + return SECFailure; } return SECSuccess; } /* NSC_UnwrapKey unwraps (decrypts) a wrapped key, creating a new key object. */ CK_RV NSC_UnwrapKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hUnwrappingKey, - CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, CK_ULONG ulWrappedKeyLen, - CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey) + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hUnwrappingKey, + CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, CK_ULONG ulWrappedKeyLen, + CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey) { SFTKObject *key = NULL; SFTKSession *session; CK_ULONG key_length = 0; unsigned char * buf = NULL; CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; int i; CK_ULONG bsize = ulWrappedKeyLen; SFTKSlot *slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession); SECItem bpki; CK_OBJECT_CLASS target_type = CKO_SECRET_KEY; /* * now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of */ key = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */ if (key == NULL) { - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; } /* * load the template values into the object */ for (i=0; i < (int) ulAttributeCount; i++) { - if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN) { - key_length = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue; - continue; - } + if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN) { + key_length = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue; + continue; + } if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_CLASS) { - target_type = *(CK_OBJECT_CLASS *)pTemplate[i].pValue; - } - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,sftk_attr_expand(&pTemplate[i])); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; + target_type = *(CK_OBJECT_CLASS *)pTemplate[i].pValue; + } + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,sftk_attr_expand(&pTemplate[i])); + if (crv != CKR_OK) break; } if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeObject(key); - return crv; + sftk_FreeObject(key); + return crv; } crv = sftk_CryptInit(hSession,pMechanism,hUnwrappingKey,CKA_UNWRAP, - SFTK_DECRYPT, PR_FALSE); + SFTK_DECRYPT, PR_FALSE); if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeObject(key); - return sftk_mapWrap(crv); + sftk_FreeObject(key); + return sftk_mapWrap(crv); } /* allocate the buffer to decrypt into * this assumes the unwrapped key is never larger than the * wrapped key. For all the mechanisms we support this is true */ buf = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc( ulWrappedKeyLen); bsize = ulWrappedKeyLen; crv = NSC_Decrypt(hSession, pWrappedKey, ulWrappedKeyLen, buf, &bsize); if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeObject(key); - PORT_Free(buf); - return sftk_mapWrap(crv); + sftk_FreeObject(key); + PORT_Free(buf); + return sftk_mapWrap(crv); } switch(target_type) { - case CKO_SECRET_KEY: - if (!sftk_hasAttribute(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE)) { - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; - break; - } - - if (key_length == 0 || key_length > bsize) { - key_length = bsize; - } - if (key_length > MAX_KEY_LEN) { - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } + case CKO_SECRET_KEY: + if (!sftk_hasAttribute(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE)) { + crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; + break; + } + + if (key_length == 0 || key_length > bsize) { + key_length = bsize; + } + if (key_length > MAX_KEY_LEN) { + crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; + break; + } - /* add the value */ - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_VALUE,buf,key_length); - break; - case CKO_PRIVATE_KEY: - bpki.data = (unsigned char *)buf; - bpki.len = bsize; - crv = CKR_OK; - if(sftk_unwrapPrivateKey(key, &bpki) != SECSuccess) { - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; - } - break; - default: - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; - break; + /* add the value */ + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_VALUE,buf,key_length); + break; + case CKO_PRIVATE_KEY: + bpki.data = (unsigned char *)buf; + bpki.len = bsize; + crv = CKR_OK; + if(sftk_unwrapPrivateKey(key, &bpki) != SECSuccess) { + crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; + } + break; + default: + crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; + break; } PORT_ZFree(buf, bsize); if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; } /* get the session */ session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); if (session == NULL) { - sftk_FreeObject(key); + sftk_FreeObject(key); return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; } /* * handle the base object stuff */ crv = sftk_handleObject(key,session); *phKey = key->handle; sftk_FreeSession(session); sftk_FreeObject(key); @@ -4438,57 +4439,57 @@ CK_RV NSC_UnwrapKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS return crv; } /* * The SSL key gen mechanism create's lots of keys. This function handles the * details of each of these key creation. */ static CK_RV sftk_buildSSLKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, SFTKObject *baseKey, - PRBool isMacKey, unsigned char *keyBlock, unsigned int keySize, - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *keyHandle) + PRBool isMacKey, unsigned char *keyBlock, unsigned int keySize, + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *keyHandle) { SFTKObject *key; SFTKSession *session; CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE; CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE; CK_RV crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; /* * now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of */ *keyHandle = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; key = sftk_NewObject(baseKey->slot); if (key == NULL) return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; sftk_narrowToSessionObject(key)->wasDerived = PR_TRUE; crv = sftk_CopyObject(key,baseKey); if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; if (isMacKey) { - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&keyType,sizeof(keyType)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_DERIVE,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_ENCRYPT,&ckfalse,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_DECRYPT,&ckfalse,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_SIGN,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VERIFY,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_WRAP,&ckfalse,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_UNWRAP,&ckfalse,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; + crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&keyType,sizeof(keyType)); + if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; + crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_DERIVE,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); + if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; + crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_ENCRYPT,&ckfalse,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); + if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; + crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_DECRYPT,&ckfalse,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); + if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; + crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_SIGN,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); + if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; + crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VERIFY,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); + if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; + crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_WRAP,&ckfalse,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); + if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; + crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_UNWRAP,&ckfalse,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); + if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; } crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE,keyBlock,keySize); if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; /* get the session */ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); if (session == NULL) { goto loser; } crv = sftk_handleObject(key,session); @@ -4498,34 +4499,34 @@ loser: if (key) sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; } /* * if there is an error, we need to free the keys we already created in SSL * This is the routine that will do it.. */ static void sftk_freeSSLKeys(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, - CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT *returnedMaterial ) + CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT *returnedMaterial ) { - if (returnedMaterial->hClientMacSecret != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) { - NSC_DestroyObject(session,returnedMaterial->hClientMacSecret); - } - if (returnedMaterial->hServerMacSecret != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) { - NSC_DestroyObject(session, returnedMaterial->hServerMacSecret); - } - if (returnedMaterial->hClientKey != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) { - NSC_DestroyObject(session, returnedMaterial->hClientKey); - } - if (returnedMaterial->hServerKey != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) { - NSC_DestroyObject(session, returnedMaterial->hServerKey); - } + if (returnedMaterial->hClientMacSecret != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) { + NSC_DestroyObject(session,returnedMaterial->hClientMacSecret); + } + if (returnedMaterial->hServerMacSecret != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) { + NSC_DestroyObject(session, returnedMaterial->hServerMacSecret); + } + if (returnedMaterial->hClientKey != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) { + NSC_DestroyObject(session, returnedMaterial->hClientKey); + } + if (returnedMaterial->hServerKey != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) { + NSC_DestroyObject(session, returnedMaterial->hServerKey); + } } /* * when deriving from sensitive and extractable keys, we need to preserve some * of the semantics in the derived key. This helper routine maintains these * semantics. */ static CK_RV sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(SFTKObject *baseKey,SFTKObject *destKey) { @@ -4533,83 +4534,83 @@ sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(SFTKObject *ba PRBool sensitive = PR_FALSE; PRBool hasExtractable; PRBool extractable = PR_TRUE; CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; SFTKAttribute *att; hasSensitive = PR_FALSE; att = sftk_FindAttribute(destKey,CKA_SENSITIVE); if (att) { hasSensitive = PR_TRUE; - sensitive = (PRBool) *(CK_BBOOL *)att->attrib.pValue; - sftk_FreeAttribute(att); + sensitive = (PRBool) *(CK_BBOOL *)att->attrib.pValue; + sftk_FreeAttribute(att); } hasExtractable = PR_FALSE; att = sftk_FindAttribute(destKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE); if (att) { hasExtractable = PR_TRUE; - extractable = (PRBool) *(CK_BBOOL *)att->attrib.pValue; - sftk_FreeAttribute(att); + extractable = (PRBool) *(CK_BBOOL *)att->attrib.pValue; + sftk_FreeAttribute(att); } /* don't make a key more accessible */ if (sftk_isTrue(baseKey,CKA_SENSITIVE) && hasSensitive && - (sensitive == PR_FALSE)) { - return CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED; + (sensitive == PR_FALSE)) { + return CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED; } if (!sftk_isTrue(baseKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE) && hasExtractable && - (extractable == PR_TRUE)) { - return CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED; + (extractable == PR_TRUE)) { + return CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED; } /* inherit parent's sensitivity */ if (!hasSensitive) { att = sftk_FindAttribute(baseKey,CKA_SENSITIVE); - if (att == NULL) return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - crv = sftk_defaultAttribute(destKey,sftk_attr_expand(&att->attrib)); - sftk_FreeAttribute(att); - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; + if (att == NULL) return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + crv = sftk_defaultAttribute(destKey,sftk_attr_expand(&att->attrib)); + sftk_FreeAttribute(att); + if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; } if (!hasExtractable) { att = sftk_FindAttribute(baseKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE); - if (att == NULL) return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - crv = sftk_defaultAttribute(destKey,sftk_attr_expand(&att->attrib)); - sftk_FreeAttribute(att); - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; + if (att == NULL) return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + crv = sftk_defaultAttribute(destKey,sftk_attr_expand(&att->attrib)); + sftk_FreeAttribute(att); + if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; } /* we should inherit the parent's always extractable/ never sensitive info, * but handleObject always forces this attributes, so we would need to do * something special. */ return CKR_OK; } /* * make known fixed PKCS #11 key types to their sizes in bytes - */ + */ unsigned long sftk_MapKeySize(CK_KEY_TYPE keyType) { switch (keyType) { case CKK_CDMF: - return 8; + return 8; case CKK_DES: - return 8; + return 8; case CKK_DES2: - return 16; + return 16; case CKK_DES3: - return 24; + return 24; /* IDEA and CAST need to be added */ default: - break; + break; } return 0; } /* * SSL Key generation given pre master secret */ #define NUM_MIXERS 9 static const char * const mixers[NUM_MIXERS] = { "A", @@ -4620,1010 +4621,1010 @@ static const char * const mixers[NUM_MIX "FFFFFF", "GGGGGGG", "HHHHHHHH", "IIIIIIIII" }; #define SSL3_PMS_LENGTH 48 #define SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH 48 /* NSC_DeriveKey derives a key from a base key, creating a new key object. */ CK_RV NSC_DeriveKey( CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hBaseKey, - CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey) + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hBaseKey, + CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey) { SFTKSession * session; - SFTKSlot * slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession); + SFTKSlot * slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession); SFTKObject * key; SFTKObject * sourceKey; SFTKAttribute * att; SFTKAttribute * att2; unsigned char * buf; SHA1Context * sha; MD5Context * md5; MD2Context * md2; CK_ULONG macSize; CK_ULONG tmpKeySize; CK_ULONG IVSize; - CK_ULONG keySize = 0; - CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; - CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE; - CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; - CK_OBJECT_CLASS classType = CKO_SECRET_KEY; + CK_ULONG keySize = 0; + CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; + CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE; + CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS classType = CKO_SECRET_KEY; CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *stringPtr; PRBool isTLS = PR_FALSE; PRBool isDH = PR_FALSE; SECStatus rv; int i; unsigned int outLen; unsigned char sha_out[SHA1_LENGTH]; unsigned char key_block[NUM_MIXERS * MD5_LENGTH]; unsigned char key_block2[MD5_LENGTH]; - PRBool isFIPS; + PRBool isFIPS; /* * now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of */ if (phKey) *phKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; key = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */ if (key == NULL) { - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; } isFIPS = (slot->slotID == FIPS_SLOT_ID); /* * load the template values into the object */ for (i=0; i < (int) ulAttributeCount; i++) { - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,sftk_attr_expand(&pTemplate[i])); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; + crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,sftk_attr_expand(&pTemplate[i])); + if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_KEY_TYPE) { - keyType = *(CK_KEY_TYPE *)pTemplate[i].pValue; - } - if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN) { - keySize = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue; - } + if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_KEY_TYPE) { + keyType = *(CK_KEY_TYPE *)pTemplate[i].pValue; + } + if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN) { + keySize = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue; + } } if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; } if (keySize == 0) { - keySize = sftk_MapKeySize(keyType); + keySize = sftk_MapKeySize(keyType); } /* Derive can only create SECRET KEY's currently... */ classType = CKO_SECRET_KEY; crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_CLASS,&classType,sizeof(classType)); if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeObject(key); - return crv; + sftk_FreeObject(key); + return crv; } /* look up the base key we're deriving with */ session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); if (session == NULL) { - sftk_FreeObject(key); + sftk_FreeObject(key); return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; } sourceKey = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hBaseKey,session); sftk_FreeSession(session); if (sourceKey == NULL) { - sftk_FreeObject(key); + sftk_FreeObject(key); return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; } /* get the value of the base key */ att = sftk_FindAttribute(sourceKey,CKA_VALUE); if (att == NULL) { - sftk_FreeObject(key); - sftk_FreeObject(sourceKey); + sftk_FreeObject(key); + sftk_FreeObject(sourceKey); return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; } switch (pMechanism->mechanism) { /* * generate the master secret */ case CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE: case CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH: - isTLS = PR_TRUE; - /* fall thru */ + isTLS = PR_TRUE; + /* fall thru */ case CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE: case CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH: { - CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *ssl3_master; - SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret * rsa_pms; - unsigned char crsrdata[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2]; + CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *ssl3_master; + SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret * rsa_pms; + unsigned char crsrdata[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2]; if ((pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH) || (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH)) - isDH = PR_TRUE; + isDH = PR_TRUE; + + /* first do the consistancy checks */ + if (!isDH && (att->attrib.ulValueLen != SSL3_PMS_LENGTH)) { + crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + break; + } + att2 = sftk_FindAttribute(sourceKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE); + if ((att2 == NULL) || (*(CK_KEY_TYPE *)att2->attrib.pValue != + CKK_GENERIC_SECRET)) { + if (att2) sftk_FreeAttribute(att2); + crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED; + break; + } + sftk_FreeAttribute(att2); + if (keyType != CKK_GENERIC_SECRET) { + crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED; + break; + } + if ((keySize != 0) && (keySize != SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH)) { + crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED; + break; + } - /* first do the consistancy checks */ - if (!isDH && (att->attrib.ulValueLen != SSL3_PMS_LENGTH)) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - att2 = sftk_FindAttribute(sourceKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE); - if ((att2 == NULL) || (*(CK_KEY_TYPE *)att2->attrib.pValue != - CKK_GENERIC_SECRET)) { - if (att2) sftk_FreeAttribute(att2); - crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED; - break; - } - sftk_FreeAttribute(att2); - if (keyType != CKK_GENERIC_SECRET) { - crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED; - break; - } - if ((keySize != 0) && (keySize != SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH)) { - crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED; - break; - } - - /* finally do the key gen */ - ssl3_master = (CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *) - pMechanism->pParameter; - - PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata, - ssl3_master->RandomInfo.pClientRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); - PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, - ssl3_master->RandomInfo.pServerRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); - - if (ssl3_master->pVersion) { - SFTKSessionObject *sessKey = sftk_narrowToSessionObject(key); - rsa_pms = (SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *) att->attrib.pValue; - /* don't leak more key material then necessary for SSL to work */ - if ((sessKey == NULL) || sessKey->wasDerived) { - ssl3_master->pVersion->major = 0xff; - ssl3_master->pVersion->minor = 0xff; - } else { - ssl3_master->pVersion->major = rsa_pms->client_version[0]; - ssl3_master->pVersion->minor = rsa_pms->client_version[1]; - } - } - if (ssl3_master->RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen != SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH) { - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; - break; - } - if (ssl3_master->RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen != SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH) { - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; - break; - } + /* finally do the key gen */ + ssl3_master = (CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *) + pMechanism->pParameter; + + PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata, + ssl3_master->RandomInfo.pClientRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, + ssl3_master->RandomInfo.pServerRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + + if (ssl3_master->pVersion) { + SFTKSessionObject *sessKey = sftk_narrowToSessionObject(key); + rsa_pms = (SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *) att->attrib.pValue; + /* don't leak more key material then necessary for SSL to work */ + if ((sessKey == NULL) || sessKey->wasDerived) { + ssl3_master->pVersion->major = 0xff; + ssl3_master->pVersion->minor = 0xff; + } else { + ssl3_master->pVersion->major = rsa_pms->client_version[0]; + ssl3_master->pVersion->minor = rsa_pms->client_version[1]; + } + } + if (ssl3_master->RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen != SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH) { + crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; + break; + } + if (ssl3_master->RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen != SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH) { + crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; + break; + } if (isTLS) { - SECStatus status; - SECItem crsr = { siBuffer, crsrdata, sizeof crsrdata }; - SECItem master = { siBuffer, key_block, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH}; - SECItem pms = { siBuffer }; - - /* HPUX won't let a structure member be initialized with the - * value of a variable, but the address of a local variable. :-/ - */ - pms.data = (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue; - pms.len = att->attrib.ulValueLen; - - status = TLS_PRF(&pms, "master secret", &crsr, &master, isFIPS); - if (status != SECSuccess) { - crv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED; - break; - } - } else { - /* now allocate the hash contexts */ - md5 = MD5_NewContext(); - if (md5 == NULL) { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - sha = SHA1_NewContext(); - if (sha == NULL) { - PORT_Free(md5); - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } + SECStatus status; + SECItem crsr = { siBuffer, crsrdata, sizeof crsrdata }; + SECItem master = { siBuffer, key_block, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH}; + SECItem pms = { siBuffer }; + + /* HPUX won't let a structure member be initialized with the + * value of a variable, but the address of a local variable. :-/ + */ + pms.data = (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue; + pms.len = att->attrib.ulValueLen; + + status = TLS_PRF(&pms, "master secret", &crsr, &master, isFIPS); + if (status != SECSuccess) { + crv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED; + break; + } + } else { + /* now allocate the hash contexts */ + md5 = MD5_NewContext(); + if (md5 == NULL) { + crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + break; + } + sha = SHA1_NewContext(); + if (sha == NULL) { + PORT_Free(md5); + crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + break; + } for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { SHA1_Begin(sha); SHA1_Update(sha, (unsigned char*) mixers[i], strlen(mixers[i])); SHA1_Update(sha, (const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, - att->attrib.ulValueLen); + att->attrib.ulValueLen); SHA1_Update(sha, crsrdata, sizeof crsrdata); SHA1_End(sha, sha_out, &outLen, SHA1_LENGTH); PORT_Assert(outLen == SHA1_LENGTH); MD5_Begin(md5); MD5_Update(md5, (const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, - att->attrib.ulValueLen); + att->attrib.ulValueLen); MD5_Update(md5, sha_out, outLen); MD5_End(md5, &key_block[i*MD5_LENGTH], &outLen, MD5_LENGTH); PORT_Assert(outLen == MD5_LENGTH); } - PORT_Free(md5); - PORT_Free(sha); - } - - /* store the results */ - crv = sftk_forceAttribute - (key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; - crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&keyType,sizeof(keyType)); - if (isTLS) { - /* TLS's master secret is used to "sign" finished msgs with PRF. */ - /* XXX This seems like a hack. But SFTK_Derive only accepts - * one "operation" argument. */ - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_SIGN, &cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VERIFY,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - /* While we're here, we might as well force this, too. */ - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_DERIVE,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - } - break; + PORT_Free(md5); + PORT_Free(sha); + } + + /* store the results */ + crv = sftk_forceAttribute + (key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH); + if (crv != CKR_OK) break; + keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; + crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&keyType,sizeof(keyType)); + if (isTLS) { + /* TLS's master secret is used to "sign" finished msgs with PRF. */ + /* XXX This seems like a hack. But SFTK_Derive only accepts + * one "operation" argument. */ + crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_SIGN, &cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); + if (crv != CKR_OK) break; + crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VERIFY,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); + if (crv != CKR_OK) break; + /* While we're here, we might as well force this, too. */ + crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_DERIVE,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); + if (crv != CKR_OK) break; + } + break; } case CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE: - isTLS = PR_TRUE; - /* fall thru */ + isTLS = PR_TRUE; + /* fall thru */ case CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE: { - CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS *ssl3_keys; - CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT * ssl3_keys_out; - CK_ULONG effKeySize; - unsigned int block_needed; - unsigned char srcrdata[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2]; - unsigned char crsrdata[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2]; - - crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - - if (att->attrib.ulValueLen != SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH) { - crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED; - break; - } - att2 = sftk_FindAttribute(sourceKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE); - if ((att2 == NULL) || (*(CK_KEY_TYPE *)att2->attrib.pValue != - CKK_GENERIC_SECRET)) { - if (att2) sftk_FreeAttribute(att2); - crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED; - break; - } - sftk_FreeAttribute(att2); - md5 = MD5_NewContext(); - if (md5 == NULL) { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - sha = SHA1_NewContext(); - if (sha == NULL) { - PORT_Free(md5); - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - ssl3_keys = (CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS *) pMechanism->pParameter; - - PORT_Memcpy(srcrdata, - ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pServerRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); - PORT_Memcpy(srcrdata + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, - ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pClientRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); - - PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata, - ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pClientRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); - PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, - ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pServerRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); - - /* - * clear out our returned keys so we can recover on failure - */ - ssl3_keys_out = ssl3_keys->pReturnedKeyMaterial; - ssl3_keys_out->hClientMacSecret = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - ssl3_keys_out->hServerMacSecret = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - - /* - * How much key material do we need? - */ - macSize = ssl3_keys->ulMacSizeInBits/8; - effKeySize = ssl3_keys->ulKeySizeInBits/8; - IVSize = ssl3_keys->ulIVSizeInBits/8; - if (keySize == 0) { - effKeySize = keySize; - } - block_needed = 2 * (macSize + effKeySize + - ((!ssl3_keys->bIsExport) * IVSize)); - PORT_Assert(block_needed <= sizeof key_block); - if (block_needed > sizeof key_block) - block_needed = sizeof key_block; - - /* - * generate the key material: This looks amazingly similar to the - * PMS code, and is clearly crying out for a function to provide it. - */ - if (isTLS) { - SECStatus status; - SECItem srcr = { siBuffer, srcrdata, sizeof srcrdata }; - SECItem keyblk = { siBuffer, key_block }; - SECItem master = { siBuffer }; - - keyblk.len = block_needed; - master.data = (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue; - master.len = att->attrib.ulValueLen; - - status = TLS_PRF(&master, "key expansion", &srcr, &keyblk, - isFIPS); - if (status != SECSuccess) { - goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; - } - } else { - unsigned int block_bytes = 0; - /* key_block = - * MD5(master_secret + SHA('A' + master_secret + - * ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)) + - * MD5(master_secret + SHA('BB' + master_secret + - * ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)) + - * MD5(master_secret + SHA('CCC' + master_secret + - * ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)) + - * [...]; - */ - for (i = 0; i < NUM_MIXERS && block_bytes < block_needed; i++) { - SHA1_Begin(sha); - SHA1_Update(sha, (unsigned char*) mixers[i], strlen(mixers[i])); - SHA1_Update(sha, (const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, - att->attrib.ulValueLen); - SHA1_Update(sha, srcrdata, sizeof srcrdata); - SHA1_End(sha, sha_out, &outLen, SHA1_LENGTH); - PORT_Assert(outLen == SHA1_LENGTH); - MD5_Begin(md5); - MD5_Update(md5, (const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, - att->attrib.ulValueLen); - MD5_Update(md5, sha_out, outLen); - MD5_End(md5, &key_block[i*MD5_LENGTH], &outLen, MD5_LENGTH); - PORT_Assert(outLen == MD5_LENGTH); - block_bytes += outLen; - } - } - - /* - * Put the key material where it goes. - */ - i = 0; /* now shows how much consumed */ - - /* - * The key_block is partitioned as follows: - * client_write_MAC_secret[CipherSpec.hash_size] - */ - crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_TRUE,&key_block[i],macSize, - &ssl3_keys_out->hClientMacSecret); - if (crv != CKR_OK) - goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; - - i += macSize; - - /* - * server_write_MAC_secret[CipherSpec.hash_size] - */ - crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_TRUE,&key_block[i],macSize, - &ssl3_keys_out->hServerMacSecret); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; - } - i += macSize; - - if (keySize) { - if (!ssl3_keys->bIsExport) { - /* - ** Generate Domestic write keys and IVs. - ** client_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material] - */ - crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_FALSE,&key_block[i], - keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; - } - i += keySize; - - /* - ** server_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material] - */ - crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_FALSE,&key_block[i], - keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; - } - i += keySize; - - /* - ** client_write_IV[CipherSpec.IV_size] - */ - if (IVSize > 0) { - PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVClient, - &key_block[i], IVSize); - i += IVSize; - } - - /* - ** server_write_IV[CipherSpec.IV_size] - */ - if (IVSize > 0) { - PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVServer, - &key_block[i], IVSize); - i += IVSize; - } - PORT_Assert(i <= sizeof key_block); - - } else if (!isTLS) { - - /* - ** Generate SSL3 Export write keys and IVs. - ** client_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material] - ** final_client_write_key = MD5(client_write_key + - ** ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random); - */ - MD5_Begin(md5); - MD5_Update(md5, &key_block[i], effKeySize); - MD5_Update(md5, crsrdata, sizeof crsrdata); - MD5_End(md5, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH); - i += effKeySize; - crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_FALSE,key_block2, - keySize,&ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; - } - - /* - ** server_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material] - ** final_server_write_key = MD5(server_write_key + - ** ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random); - */ - MD5_Begin(md5); - MD5_Update(md5, &key_block[i], effKeySize); - MD5_Update(md5, srcrdata, sizeof srcrdata); - MD5_End(md5, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH); - i += effKeySize; - crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_FALSE,key_block2, - keySize,&ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; - } - - /* - ** client_write_IV = - ** MD5(ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random); - */ - MD5_Begin(md5); - MD5_Update(md5, crsrdata, sizeof crsrdata); - MD5_End(md5, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH); - PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVClient, key_block2, IVSize); - - /* - ** server_write_IV = - ** MD5(ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random); - */ - MD5_Begin(md5); - MD5_Update(md5, srcrdata, sizeof srcrdata); - MD5_End(md5, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH); - PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVServer, key_block2, IVSize); - - } else { - - /* - ** Generate TLS Export write keys and IVs. - */ - SECStatus status; - SECItem secret = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; - SECItem crsr = { siBuffer, crsrdata, sizeof crsrdata }; - SECItem keyblk = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; - - /* - ** client_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material] - ** final_client_write_key = PRF(client_write_key, - ** "client write key", - ** client_random + server_random); - */ - secret.data = &key_block[i]; - secret.len = effKeySize; - i += effKeySize; - keyblk.data = key_block2; - keyblk.len = sizeof key_block2; - status = TLS_PRF(&secret, "client write key", &crsr, &keyblk, - isFIPS); - if (status != SECSuccess) { - goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; - } - crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession, key, PR_FALSE, key_block2, - keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; - } - - /* - ** server_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material] - ** final_server_write_key = PRF(server_write_key, - ** "server write key", - ** client_random + server_random); - */ - secret.data = &key_block[i]; - secret.len = effKeySize; - i += effKeySize; - keyblk.data = key_block2; - keyblk.len = sizeof key_block2; - status = TLS_PRF(&secret, "server write key", &crsr, &keyblk, - isFIPS); - if (status != SECSuccess) { - goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; - } - crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession, key, PR_FALSE, key_block2, - keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; - } - - /* - ** iv_block = PRF("", "IV block", - ** client_random + server_random); - ** client_write_IV[SecurityParameters.IV_size] - ** server_write_IV[SecurityParameters.IV_size] - */ - if (IVSize) { - secret.data = NULL; - secret.len = 0; - keyblk.data = &key_block[i]; - keyblk.len = 2 * IVSize; - status = TLS_PRF(&secret, "IV block", &crsr, &keyblk, - isFIPS); - if (status != SECSuccess) { - goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; - } - PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVClient, keyblk.data, IVSize); - PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVServer, keyblk.data + IVSize, + CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS *ssl3_keys; + CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT * ssl3_keys_out; + CK_ULONG effKeySize; + unsigned int block_needed; + unsigned char srcrdata[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2]; + unsigned char crsrdata[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2]; + + crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key); + if (crv != CKR_OK) break; + + if (att->attrib.ulValueLen != SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH) { + crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED; + break; + } + att2 = sftk_FindAttribute(sourceKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE); + if ((att2 == NULL) || (*(CK_KEY_TYPE *)att2->attrib.pValue != + CKK_GENERIC_SECRET)) { + if (att2) sftk_FreeAttribute(att2); + crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED; + break; + } + sftk_FreeAttribute(att2); + md5 = MD5_NewContext(); + if (md5 == NULL) { + crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + break; + } + sha = SHA1_NewContext(); + if (sha == NULL) { + PORT_Free(md5); + crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + break; + } + ssl3_keys = (CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS *) pMechanism->pParameter; + + PORT_Memcpy(srcrdata, + ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pServerRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + PORT_Memcpy(srcrdata + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, + ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pClientRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + + PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata, + ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pClientRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, + ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pServerRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + + /* + * clear out our returned keys so we can recover on failure + */ + ssl3_keys_out = ssl3_keys->pReturnedKeyMaterial; + ssl3_keys_out->hClientMacSecret = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + ssl3_keys_out->hServerMacSecret = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + + /* + * How much key material do we need? + */ + macSize = ssl3_keys->ulMacSizeInBits/8; + effKeySize = ssl3_keys->ulKeySizeInBits/8; + IVSize = ssl3_keys->ulIVSizeInBits/8; + if (keySize == 0) { + effKeySize = keySize; + } + block_needed = 2 * (macSize + effKeySize + + ((!ssl3_keys->bIsExport) * IVSize)); + PORT_Assert(block_needed <= sizeof key_block); + if (block_needed > sizeof key_block) + block_needed = sizeof key_block; + + /* + * generate the key material: This looks amazingly similar to the + * PMS code, and is clearly crying out for a function to provide it. + */ + if (isTLS) { + SECStatus status; + SECItem srcr = { siBuffer, srcrdata, sizeof srcrdata }; + SECItem keyblk = { siBuffer, key_block }; + SECItem master = { siBuffer }; + + keyblk.len = block_needed; + master.data = (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue; + master.len = att->attrib.ulValueLen; + + status = TLS_PRF(&master, "key expansion", &srcr, &keyblk, + isFIPS); + if (status != SECSuccess) { + goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; + } + } else { + unsigned int block_bytes = 0; + /* key_block = + * MD5(master_secret + SHA('A' + master_secret + + * ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)) + + * MD5(master_secret + SHA('BB' + master_secret + + * ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)) + + * MD5(master_secret + SHA('CCC' + master_secret + + * ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)) + + * [...]; + */ + for (i = 0; i < NUM_MIXERS && block_bytes < block_needed; i++) { + SHA1_Begin(sha); + SHA1_Update(sha, (unsigned char*) mixers[i], strlen(mixers[i])); + SHA1_Update(sha, (const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, + att->attrib.ulValueLen); + SHA1_Update(sha, srcrdata, sizeof srcrdata); + SHA1_End(sha, sha_out, &outLen, SHA1_LENGTH); + PORT_Assert(outLen == SHA1_LENGTH); + MD5_Begin(md5); + MD5_Update(md5, (const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, + att->attrib.ulValueLen); + MD5_Update(md5, sha_out, outLen); + MD5_End(md5, &key_block[i*MD5_LENGTH], &outLen, MD5_LENGTH); + PORT_Assert(outLen == MD5_LENGTH); + block_bytes += outLen; + } + } + + /* + * Put the key material where it goes. + */ + i = 0; /* now shows how much consumed */ + + /* + * The key_block is partitioned as follows: + * client_write_MAC_secret[CipherSpec.hash_size] + */ + crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_TRUE,&key_block[i],macSize, + &ssl3_keys_out->hClientMacSecret); + if (crv != CKR_OK) + goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; + + i += macSize; + + /* + * server_write_MAC_secret[CipherSpec.hash_size] + */ + crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_TRUE,&key_block[i],macSize, + &ssl3_keys_out->hServerMacSecret); + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; + } + i += macSize; + + if (keySize) { + if (!ssl3_keys->bIsExport) { + /* + ** Generate Domestic write keys and IVs. + ** client_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material] + */ + crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_FALSE,&key_block[i], + keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey); + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; + } + i += keySize; + + /* + ** server_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material] + */ + crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_FALSE,&key_block[i], + keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey); + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; + } + i += keySize; + + /* + ** client_write_IV[CipherSpec.IV_size] + */ + if (IVSize > 0) { + PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVClient, + &key_block[i], IVSize); + i += IVSize; + } + + /* + ** server_write_IV[CipherSpec.IV_size] + */ + if (IVSize > 0) { + PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVServer, + &key_block[i], IVSize); + i += IVSize; + } + PORT_Assert(i <= sizeof key_block); + + } else if (!isTLS) { + + /* + ** Generate SSL3 Export write keys and IVs. + ** client_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material] + ** final_client_write_key = MD5(client_write_key + + ** ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random); + */ + MD5_Begin(md5); + MD5_Update(md5, &key_block[i], effKeySize); + MD5_Update(md5, crsrdata, sizeof crsrdata); + MD5_End(md5, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH); + i += effKeySize; + crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_FALSE,key_block2, + keySize,&ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey); + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; + } + + /* + ** server_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material] + ** final_server_write_key = MD5(server_write_key + + ** ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random); + */ + MD5_Begin(md5); + MD5_Update(md5, &key_block[i], effKeySize); + MD5_Update(md5, srcrdata, sizeof srcrdata); + MD5_End(md5, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH); + i += effKeySize; + crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_FALSE,key_block2, + keySize,&ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey); + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; + } + + /* + ** client_write_IV = + ** MD5(ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random); + */ + MD5_Begin(md5); + MD5_Update(md5, crsrdata, sizeof crsrdata); + MD5_End(md5, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH); + PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVClient, key_block2, IVSize); + + /* + ** server_write_IV = + ** MD5(ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random); + */ + MD5_Begin(md5); + MD5_Update(md5, srcrdata, sizeof srcrdata); + MD5_End(md5, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH); + PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVServer, key_block2, IVSize); + + } else { + + /* + ** Generate TLS Export write keys and IVs. + */ + SECStatus status; + SECItem secret = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SECItem crsr = { siBuffer, crsrdata, sizeof crsrdata }; + SECItem keyblk = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + + /* + ** client_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material] + ** final_client_write_key = PRF(client_write_key, + ** "client write key", + ** client_random + server_random); + */ + secret.data = &key_block[i]; + secret.len = effKeySize; + i += effKeySize; + keyblk.data = key_block2; + keyblk.len = sizeof key_block2; + status = TLS_PRF(&secret, "client write key", &crsr, &keyblk, + isFIPS); + if (status != SECSuccess) { + goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; + } + crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession, key, PR_FALSE, key_block2, + keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey); + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; + } + + /* + ** server_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material] + ** final_server_write_key = PRF(server_write_key, + ** "server write key", + ** client_random + server_random); + */ + secret.data = &key_block[i]; + secret.len = effKeySize; + i += effKeySize; + keyblk.data = key_block2; + keyblk.len = sizeof key_block2; + status = TLS_PRF(&secret, "server write key", &crsr, &keyblk, + isFIPS); + if (status != SECSuccess) { + goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; + } + crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession, key, PR_FALSE, key_block2, + keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey); + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; + } + + /* + ** iv_block = PRF("", "IV block", + ** client_random + server_random); + ** client_write_IV[SecurityParameters.IV_size] + ** server_write_IV[SecurityParameters.IV_size] + */ + if (IVSize) { + secret.data = NULL; + secret.len = 0; + keyblk.data = &key_block[i]; + keyblk.len = 2 * IVSize; + status = TLS_PRF(&secret, "IV block", &crsr, &keyblk, + isFIPS); + if (status != SECSuccess) { + goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; + } + PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVClient, keyblk.data, IVSize); + PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVServer, keyblk.data + IVSize, IVSize); - } - } - } + } + } + } - crv = CKR_OK; + crv = CKR_OK; - if (0) { + if (0) { key_and_mac_derive_fail: - if (crv == CKR_OK) - crv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED; - sftk_freeSSLKeys(hSession, ssl3_keys_out); - } - MD5_DestroyContext(md5, PR_TRUE); - SHA1_DestroyContext(sha, PR_TRUE); - sftk_FreeObject(key); - key = NULL; - break; + if (crv == CKR_OK) + crv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED; + sftk_freeSSLKeys(hSession, ssl3_keys_out); + } + MD5_DestroyContext(md5, PR_TRUE); + SHA1_DestroyContext(sha, PR_TRUE); + sftk_FreeObject(key); + key = NULL; + break; } case CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY: { - SFTKObject *newKey; + SFTKObject *newKey; - crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; + crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key); + if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); - if (session == NULL) { + session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); + if (session == NULL) { crv = CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; - break; - } + break; + } - newKey = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(*(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *) - pMechanism->pParameter,session); - sftk_FreeSession(session); - if ( newKey == NULL) { + newKey = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(*(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *) + pMechanism->pParameter,session); + sftk_FreeSession(session); + if ( newKey == NULL) { crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; - break; - } + break; + } - if (sftk_isTrue(newKey,CKA_SENSITIVE)) { - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(newKey,CKA_SENSITIVE,&cktrue, - sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeObject(newKey); - break; - } - } - - att2 = sftk_FindAttribute(newKey,CKA_VALUE); - if (att2 == NULL) { - sftk_FreeObject(newKey); + if (sftk_isTrue(newKey,CKA_SENSITIVE)) { + crv = sftk_forceAttribute(newKey,CKA_SENSITIVE,&cktrue, + sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + sftk_FreeObject(newKey); + break; + } + } + + att2 = sftk_FindAttribute(newKey,CKA_VALUE); + if (att2 == NULL) { + sftk_FreeObject(newKey); crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; - break; - } - tmpKeySize = att->attrib.ulValueLen+att2->attrib.ulValueLen; - if (keySize == 0) keySize = tmpKeySize; - if (keySize > tmpKeySize) { - sftk_FreeObject(newKey); - sftk_FreeAttribute(att2); - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(tmpKeySize); - if (buf == NULL) { - sftk_FreeAttribute(att2); - sftk_FreeObject(newKey); - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - - PORT_Memcpy(buf,att->attrib.pValue,att->attrib.ulValueLen); - PORT_Memcpy(buf+att->attrib.ulValueLen, - att2->attrib.pValue,att2->attrib.ulValueLen); - - crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize); - PORT_ZFree(buf,tmpKeySize); - sftk_FreeAttribute(att2); - sftk_FreeObject(newKey); - break; + break; + } + tmpKeySize = att->attrib.ulValueLen+att2->attrib.ulValueLen; + if (keySize == 0) keySize = tmpKeySize; + if (keySize > tmpKeySize) { + sftk_FreeObject(newKey); + sftk_FreeAttribute(att2); + crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; + break; + } + buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(tmpKeySize); + if (buf == NULL) { + sftk_FreeAttribute(att2); + sftk_FreeObject(newKey); + crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + break; + } + + PORT_Memcpy(buf,att->attrib.pValue,att->attrib.ulValueLen); + PORT_Memcpy(buf+att->attrib.ulValueLen, + att2->attrib.pValue,att2->attrib.ulValueLen); + + crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize); + PORT_ZFree(buf,tmpKeySize); + sftk_FreeAttribute(att2); + sftk_FreeObject(newKey); + break; } case CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA: - crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; + crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key); + if (crv != CKR_OK) break; + + stringPtr = (CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *) pMechanism->pParameter; + tmpKeySize = att->attrib.ulValueLen+stringPtr->ulLen; + if (keySize == 0) keySize = tmpKeySize; + if (keySize > tmpKeySize) { + crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; + break; + } + buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(tmpKeySize); + if (buf == NULL) { + crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + break; + } - stringPtr = (CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *) pMechanism->pParameter; - tmpKeySize = att->attrib.ulValueLen+stringPtr->ulLen; - if (keySize == 0) keySize = tmpKeySize; - if (keySize > tmpKeySize) { - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(tmpKeySize); - if (buf == NULL) { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - - PORT_Memcpy(buf,att->attrib.pValue,att->attrib.ulValueLen); - PORT_Memcpy(buf+att->attrib.ulValueLen,stringPtr->pData, - stringPtr->ulLen); - - crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize); - PORT_ZFree(buf,tmpKeySize); - break; + PORT_Memcpy(buf,att->attrib.pValue,att->attrib.ulValueLen); + PORT_Memcpy(buf+att->attrib.ulValueLen,stringPtr->pData, + stringPtr->ulLen); + + crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize); + PORT_ZFree(buf,tmpKeySize); + break; case CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: - crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; + crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key); + if (crv != CKR_OK) break; + + stringPtr = (CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *)pMechanism->pParameter; + tmpKeySize = att->attrib.ulValueLen+stringPtr->ulLen; + if (keySize == 0) keySize = tmpKeySize; + if (keySize > tmpKeySize) { + crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; + break; + } + buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(tmpKeySize); + if (buf == NULL) { + crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + break; + } - stringPtr = (CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *)pMechanism->pParameter; - tmpKeySize = att->attrib.ulValueLen+stringPtr->ulLen; - if (keySize == 0) keySize = tmpKeySize; - if (keySize > tmpKeySize) { - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(tmpKeySize); - if (buf == NULL) { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - - PORT_Memcpy(buf,stringPtr->pData,stringPtr->ulLen); - PORT_Memcpy(buf+stringPtr->ulLen,att->attrib.pValue, - att->attrib.ulValueLen); - - crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize); - PORT_ZFree(buf,tmpKeySize); - break; + PORT_Memcpy(buf,stringPtr->pData,stringPtr->ulLen); + PORT_Memcpy(buf+stringPtr->ulLen,att->attrib.pValue, + att->attrib.ulValueLen); + + crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize); + PORT_ZFree(buf,tmpKeySize); + break; case CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: - crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; + crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key); + if (crv != CKR_OK) break; + + stringPtr = (CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *)pMechanism->pParameter; + tmpKeySize = PR_MIN(att->attrib.ulValueLen,stringPtr->ulLen); + if (keySize == 0) keySize = tmpKeySize; + if (keySize > tmpKeySize) { + crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; + break; + } + buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(keySize); + if (buf == NULL) { + crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + break; + } - stringPtr = (CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *)pMechanism->pParameter; - tmpKeySize = PR_MIN(att->attrib.ulValueLen,stringPtr->ulLen); - if (keySize == 0) keySize = tmpKeySize; - if (keySize > tmpKeySize) { - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(keySize); - if (buf == NULL) { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - - - PORT_Memcpy(buf,att->attrib.pValue,keySize); - for (i=0; i < (int)keySize; i++) { - buf[i] ^= stringPtr->pData[i]; - } - - crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize); - PORT_ZFree(buf,keySize); - break; + + PORT_Memcpy(buf,att->attrib.pValue,keySize); + for (i=0; i < (int)keySize; i++) { + buf[i] ^= stringPtr->pData[i]; + } + + crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize); + PORT_ZFree(buf,keySize); + break; case CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: { - /* the following assumes 8 bits per byte */ - CK_ULONG extract = *(CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter; - CK_ULONG shift = extract & 0x7; /* extract mod 8 the fast way */ - CK_ULONG offset = extract >> 3; /* extract div 8 the fast way */ - - crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - - if (keySize == 0) { - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; - break; - } - /* make sure we have enough bits in the original key */ - if (att->attrib.ulValueLen < - (offset + keySize + ((shift != 0)? 1 :0)) ) { - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; - break; - } - buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(keySize); - if (buf == NULL) { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - - /* copy the bits we need into the new key */ - for (i=0; i < (int)keySize; i++) { - unsigned char *value = - ((unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue)+offset+i; - if (shift) { - buf[i] = (value[0] << (shift)) | (value[1] >> (8 - shift)); - } else { - buf[i] = value[0]; - } - } - - crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize); - PORT_ZFree(buf,keySize); - break; + /* the following assumes 8 bits per byte */ + CK_ULONG extract = *(CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter; + CK_ULONG shift = extract & 0x7; /* extract mod 8 the fast way */ + CK_ULONG offset = extract >> 3; /* extract div 8 the fast way */ + + crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key); + if (crv != CKR_OK) break; + + if (keySize == 0) { + crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; + break; + } + /* make sure we have enough bits in the original key */ + if (att->attrib.ulValueLen < + (offset + keySize + ((shift != 0)? 1 :0)) ) { + crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; + break; + } + buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(keySize); + if (buf == NULL) { + crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + break; + } + + /* copy the bits we need into the new key */ + for (i=0; i < (int)keySize; i++) { + unsigned char *value = + ((unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue)+offset+i; + if (shift) { + buf[i] = (value[0] << (shift)) | (value[1] >> (8 - shift)); + } else { + buf[i] = value[0]; + } + } + + crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize); + PORT_ZFree(buf,keySize); + break; } case CKM_MD2_KEY_DERIVATION: - if (keySize == 0) keySize = MD2_LENGTH; - if (keySize > MD2_LENGTH) { - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - /* now allocate the hash contexts */ - md2 = MD2_NewContext(); - if (md2 == NULL) { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - MD2_Begin(md2); - MD2_Update(md2,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, - att->attrib.ulValueLen); - MD2_End(md2,key_block,&outLen,MD2_LENGTH); - MD2_DestroyContext(md2, PR_TRUE); + if (keySize == 0) keySize = MD2_LENGTH; + if (keySize > MD2_LENGTH) { + crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; + break; + } + /* now allocate the hash contexts */ + md2 = MD2_NewContext(); + if (md2 == NULL) { + crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + break; + } + MD2_Begin(md2); + MD2_Update(md2,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, + att->attrib.ulValueLen); + MD2_End(md2,key_block,&outLen,MD2_LENGTH); + MD2_DestroyContext(md2, PR_TRUE); - crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize); - break; + crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize); + break; case CKM_MD5_KEY_DERIVATION: - if (keySize == 0) keySize = MD5_LENGTH; - if (keySize > MD5_LENGTH) { - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - /* now allocate the hash contexts */ - md5 = MD5_NewContext(); - if (md5 == NULL) { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - MD5_Begin(md5); - MD5_Update(md5,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, - att->attrib.ulValueLen); - MD5_End(md5,key_block,&outLen,MD5_LENGTH); - MD5_DestroyContext(md5, PR_TRUE); + if (keySize == 0) keySize = MD5_LENGTH; + if (keySize > MD5_LENGTH) { + crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; + break; + } + /* now allocate the hash contexts */ + md5 = MD5_NewContext(); + if (md5 == NULL) { + crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + break; + } + MD5_Begin(md5); + MD5_Update(md5,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, + att->attrib.ulValueLen); + MD5_End(md5,key_block,&outLen,MD5_LENGTH); + MD5_DestroyContext(md5, PR_TRUE); - crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize); - break; + crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize); + break; case CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION: - if (keySize == 0) keySize = SHA1_LENGTH; - if (keySize > SHA1_LENGTH) { - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - /* now allocate the hash contexts */ - sha = SHA1_NewContext(); - if (sha == NULL) { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - SHA1_Begin(sha); - SHA1_Update(sha,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, - att->attrib.ulValueLen); - SHA1_End(sha,key_block,&outLen,SHA1_LENGTH); - SHA1_DestroyContext(sha, PR_TRUE); + if (keySize == 0) keySize = SHA1_LENGTH; + if (keySize > SHA1_LENGTH) { + crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; + break; + } + /* now allocate the hash contexts */ + sha = SHA1_NewContext(); + if (sha == NULL) { + crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + break; + } + SHA1_Begin(sha); + SHA1_Update(sha,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, + att->attrib.ulValueLen); + SHA1_End(sha,key_block,&outLen,SHA1_LENGTH); + SHA1_DestroyContext(sha, PR_TRUE); - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize); - break; + crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize); + break; case CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE: { - SECItem derived, dhPublic; - SECItem dhPrime, dhValue; - /* sourceKey - values for the local existing low key */ - /* get prime and value attributes */ - crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhPrime, sourceKey, CKA_PRIME); - if (crv != SECSuccess) break; - crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhValue, sourceKey, CKA_VALUE); - if (crv != SECSuccess) { - PORT_Free(dhPrime.data); - break; - } + SECItem derived, dhPublic; + SECItem dhPrime, dhValue; + /* sourceKey - values for the local existing low key */ + /* get prime and value attributes */ + crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhPrime, sourceKey, CKA_PRIME); + if (crv != SECSuccess) break; + crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhValue, sourceKey, CKA_VALUE); + if (crv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_Free(dhPrime.data); + break; + } - dhPublic.data = pMechanism->pParameter; - dhPublic.len = pMechanism->ulParameterLen; + dhPublic.data = pMechanism->pParameter; + dhPublic.len = pMechanism->ulParameterLen; - /* calculate private value - oct */ - rv = DH_Derive(&dhPublic, &dhPrime, &dhValue, &derived, keySize); + /* calculate private value - oct */ + rv = DH_Derive(&dhPublic, &dhPrime, &dhValue, &derived, keySize); - PORT_Free(dhPrime.data); - PORT_Free(dhValue.data); + PORT_Free(dhPrime.data); + PORT_Free(dhValue.data); - if (rv == SECSuccess) { - sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, derived.data, derived.len); - PORT_ZFree(derived.data, derived.len); - } else - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - - break; + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, derived.data, derived.len); + PORT_ZFree(derived.data, derived.len); + } else + crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + + break; } #ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC case CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE: case CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE: { - SECItem ecScalar, ecPoint; - SECItem tmp; - PRBool withCofactor = PR_FALSE; - unsigned char secret_hash[20]; - unsigned char *secret; - unsigned char *keyData = NULL; - int secretlen; - CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS *mechParams; - NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *privKey; - - /* Check mechanism parameters */ - mechParams = (CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS *) pMechanism->pParameter; - if ((pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS)) || - ((mechParams->kdf == CKD_NULL) && - ((mechParams->ulSharedDataLen != 0) || - (mechParams->pSharedData != NULL)))) { - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; - break; - } - - privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(sourceKey, CKK_EC, &crv); - if (privKey == NULL) { - break; - } - - /* Now we are working with a non-NULL private key */ - SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ecScalar, &privKey->u.ec.privateValue); - - ecPoint.data = mechParams->pPublicData; - ecPoint.len = mechParams->ulPublicDataLen; - - if (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE) { - withCofactor = PR_TRUE; - } else { - /* When not using cofactor derivation, one should - * validate the public key to avoid small subgroup - * attacks. - */ - if (EC_ValidatePublicKey(&privKey->u.ec.ecParams, &ecPoint) - != SECSuccess) { - crv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; - PORT_Free(ecScalar.data); - if (privKey != sourceKey->objectInfo) - nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey); - break; - } - } - - rv = ECDH_Derive(&ecPoint, &privKey->u.ec.ecParams, &ecScalar, - withCofactor, &tmp); - PORT_Free(ecScalar.data); - if (privKey != sourceKey->objectInfo) - nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey); - - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - crv = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; - break; - } - - /* - * tmp is the raw data created by ECDH_Derive, - * secret and secretlen are the values we will eventually pass as our - * generated key. - */ - secret = tmp.data; - secretlen = tmp.len; - - /* - * apply the kdf function. - */ - if (mechParams->kdf == CKD_SHA1_KDF) { - /* Compute SHA1 hash */ - PORT_Memset(secret_hash, 0, 20); - rv = SHA1_HashBuf(secret_hash, tmp.data, tmp.len); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len); - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - secret = secret_hash; - secretlen = 20; - } - - /* - * if keySize is supplied, then we are generating a key of a specific - * length. This is done by taking the least significant 'keySize' - * bytes from the unsigned value calculated by ECDH. Note: this may - * mean padding temp with extra leading zeros from what ECDH_Derive - * already returned (which itself may contain leading zeros). - */ - if (keySize) { - if (secretlen < keySize) { - keyData = PORT_ZAlloc(keySize); - if (!keyData) { - PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len); - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - PORT_Memcpy(&keyData[keySize-secretlen],secret,secretlen); - secret = keyData; - } else { - secret += (secretlen - keySize); - } - secretlen = keySize; - } - - sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, secret, secretlen); - PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len); - if (keyData) { - PORT_ZFree(keyData, keySize); - } - PORT_Memset(secret_hash, 0, 20); - - break; + SECItem ecScalar, ecPoint; + SECItem tmp; + PRBool withCofactor = PR_FALSE; + unsigned char secret_hash[20]; + unsigned char *secret; + unsigned char *keyData = NULL; + int secretlen; + CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS *mechParams; + NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *privKey; + + /* Check mechanism parameters */ + mechParams = (CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS *) pMechanism->pParameter; + if ((pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS)) || + ((mechParams->kdf == CKD_NULL) && + ((mechParams->ulSharedDataLen != 0) || + (mechParams->pSharedData != NULL)))) { + crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; + break; + } + + privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(sourceKey, CKK_EC, &crv); + if (privKey == NULL) { + break; + } + + /* Now we are working with a non-NULL private key */ + SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ecScalar, &privKey->u.ec.privateValue); + + ecPoint.data = mechParams->pPublicData; + ecPoint.len = mechParams->ulPublicDataLen; + + if (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE) { + withCofactor = PR_TRUE; + } else { + /* When not using cofactor derivation, one should + * validate the public key to avoid small subgroup + * attacks. + */ + if (EC_ValidatePublicKey(&privKey->u.ec.ecParams, &ecPoint) + != SECSuccess) { + crv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; + PORT_Free(ecScalar.data); + if (privKey != sourceKey->objectInfo) + nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey); + break; + } + } + + rv = ECDH_Derive(&ecPoint, &privKey->u.ec.ecParams, &ecScalar, + withCofactor, &tmp); + PORT_Free(ecScalar.data); + if (privKey != sourceKey->objectInfo) + nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey); + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + crv = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; + break; + } + + /* + * tmp is the raw data created by ECDH_Derive, + * secret and secretlen are the values we will eventually pass as our + * generated key. + */ + secret = tmp.data; + secretlen = tmp.len; + + /* + * apply the kdf function. + */ + if (mechParams->kdf == CKD_SHA1_KDF) { + /* Compute SHA1 hash */ + PORT_Memset(secret_hash, 0, 20); + rv = SHA1_HashBuf(secret_hash, tmp.data, tmp.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len); + crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + break; + } + secret = secret_hash; + secretlen = 20; + } + + /* + * if keySize is supplied, then we are generating a key of a specific + * length. This is done by taking the least significant 'keySize' + * bytes from the unsigned value calculated by ECDH. Note: this may + * mean padding temp with extra leading zeros from what ECDH_Derive + * already returned (which itself may contain leading zeros). + */ + if (keySize) { + if (secretlen < keySize) { + keyData = PORT_ZAlloc(keySize); + if (!keyData) { + PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len); + crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + break; + } + PORT_Memcpy(&keyData[keySize-secretlen],secret,secretlen); + secret = keyData; + } else { + secret += (secretlen - keySize); + } + secretlen = keySize; + } + + sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, secret, secretlen); + PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len); + if (keyData) { + PORT_ZFree(keyData, keySize); + } + PORT_Memset(secret_hash, 0, 20); + + break; } #endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ default: - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; + crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; } sftk_FreeAttribute(att); sftk_FreeObject(sourceKey); if (crv != CKR_OK) { - if (key) sftk_FreeObject(key); - return crv; + if (key) sftk_FreeObject(key); + return crv; } /* link the key object into the list */ if (key) { - SFTKSessionObject *sessKey = sftk_narrowToSessionObject(key); - PORT_Assert(sessKey); - /* get the session */ - sessKey->wasDerived = PR_TRUE; - session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); - if (session == NULL) { - sftk_FreeObject(key); - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - } - - crv = sftk_handleObject(key,session); - sftk_FreeSession(session); - *phKey = key->handle; - sftk_FreeObject(key); + SFTKSessionObject *sessKey = sftk_narrowToSessionObject(key); + PORT_Assert(sessKey); + /* get the session */ + sessKey->wasDerived = PR_TRUE; + session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); + if (session == NULL) { + sftk_FreeObject(key); + return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + } + + crv = sftk_handleObject(key,session); + sftk_FreeSession(session); + *phKey = key->handle; + sftk_FreeObject(key); } return crv; } /* NSC_GetFunctionStatus obtains an updated status of a function running * in parallel with an application. */ CK_RV NSC_GetFunctionStatus(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession) { return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL; @@ -5634,177 +5635,177 @@ CK_RV NSC_CancelFunction(CK_SESSION_HAND { return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL; } /* NSC_GetOperationState saves the state of the cryptographic *operation in a session. * NOTE: This code only works for digest functions for now. eventually need * to add full flatten/resurect to our state stuff so that all types of state * can be saved */ CK_RV NSC_GetOperationState(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, CK_ULONG_PTR pulOperationStateLen) + CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, CK_ULONG_PTR pulOperationStateLen) { SFTKSessionContext *context; SFTKSession *session; CK_RV crv; CK_ULONG pOSLen = *pulOperationStateLen; /* make sure we're legal */ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_HASH, PR_TRUE, &session); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; *pulOperationStateLen = context->cipherInfoLen + sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE) - + sizeof(SFTKContextType); + + sizeof(SFTKContextType); if (pOperationState == NULL) { sftk_FreeSession(session); - return CKR_OK; + return CKR_OK; } else { - if (pOSLen < *pulOperationStateLen) { - return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; - } + if (pOSLen < *pulOperationStateLen) { + return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } } PORT_Memcpy(pOperationState,&context->type,sizeof(SFTKContextType)); pOperationState += sizeof(SFTKContextType); PORT_Memcpy(pOperationState,&context->currentMech, - sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)); + sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)); pOperationState += sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE); PORT_Memcpy(pOperationState,context->cipherInfo,context->cipherInfoLen); sftk_FreeSession(session); return CKR_OK; } #define sftk_Decrement(stateSize,len) \ - stateSize = ((stateSize) > (CK_ULONG)(len)) ? \ - ((stateSize) - (CK_ULONG)(len)) : 0; + stateSize = ((stateSize) > (CK_ULONG)(len)) ? \ + ((stateSize) - (CK_ULONG)(len)) : 0; /* NSC_SetOperationState restores the state of the cryptographic * operation in a session. This is coded like it can restore lots of * states, but it only works for truly flat cipher structures. */ CK_RV NSC_SetOperationState(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, CK_ULONG ulOperationStateLen, - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hEncryptionKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hAuthenticationKey) + CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, CK_ULONG ulOperationStateLen, + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hEncryptionKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hAuthenticationKey) { SFTKSessionContext *context; SFTKSession *session; SFTKContextType type; CK_MECHANISM mech; CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; while (ulOperationStateLen != 0) { - /* get what type of state we're dealing with... */ - PORT_Memcpy(&type,pOperationState, sizeof(SFTKContextType)); + /* get what type of state we're dealing with... */ + PORT_Memcpy(&type,pOperationState, sizeof(SFTKContextType)); + + /* fix up session contexts based on type */ + session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); + if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; + context = sftk_ReturnContextByType(session, type); + sftk_SetContextByType(session, type, NULL); + if (context) { + sftk_FreeContext(context); + } + pOperationState += sizeof(SFTKContextType); + sftk_Decrement(ulOperationStateLen,sizeof(SFTKContextType)); + - /* fix up session contexts based on type */ - session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); - if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; - context = sftk_ReturnContextByType(session, type); - sftk_SetContextByType(session, type, NULL); - if (context) { - sftk_FreeContext(context); - } - pOperationState += sizeof(SFTKContextType); - sftk_Decrement(ulOperationStateLen,sizeof(SFTKContextType)); - - - /* get the mechanism structure */ - PORT_Memcpy(&mech.mechanism,pOperationState,sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)); - pOperationState += sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE); - sftk_Decrement(ulOperationStateLen, sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)); - /* should be filled in... but not necessary for hash */ - mech.pParameter = NULL; - mech.ulParameterLen = 0; - switch (type) { - case SFTK_HASH: - crv = NSC_DigestInit(hSession,&mech); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_HASH, PR_TRUE, - NULL); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - PORT_Memcpy(context->cipherInfo,pOperationState, - context->cipherInfoLen); - pOperationState += context->cipherInfoLen; - sftk_Decrement(ulOperationStateLen,context->cipherInfoLen); - break; - default: - /* do sign/encrypt/decrypt later */ - crv = CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID; + /* get the mechanism structure */ + PORT_Memcpy(&mech.mechanism,pOperationState,sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)); + pOperationState += sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE); + sftk_Decrement(ulOperationStateLen, sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)); + /* should be filled in... but not necessary for hash */ + mech.pParameter = NULL; + mech.ulParameterLen = 0; + switch (type) { + case SFTK_HASH: + crv = NSC_DigestInit(hSession,&mech); + if (crv != CKR_OK) break; + crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_HASH, PR_TRUE, + NULL); + if (crv != CKR_OK) break; + PORT_Memcpy(context->cipherInfo,pOperationState, + context->cipherInfoLen); + pOperationState += context->cipherInfoLen; + sftk_Decrement(ulOperationStateLen,context->cipherInfoLen); + break; + default: + /* do sign/encrypt/decrypt later */ + crv = CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID; } sftk_FreeSession(session); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; + if (crv != CKR_OK) break; } return crv; } /* Dual-function cryptographic operations */ /* NSC_DigestEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part digesting and encryption * operation. */ CK_RV NSC_DigestEncryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, - CK_ULONG ulPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, - CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen) + CK_ULONG ulPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, + CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen) { CK_RV crv; - crv = NSC_EncryptUpdate(hSession,pPart,ulPartLen, pEncryptedPart, - pulEncryptedPartLen); + crv = NSC_EncryptUpdate(hSession,pPart,ulPartLen, pEncryptedPart, + pulEncryptedPartLen); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; crv = NSC_DigestUpdate(hSession,pPart,ulPartLen); return crv; } /* NSC_DecryptDigestUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and * digesting operation. */ CK_RV NSC_DecryptDigestUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, - CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen) + CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, + CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen) { CK_RV crv; crv = NSC_DecryptUpdate(hSession,pEncryptedPart, ulEncryptedPartLen, - pPart, pulPartLen); + pPart, pulPartLen); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; crv = NSC_DigestUpdate(hSession,pPart,*pulPartLen); return crv; } /* NSC_SignEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part signing and * encryption operation. */ CK_RV NSC_SignEncryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, - CK_ULONG ulPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, - CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen) + CK_ULONG ulPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, + CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen) { CK_RV crv; - crv = NSC_EncryptUpdate(hSession,pPart,ulPartLen, pEncryptedPart, - pulEncryptedPartLen); + crv = NSC_EncryptUpdate(hSession,pPart,ulPartLen, pEncryptedPart, + pulEncryptedPartLen); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; crv = NSC_SignUpdate(hSession,pPart,ulPartLen); return crv; } /* NSC_DecryptVerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption * and verify operation. */ CK_RV NSC_DecryptVerifyUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen, - CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen) + CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen, + CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen) { CK_RV crv; crv = NSC_DecryptUpdate(hSession,pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen, - pData, pulDataLen); + pData, pulDataLen); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; crv = NSC_VerifyUpdate(hSession, pData, *pulDataLen); return crv; } /* NSC_DigestKey continues a multi-part message-digesting operation, * by digesting the value of a secret key as part of the data already digested. */ CK_RV NSC_DigestKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) @@ -5818,22 +5819,22 @@ CK_RV NSC_DigestKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; key = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hKey,session); sftk_FreeSession(session); if (key == NULL) return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; /* PUT ANY DIGEST KEY RESTRICTION CHECKS HERE */ /* make sure it's a valid key for this operation */ if (key->objclass != CKO_SECRET_KEY) { - sftk_FreeObject(key); - return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; + sftk_FreeObject(key); + return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; } /* get the key value */ att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); sftk_FreeObject(key); crv = NSC_DigestUpdate(hSession,(CK_BYTE_PTR)att->attrib.pValue, - att->attrib.ulValueLen); + att->attrib.ulValueLen); sftk_FreeAttribute(att); return crv; }